5 ms·
I'm not sure why you interpret it that way. Nobody has found built-in backdoors for UK spies, and where did you get the "32 other agencies" from? This shift wa
by mike_hearn 8y ago
I'm not sure why you interpret it that way. Nobody has found built-in backdoors for UK spies, and where did you get the "32 other agencies" from?
This shift was predicted long in advance and is clearly a response to the increasingly saturation-level usage of SSL. GCHQ and NSA have for decades been oriented primarily around bulk interception of unencrypted radio and fibre traffic, see:
http://www.lamont.me.uk/capenhurst/original.html http://www.lamont.me.uk/capenhurst/original.html
But what happens when nearly all traffic becomes encrypted? Then they must become ever more reliant on hacking the endpoints, to get at data before the encryption is applied.
What's happening is easily explainable without needing to refer to apparently non-existent back doors. The closest thing to that was the EC-DRB algorithm, but nobody ever used that except RSA Inc who got paid to use it, because their back doored algorithm sucked and the back door was spotted very quickly. I doubt it ever had much operational impact.
- mmjaa 8y ago>Nobody has found built-in backdoors for UK spies I think GCHQ's intercept capabilities are pretty well documented in the ANT catalog: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSA_ANT_catalog https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSA_ANT_catalog I know for a fact that GCHQ are customers of JUNIORMINT. (Check for fingerprints and other sloppy cleaning on the wrappers of those "brand new laptops", folks.. the ones that spent a couple of days in limbo at a 'shipping hub' somewhere around Heathrow/Stanstead, etc.) This is the issue with the duplicity inherent in the 5-eyes agreement - what we think only 'the other guys' can do, our guys can do when they work with the 'other guys'.
- rl3 8y ago>(Check for fingerprints and other sloppy cleaning on the wrappers of those "brand new laptops", folks ... Or you know, they just use gloves because they work for a signals intelligence agency installing implants for a living.
- ben_w 8y agoThey might, they might not. They’re also fallible humans who silo their knowledge from each other as protection against other state agencies, and the downside of sioling your internal information is more dumb-looking mistakes and resistance to fixing them. Heck, that resistance is why Snowden did his thing in the first place.
- mmjaa 8y agoI found fingerprints and dust on my recent Apple MacBook Pro purchase, underneath the peel-off wrapper. It was not a refurb, was bought originally from Apple and it did indeed have a 2-day wait in a 'shipping hub'. I'm fairly sure this machine has an implant - or at least, someone really goofed at Apples' manufacturing.
- foldr 8y ago>(Check for fingerprints and other sloppy cleaning on the wrappers of those "brand new laptops", folks.. the ones that spent a couple of days in limbo at a 'shipping hub' somewhere around Heathrow/Stanstead, etc.) If the intelligence agencies are really spending time and resources on such ludicrously inefficient and ineffective techniques as installing backdoors on random laptops in warehouses, you should be glad!
- mmjaa 8y agoI don't think its so random. I work for people they would definitely be interested in.
- TallGuyShort 8y agoWhy should I be glad? I'm paying for it. If they're not spending on effective efforts against legitimate threats, that money is, at best, wasted and I'm still exposed to those threats. At worst, maybe my own money will one day be used against me in prosecuting a victimless crime. The likely middle ground is my own money is being wasted to violate my own privacy for no good reason. This isn't sounding very good to me.
- foldr 8y agoThe intelligence agencies obviously aren't doing this. It was a tongue-in-cheek comment.