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That most obvious savings generated by the Manhattan Project was probably the displacement of perceived need to invade Japan. It would be nice to see an estimat

That most obvious savings generated by the Manhattan Project was probably the displacement of perceived need to invade Japan. It would be nice to see an estimate of the cost of that invasion as a comparison. But the primary cost of an invasion would have been the lives of Americans and Japanese, and it would be difficult to arrive at a consensus value for that. As part of that wider comparison the cost of the destruction in Hiroshima and Nagasaki should also be included on the Manhattan Project's side of the ledger.

deogeo 8y ago
'Perceived' is correct, as the other option was conditional surrender of Japan. But it sounds much nicer, and is better for morale, to say the bombs or an invasion were the only possibilities. Sources: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-the-atomic-bomb/2015/07/31/32dbc15c-3620-11e5-b673-1df005a0fb28_story.html https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-the... https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/debate-over-japanese-surrender https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/debate-over-japanese-... https://mises.org/library/hiroshima-myth https://mises.org/library/hiroshima-myth
boomboomsubban 8y ago
In July of 1945, Szilard and a number of other scientists involved with the Manhattan Project, signed a petition asking that Japan be publicly informed of the terms of surrender and refused then before the bomb was dropped. Not only was that simple request ignored, the US Government tried to blacklist the scientists who signed that petition. Arguing that the bombs were necessary to prevent an invasion pretends that any other option was tried. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Szil%C3%A1rd_petition https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Szil%C3%A1rd_petition
- hirundo 8y ago
  In accounting for the costs of counterfactuals I think the question is less what is possible and more what is likely. The outsized response you describe to the simple request is evidence of the strong political will for more aggressive options.
  - boomboomsubban 8y ago
    I suspect that US military leaders would be much more hesitant to spend the lives of untold thousands of US soldiers, and a prolonged firebombing campaign would have been the most likely non-nuclear continuation. Whether that would have saved lives or cost more is impossible to guess
- rjsw 8y ago
  John McCloy proposed explicitly including a description of the bomb in surrender terms too.
- gedy 8y ago
  I feel like this splits hairs a bit, as the Potsdam Declaration[1] already had warned of utter destruction unless Japan surrendered. Our firebomb raids had already demonstrated this resolve and killed more civilians than the atomic bombs, in likely more horrific ways. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potsdam_Declaration https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potsdam_Declaration
  - Nomentatus 8y ago
    This is to one side of the point - many historians hold that the U.S. was keen to demonstrate the power of these bombs in order to cow the U.S.S.R., (and prove they were practical) even if it meant delaying the end of the war. Firebombing was even more effective (but not economical) in killing Japanese civilians, as you note. However, firebombing would not have been as effective vs the Soviets (far less flimsy, compact wood construction) nor have the same effect vs ground forces: making a live demonstration of atomic bombs still useful intimidation, according to this view.
    - iguy 8y ago
      Besides cowing the USSR, I think that a valid war aim was fully cowing Japan. One of the lessons of WWI was that military victory wasn't enough, too many Germans could tell themselves afterwards that they were stabbed in the back, etc. If the goal was to defeat Japanese fascism, then it was important that no Japanese could believe such things afterwards. And for this, a shocking weapon (one plane, one city) was effective in a way that (say) a starvation blockade would not have been.
  - boomboomsubban 8y ago
    One of the goals of the Potsdam Deceleration was to be intentionally vague about the terms of surrender, and the terms were never formally rejected. It doesn't fit the guidelines of the petition, and barely counts as an attempt at peace without bombing or invasion.
    - jessriedel 8y ago
      > One of the goals of the Potsdam Deceleration was to be intentionally vague about the terms of surrender Do you have a cite that the ambiguity was intended to reduce the chance the Japanese would surrender? I don't know the history well. I have the impression that, given the US's knowledge of its own military superiority, it would never have accepted anything besides total surrender and occupation. (This is not just vindictive; cease fires and truces are less effective for ensuring the enemy doesn't rise later.) Therefore, if the declaration was vague, this if anything would have been to encourage getting the Japanese to the bargaining table. Wikipedia seems consistent with this: > A major aspect relating to the Potsdam Declaration was that it was intended to be ambiguous. It is not clear from the document itself whether a Japanese government was to remain under Allied occupation or whether the occupation would be run by a foreign military government. In the same manner, it was not clear whether after the end of the occupation Japan was to include any territory other than the four main Japanese islands...This ambiguity was intentional on the part of the U.S. government in order to allow the Allies a free hand in running the affairs of Japan afterwards. One can certainly criticize the US for not accepting conditional/partial surrender as a way to avoid unnecessary deaths, but the ambiguity of the declaration doesn't seem like the issue.
- claydavisss 8y ago
  Szilard was not an elected political leader or a military leader, so why would it be assumed he could impose such a profound policy?
- Tsubasachan 8y ago
  People make the mistake that the Japanese government actually CARED about the suffering of its people. Japanese cities were already being bombed daily and Japan was starving. The war had been lost for years.
Nomentatus 8y ago
John Toland et al, in contrast, see the Russian invasion of Manchuria as the final straw that forced Japan to surrender; Japan continued fighting after the bombs were dropped, but the U.S. did not immediately have more bombs to drop.
- claydavisss 8y ago
  wrong, fatman2 was already at Tinian when Japan surrendered
- xixixao 8y ago
  I read about this recently here: https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/30/the-bomb-didnt-beat-japan-stalin-did/ https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/30/the-bomb-didnt-beat-jap... Fascinating how much sense it makes. Likely the truth is somewhere in-between.
wcarey 8y ago
Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan by Giangreco is a comparison of the American plans for the invasion of the Home Islands with the Japanese plans for their defense. It talks through the cost in live of such an invasion. Though it doesn't explicitly speak to the value of the Manhattan project, it argues for it indirectly by explaining the horrifying brutality that would have been that invasion.

