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Cool. HSMs are a notable step up from secure execution environments like TrustZone and SGX because they make side-channel attacks that take advantage of the sha
by jchw 8y ago
Cool. HSMs are a notable step up from secure execution environments like TrustZone and SGX because they make side-channel attacks that take advantage of the shared hardware much more difficult.
That said, the HSM itself becomes a target after a while. So the more stuff you off-load to your enclave, the larger the attack surface becomes, and now you moved your problem over.
And I am further skeptical about how much this improves on the status quo. Apple delivered a secure enclave that was essentially a blackbox. Google delivered one and is open sourcing the firmware at some point (apparently.) Now, this is going to give us an enclave with open source hardware. But in a world where there are known, novel attacks against the integrity of microchips that would make it difficult to verify even in the presence of microscope images of a decapped chip, I'm not sure if this really gives us that much reassurance that the chip does what it says. And if it did, we would never know for sure that it is free of security-sensitive bugs.
I still think this is great. Again, step above SGX and TrustZone in my opinion. But, this article makes it sound like a panacea, which I don't think is the case.
(Case in point: people have successfully attacked devices secured with enclaves, including iPhones and I assume Pixel. Doesn't matter how bad ass your gate is if it isn't surrounded by an equally strong fence. These devices should keep encryption secrets secure, but they don't 'stop hackers.')
- anonymousDan 8y agoHSMs have been around for donkey's years. SGX is interesting because now you can run e.g. a whole database inside an enclave on commodity CPUs with competitive performance.
- mtgx 8y agoArm has already announced crypto-processors, which I assume aren't very expensive. Every chip maker could use one as an HSM now. https://developer.arm.com/products/system-ip/security-ip/cryptoisland-family https://developer.arm.com/products/system-ip/security-ip/cry... https://developer.arm.com/products/system-ip/security-ip/cryptocell-700-family https://developer.arm.com/products/system-ip/security-ip/cry...
- MaxBarraclough 8y agoSo the chip-maker would have their hardware protect the permanent secret key, and use ARM's coprocessor to do the cryptographic heavy-lifting? Sounds reasonable. Is that the first high-level crypto coprocessor then? I'm surprised it's taken this long.
- jchw 8y agoI always thought the purported advantage of SGX was being able to run important bits of code with ensured integrity, using attestation, even on an unsecure machine. If you ran a whole database in SGX or TrustZone, you just open yourself up to traditional security vulnerabilities alongside the usual side channel attacks you can do against them.
- anonymousDan 8y agoWell yes, but I AFAIK remote attestation for specialized security processors has been around for a while. You are of course right that you still have a large attack surface + side channels etc. But at least you can't just snoop on the RAM.
- blitmap 8y agoI am probably very uninformed, but I was hoping we might see the kernel + userland running entirely from a secure enclave. As I understood, this would make cold boot attacks more difficult? I'm sure it's like using a sledgehammer to close a narrow attack surface, though. From a performance point of view it's probably not a great exchange. At minimum I'd want full-disk encryption programs (veracrypt) and biometric authentication services running from an enclave. Lenovo does this for their fingerprint reader. It would be cool to have the facilities to say "everything run by this user runs in the enclave", but I think the argument is the same as FDE - don't invite the possibility of a leak by selective encryption. All or nothing.
- jki275 8y agoThat's very restrictive in terms of general purpose computing. It makes a lot of sense in some other cases though.
- na85 8y ago>But in a world where there are known, novel attacks against the integrity of microchips that would make it difficult to verify even in the presence of microscope images of a decapped chip, I'm not sure if this really gives us that much reassurance that the chip does what it says I find myself saying this a lot lately but I really think that stuff like this is going to lead us to chip fabs being national strategic industries in the short/medium term future.
- andromeduck 8y agoWhen were fabs not a strategic asset?! It's the whole reason Taiwan still exists.