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It's a simple matter of incentives. We all want scientists to share their code because that's the positive sum action. But individual scientists aren't paid ba

It's a simple matter of incentives. We all want scientists to share their code because that's the positive sum action. But individual scientists aren't paid based on how well the scientific community is doing. They're awarded positions, grants and prestige on their individual performance against other scientists. So scientists worried about their career think in zero sum terms: if I publish this source code, will I be pipped to the next paper? Well, I'll publish this other piece to make myself look good, since I'm not following it up; and then I'll collect the citations too." We can wring our hands about scientists acting in bad faith all we like, but it's obvious we just have to change the incentives. Funding agencies just need to award higher weight to journals that demand source releases, transitioning to only weighting those journals.

CWuestefeld 16y ago
In concept you're right, but I want to clear up some terminology. This isn't a "zero-sum game" issue: it's a "prisoner's dilemma" [1] In the prisoner's dilemma, the parties can work together to yield a common, greater result. But they might not do so because the common solution requires trust; any individual might go for the easy answer that brings himself a return while screwing the others. [1] https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Prisoner%27s_dilemma https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Prisoner%27s_...
- syllogism 16y ago
  I considered this, but if you assume that the scientists don't benefit from science functioning properly, then they're playing a zero sum game with other scientists --- they're simply competing with each other for a fixed pool of resources. That was what I meant. You could argue that a prisoner's dilemma view of it is more realistic. In this view, the scientists all desperately do want to get it right, but they know they can't because they'll be punished for doing it by their peers, who'll seize the opportunity to get ahead at their expense. This model is plausible too, but it's different from the one I suggested. So it's not actually a terminological difference.
LiveTheDream 16y ago
> It's a simple matter of incentives. Incentives are difficult to get right.

CWuestefeld 16y ago

In concept you're right, but I want to clear up some terminology. This isn't a "zero-sum game" issue: it's a "prisoner's dilemma" [1] In the prisoner's dilemma, the parties can work together to yield a common, greater result. But they might not do so because the common solution requires trust; any individual might go for the easy answer that brings himself a return while screwing the others. [1] https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Prisoner%27s_dilemma https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Prisoner%27s_...

syllogism 16y ago
I considered this, but if you assume that the scientists don't benefit from science functioning properly, then they're playing a zero sum game with other scientists --- they're simply competing with each other for a fixed pool of resources. That was what I meant. You could argue that a prisoner's dilemma view of it is more realistic. In this view, the scientists all desperately do want to get it right, but they know they can't because they'll be punished for doing it by their peers, who'll seize the opportunity to get ahead at their expense. This model is plausible too, but it's different from the one I suggested. So it's not actually a terminological difference.

LiveTheDream 16y ago

> It's a simple matter of incentives. Incentives are difficult to get right.