deogeo 8y ago

'Perceived' is correct, as the other option was conditional surrender of Japan. But it sounds much nicer, and is better for morale, to say the bombs or an invasion were the only possibilities. Sources: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-the-atomic-bomb/2015/07/31/32dbc15c-3620-11e5-b673-1df005a0fb28_story.html https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-the... https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/debate-over-japanese-surrender https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/debate-over-japanese-... https://mises.org/library/hiroshima-myth https://mises.org/library/hiroshima-myth

boomboomsubban 8y ago

In July of 1945, Szilard and a number of other scientists involved with the Manhattan Project, signed a petition asking that Japan be publicly informed of the terms of surrender and refused then before the bomb was dropped. Not only was that simple request ignored, the US Government tried to blacklist the scientists who signed that petition. Arguing that the bombs were necessary to prevent an invasion pretends that any other option was tried. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Szil%C3%A1rd_petition https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Szil%C3%A1rd_petition

hirundo 8y ago
In accounting for the costs of counterfactuals I think the question is less what is possible and more what is likely. The outsized response you describe to the simple request is evidence of the strong political will for more aggressive options.
- boomboomsubban 8y ago
  I suspect that US military leaders would be much more hesitant to spend the lives of untold thousands of US soldiers, and a prolonged firebombing campaign would have been the most likely non-nuclear continuation. Whether that would have saved lives or cost more is impossible to guess
rjsw 8y ago
John McCloy proposed explicitly including a description of the bomb in surrender terms too.
gedy 8y ago
I feel like this splits hairs a bit, as the Potsdam Declaration[1] already had warned of utter destruction unless Japan surrendered. Our firebomb raids had already demonstrated this resolve and killed more civilians than the atomic bombs, in likely more horrific ways. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potsdam_Declaration https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potsdam_Declaration
- Nomentatus 8y ago
  This is to one side of the point - many historians hold that the U.S. was keen to demonstrate the power of these bombs in order to cow the U.S.S.R., (and prove they were practical) even if it meant delaying the end of the war. Firebombing was even more effective (but not economical) in killing Japanese civilians, as you note. However, firebombing would not have been as effective vs the Soviets (far less flimsy, compact wood construction) nor have the same effect vs ground forces: making a live demonstration of atomic bombs still useful intimidation, according to this view.
  - iguy 8y ago
    Besides cowing the USSR, I think that a valid war aim was fully cowing Japan. One of the lessons of WWI was that military victory wasn't enough, too many Germans could tell themselves afterwards that they were stabbed in the back, etc. If the goal was to defeat Japanese fascism, then it was important that no Japanese could believe such things afterwards. And for this, a shocking weapon (one plane, one city) was effective in a way that (say) a starvation blockade would not have been.
- boomboomsubban 8y ago
  One of the goals of the Potsdam Deceleration was to be intentionally vague about the terms of surrender, and the terms were never formally rejected. It doesn't fit the guidelines of the petition, and barely counts as an attempt at peace without bombing or invasion.
  - jessriedel 8y ago
    > One of the goals of the Potsdam Deceleration was to be intentionally vague about the terms of surrender Do you have a cite that the ambiguity was intended to reduce the chance the Japanese would surrender? I don't know the history well. I have the impression that, given the US's knowledge of its own military superiority, it would never have accepted anything besides total surrender and occupation. (This is not just vindictive; cease fires and truces are less effective for ensuring the enemy doesn't rise later.) Therefore, if the declaration was vague, this if anything would have been to encourage getting the Japanese to the bargaining table. Wikipedia seems consistent with this: > A major aspect relating to the Potsdam Declaration was that it was intended to be ambiguous. It is not clear from the document itself whether a Japanese government was to remain under Allied occupation or whether the occupation would be run by a foreign military government. In the same manner, it was not clear whether after the end of the occupation Japan was to include any territory other than the four main Japanese islands...This ambiguity was intentional on the part of the U.S. government in order to allow the Allies a free hand in running the affairs of Japan afterwards. One can certainly criticize the US for not accepting conditional/partial surrender as a way to avoid unnecessary deaths, but the ambiguity of the declaration doesn't seem like the issue.
claydavisss 8y ago
Szilard was not an elected political leader or a military leader, so why would it be assumed he could impose such a profound policy?
Tsubasachan 8y ago
People make the mistake that the Japanese government actually CARED about the suffering of its people. Japanese cities were already being bombed daily and Japan was starving. The war had been lost for years.

Nomentatus 8y ago

John Toland et al, in contrast, see the Russian invasion of Manchuria as the final straw that forced Japan to surrender; Japan continued fighting after the bombs were dropped, but the U.S. did not immediately have more bombs to drop.

claydavisss 8y ago
wrong, fatman2 was already at Tinian when Japan surrendered
xixixao 8y ago
I read about this recently here: https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/30/the-bomb-didnt-beat-japan-stalin-did/ https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/30/the-bomb-didnt-beat-jap... Fascinating how much sense it makes. Likely the truth is somewhere in-between.

wcarey 8y ago

Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan by Giangreco is a comparison of the American plans for the invasion of the Home Islands with the Japanese plans for their defense. It talks through the cost in live of such an invasion. Though it doesn't explicitly speak to the value of the Manhattan project, it argues for it indirectly by explaining the horrifying brutality that would have been that invasion.