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Thank you for the survey results - these are genuinely fascinating. I acknowledge that you weren't arguing that my view is incorrect, only that it's not a given

Thank you for the survey results - these are genuinely fascinating. I acknowledge that you weren't arguing that my view is incorrect, only that it's not a given, and I was debating a point that you weren't making. I buy your argument and agree that most people, if asked, would probably give an answer more closely aligned with moral realism than not. What's the case for moral realism that makes it so compelling? On a separate note, I take issue with the suggestion that an individual identifying with a major religion qualifies as adherence to its principles. This is nitpicking and doesn't impact the larger point you're making, but I think it's an important distinction in general.

antidesitter 8y ago
> I take issue with the suggestion that an individual identifying with a major religion qualifies as adherence to its principles. I agree that this an important distinction, but a person identifying with a major religion is a strong prima facie reason for thinking they're moral realists. Keep in mind that believing there are some moral facts is a much, much weaker position than believing all or even most moral claims of their religion are true. > What's the case for moral realism that makes it so compelling? My personal favorite are Moorean arguments of the form: (1) Torturing people for fun is morally wrong. (2) If there's at least one moral fact, then moral realism is true. (3) Therefore, moral realism is true. You can replace (1) with your favorite moral fact, such as (1) The Nanjing massacre [1] was morally wrong. (1) The torture and murder of Kelly Anne Bates [2] was morally wrong. (1) The torture and murder of Unit 731 victims [3] was morally wrong. and have the argument go through. The key point is that, as far as I know, there's no argument against moral realism whose premises are all more plausible than (1). Another class of arguments are so-called partners in crime arguments [4][5][6], which link moral reasoning with prudential and epistemic reasoning. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nanjing_Massacre#Massacre https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nanjing_Massacre#Massacre [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murder_of_Kelly_Anne_Bates#Murder https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murder_of_Kelly_Anne_Bates#Mur... [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unit_731#Activities https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unit_731#Activities [4] https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00048400802636445 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/000484008026364... [5] https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00048402.2016.1178313 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00048402.2016.1... [6] https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00048402.2017.1386693 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00048402.2017.1...
- longerthoughts 8y ago
  The trouble I have with that line of reasoning is that while I believe torturing people for fun is morally wrong (along with all proposed substitutes for (1)), that only proves that I believe that, not that it is a physical reality in the absence of our perception of morals. To be fair, I think the burden of proof for arguing that objective morals exist is incredibly high and I can't think of anything that could reasonably prove it. I'm reading up on partners in crime arguments - looks like there's an incredible wealth of related debate to peruse.
  - antidesitter 8y ago
    Hope you find this material useful. The way I look at it is the other way around: The burden of proof lies squarely on the person who denies such an obvious proposition as (1). The same is true for similarly obvious propositions like "there is an external world which I can learn about through my senses" and "inductive reasoning is a valid way of attaining knowledge", which underpin the scientific enterprise and, moreover, any basis for critiquing (1) itself. One way to capture this is through the principle of phenomenal conservatism [1][2][3] as formulated by philosopher Michael Huemer. He has also written a book on the subject called Ethical Intuitionism. [1] https://philpapers.org/rec/HUEPCA https://philpapers.org/rec/HUEPCA [2] https://philpapers.org/rec/HUECPC https://philpapers.org/rec/HUECPC [3] https://www.iep.utm.edu/phen-con/ https://www.iep.utm.edu/phen-con/

antidesitter 8y ago

> I take issue with the suggestion that an individual identifying with a major religion qualifies as adherence to its principles. I agree that this an important distinction, but a person identifying with a major religion is a strong prima facie reason for thinking they're moral realists. Keep in mind that believing there are some moral facts is a much, much weaker position than believing all or even most moral claims of their religion are true. > What's the case for moral realism that makes it so compelling? My personal favorite are Moorean arguments of the form: (1) Torturing people for fun is morally wrong. (2) If there's at least one moral fact, then moral realism is true. (3) Therefore, moral realism is true. You can replace (1) with your favorite moral fact, such as (1) The Nanjing massacre [1] was morally wrong. (1) The torture and murder of Kelly Anne Bates [2] was morally wrong. (1) The torture and murder of Unit 731 victims [3] was morally wrong. and have the argument go through. The key point is that, as far as I know, there's no argument against moral realism whose premises are all more plausible than (1). Another class of arguments are so-called partners in crime arguments [4][5][6], which link moral reasoning with prudential and epistemic reasoning. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nanjing_Massacre#Massacre https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nanjing_Massacre#Massacre [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murder_of_Kelly_Anne_Bates#Murder https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murder_of_Kelly_Anne_Bates#Mur... [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unit_731#Activities https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unit_731#Activities [4] https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00048400802636445 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/000484008026364... [5] https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00048402.2016.1178313 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00048402.2016.1... [6] https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00048402.2017.1386693 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00048402.2017.1...

longerthoughts 8y ago
The trouble I have with that line of reasoning is that while I believe torturing people for fun is morally wrong (along with all proposed substitutes for (1)), that only proves that I believe that, not that it is a physical reality in the absence of our perception of morals. To be fair, I think the burden of proof for arguing that objective morals exist is incredibly high and I can't think of anything that could reasonably prove it. I'm reading up on partners in crime arguments - looks like there's an incredible wealth of related debate to peruse.
- antidesitter 8y ago
  Hope you find this material useful. The way I look at it is the other way around: The burden of proof lies squarely on the person who denies such an obvious proposition as (1). The same is true for similarly obvious propositions like "there is an external world which I can learn about through my senses" and "inductive reasoning is a valid way of attaining knowledge", which underpin the scientific enterprise and, moreover, any basis for critiquing (1) itself. One way to capture this is through the principle of phenomenal conservatism [1][2][3] as formulated by philosopher Michael Huemer. He has also written a book on the subject called Ethical Intuitionism. [1] https://philpapers.org/rec/HUEPCA https://philpapers.org/rec/HUEPCA [2] https://philpapers.org/rec/HUECPC https://philpapers.org/rec/HUECPC [3] https://www.iep.utm.edu/phen-con/ https://www.iep.utm.edu/phen-con/