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I think the Manhattan Project is the exclamation point of what really decided the ultimate victors of WWII: Industrial capacity and efficiency. What’s interes

I think the Manhattan Project is the exclamation point of what really decided the ultimate victors of WWII: Industrial capacity and efficiency. What’s interesting is that German industrial capacity, despite being bombed 24/7(US daylight and British nighttime raids often in excess of 1,000 bombers) were able to continue producing warfighting equipment in increasing record numbers often with the use of slave labour. Despite increased German industrial production of warfighting equipment despite being bombed, the US strategic industrial depth ensured ultimate victory rather than tactical prowess. What’s interesting in Stan McChrystal’s recent book “Team of Teams” is his mention that while 20th century conventional conflicts were about industrial capacity and efficiency, the 21st century will likely be about adaptability.

lwansbrough 8y ago
You may be interested in reading about the offset strategies employed by the US DOD. In the 60s the US military conducted a still classified analysis called Project Oregon Trail. Included (apparently) was a wargames exercise which completely undermined Eisenhower's doctrine of tactical nuclear weapons to fight a land war. Oregon Trail supposedly concluded that 20,000 tactical nukes would be required to win in Europe. The result of Oregon Trail appears to be what led to the second offset strategy, which emphasizes intel, stealth, and precision guidance tech. But it also provided information by way of a two part study by a panel of historians. The historians studied 100 asymmetric wars throughout history, which lead to this key insight: if a government can figure out the reason people support the insurgents, and offer an alternative, then they would likely win. If they cannot find the reason, or are unable to win the hearts and minds of the people, they will likely lose. The more military force is substituted for politics, the less likely the government would be to win. We saw this outcome in Vietnam (and have to a certain degree seen the same in the Middle East). I believe this insight is what has lead to the US' third offset strategy, which is deterrence of war through overwhelming technological advantage. The point to all this being that industrial capacity and efficiency is just one cog in the machine. The bomb was a technological advantage. You don't need much industrial capacity or efficiency to make one. Inevitably, the best way to win a war is to convince the other side of your cause, and then they'll just stop fighting.

lwansbrough 8y ago

You may be interested in reading about the offset strategies employed by the US DOD. In the 60s the US military conducted a still classified analysis called Project Oregon Trail. Included (apparently) was a wargames exercise which completely undermined Eisenhower's doctrine of tactical nuclear weapons to fight a land war. Oregon Trail supposedly concluded that 20,000 tactical nukes would be required to win in Europe. The result of Oregon Trail appears to be what led to the second offset strategy, which emphasizes intel, stealth, and precision guidance tech. But it also provided information by way of a two part study by a panel of historians. The historians studied 100 asymmetric wars throughout history, which lead to this key insight: if a government can figure out the reason people support the insurgents, and offer an alternative, then they would likely win. If they cannot find the reason, or are unable to win the hearts and minds of the people, they will likely lose. The more military force is substituted for politics, the less likely the government would be to win. We saw this outcome in Vietnam (and have to a certain degree seen the same in the Middle East). I believe this insight is what has lead to the US' third offset strategy, which is deterrence of war through overwhelming technological advantage. The point to all this being that industrial capacity and efficiency is just one cog in the machine. The bomb was a technological advantage. You don't need much industrial capacity or efficiency to make one. Inevitably, the best way to win a war is to convince the other side of your cause, and then they'll just stop fighting.