I'm not arguing against a straw man, I'm outlining why it's unnecessary (in very blunt terms). What you've just said does nothing to refute everything I stated.

I'm not arguing against a straw man, I'm outlining why it's unnecessary (in very blunt terms). What you've just said does nothing to refute everything I stated. "Provable security" is both rare and unnecessary in most of cryptography (in the information theoretic sense relevant to this discussion, not the sense of e.g. application security or static analysis). To reiterate: you do not need information theoretic security to defend against satcom intrusions. That's tantamount to using a one time pad, which is ridiculously inefficient. The computational model is just fine. Even the United States government only rarely uses information theoretic security these days, and instead opts for the more efficient computational security provided by e.g. AES.