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This is presumably a response to the increase in encryption post-Snowden. In which case, it's a good thing from one angle at least - it suggests that moves to e

This is presumably a response to the increase in encryption post-Snowden. In which case, it's a good thing from one angle at least - it suggests that moves to encrypt everywhere are frustrating bulk intercept.

candiodari 8y ago
No, it states the reason in the article: > UK spies are planning to increase their use of bulk equipment interference, as the range of encrypted hardware and software applications they can't tap into increases. So past communication methods came with built-in backdoors for UK spies (and, as it turns out, around 32 other EU agencies). These backdoors are becoming useless for them, and so they seek to force everyone else into providing backdoors for them again.
- mike_hearn 8y ago
  I'm not sure why you interpret it that way. Nobody has found built-in backdoors for UK spies, and where did you get the "32 other agencies" from? This shift was predicted long in advance and is clearly a response to the increasingly saturation-level usage of SSL. GCHQ and NSA have for decades been oriented primarily around bulk interception of unencrypted radio and fibre traffic, see: http://www.lamont.me.uk/capenhurst/original.html http://www.lamont.me.uk/capenhurst/original.html But what happens when nearly all traffic becomes encrypted? Then they must become ever more reliant on hacking the endpoints, to get at data before the encryption is applied. What's happening is easily explainable without needing to refer to apparently non-existent back doors. The closest thing to that was the EC-DRB algorithm, but nobody ever used that except RSA Inc who got paid to use it, because their back doored algorithm sucked and the back door was spotted very quickly. I doubt it ever had much operational impact.
  - mmjaa 8y ago
    >Nobody has found built-in backdoors for UK spies I think GCHQ's intercept capabilities are pretty well documented in the ANT catalog: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSA_ANT_catalog https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSA_ANT_catalog I know for a fact that GCHQ are customers of JUNIORMINT. (Check for fingerprints and other sloppy cleaning on the wrappers of those "brand new laptops", folks.. the ones that spent a couple of days in limbo at a 'shipping hub' somewhere around Heathrow/Stanstead, etc.) This is the issue with the duplicity inherent in the 5-eyes agreement - what we think only 'the other guys' can do, our guys can do when they work with the 'other guys'.
    - rl3 8y ago
      >(Check for fingerprints and other sloppy cleaning on the wrappers of those "brand new laptops", folks ... Or you know, they just use gloves because they work for a signals intelligence agency installing implants for a living.
      - ben_w 8y ago
        They might, they might not. They’re also fallible humans who silo their knowledge from each other as protection against other state agencies, and the downside of sioling your internal information is more dumb-looking mistakes and resistance to fixing them. Heck, that resistance is why Snowden did his thing in the first place.
        mmjaa 8y ago
        I found fingerprints and dust on my recent Apple MacBook Pro purchase, underneath the peel-off wrapper. It was not a refurb, was bought originally from Apple and it did indeed have a 2-day wait in a 'shipping hub'. I'm fairly sure this machine has an implant - or at least, someone really goofed at Apples' manufacturing.
        kaybe 8y ago
        So did you do anything about it?
        mmjaa 8y ago
        What can we do? Send it back to Apple? Still trying to determine if we should.
        kaybe 8y ago
        Either that or send it on to an interested party, or have a very close look yourself I guess. AFAIK there are people out there very interested in what you might have there.
mtgx 8y ago
It's not like GCHQ wasn't hacking networks before. The law just says they need to disclose it now, so they use the encryption as an "excuse" to do it, while also making encryption look bad (something we ought to get rid of). https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/sep/21/british-spies-hacked-into-belgacom-on-ministers-orders-claims-report https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/sep/21/british-spie...

candiodari 8y ago

No, it states the reason in the article: > UK spies are planning to increase their use of bulk equipment interference, as the range of encrypted hardware and software applications they can't tap into increases. So past communication methods came with built-in backdoors for UK spies (and, as it turns out, around 32 other EU agencies). These backdoors are becoming useless for them, and so they seek to force everyone else into providing backdoors for them again.

mike_hearn 8y ago
I'm not sure why you interpret it that way. Nobody has found built-in backdoors for UK spies, and where did you get the "32 other agencies" from? This shift was predicted long in advance and is clearly a response to the increasingly saturation-level usage of SSL. GCHQ and NSA have for decades been oriented primarily around bulk interception of unencrypted radio and fibre traffic, see: http://www.lamont.me.uk/capenhurst/original.html http://www.lamont.me.uk/capenhurst/original.html But what happens when nearly all traffic becomes encrypted? Then they must become ever more reliant on hacking the endpoints, to get at data before the encryption is applied. What's happening is easily explainable without needing to refer to apparently non-existent back doors. The closest thing to that was the EC-DRB algorithm, but nobody ever used that except RSA Inc who got paid to use it, because their back doored algorithm sucked and the back door was spotted very quickly. I doubt it ever had much operational impact.
- mmjaa 8y ago
  >Nobody has found built-in backdoors for UK spies I think GCHQ's intercept capabilities are pretty well documented in the ANT catalog: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSA_ANT_catalog https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSA_ANT_catalog I know for a fact that GCHQ are customers of JUNIORMINT. (Check for fingerprints and other sloppy cleaning on the wrappers of those "brand new laptops", folks.. the ones that spent a couple of days in limbo at a 'shipping hub' somewhere around Heathrow/Stanstead, etc.) This is the issue with the duplicity inherent in the 5-eyes agreement - what we think only 'the other guys' can do, our guys can do when they work with the 'other guys'.
  - rl3 8y ago
    >(Check for fingerprints and other sloppy cleaning on the wrappers of those "brand new laptops", folks ... Or you know, they just use gloves because they work for a signals intelligence agency installing implants for a living.
    - ben_w 8y ago
      They might, they might not. They’re also fallible humans who silo their knowledge from each other as protection against other state agencies, and the downside of sioling your internal information is more dumb-looking mistakes and resistance to fixing them. Heck, that resistance is why Snowden did his thing in the first place.
      - mmjaa 8y ago
        I found fingerprints and dust on my recent Apple MacBook Pro purchase, underneath the peel-off wrapper. It was not a refurb, was bought originally from Apple and it did indeed have a 2-day wait in a 'shipping hub'. I'm fairly sure this machine has an implant - or at least, someone really goofed at Apples' manufacturing.
        kaybe 8y ago
        So did you do anything about it?
        mmjaa 8y ago
        What can we do? Send it back to Apple? Still trying to determine if we should.
        kaybe 8y ago
        Either that or send it on to an interested party, or have a very close look yourself I guess. AFAIK there are people out there very interested in what you might have there.

mtgx 8y ago

It's not like GCHQ wasn't hacking networks before. The law just says they need to disclose it now, so they use the encryption as an "excuse" to do it, while also making encryption look bad (something we ought to get rid of). https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/sep/21/british-spies-hacked-into-belgacom-on-ministers-orders-claims-report https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/sep/21/british-spie...