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Because, if they use a non-rooted phone or device, a part of traffic will come from system apps or the OS itself that the user has no control over. Before, this
by xg15 8y ago
Because, if they use a non-rooted phone or device, a part of traffic will come from system apps or the OS itself that the user has no control over. Before, this traffic could be blocked by intercepting DNS - now, there wouldn't be a way to do it at all.
- zamadatix 8y agoFirstly you still can, add a root certificate and continue using VPN/explicit proxy. Secondly, again none of this has anything to do with DoH. Users still set the system DoH/DoT DNS server the same as they always set the system DNS server and assumed system apps/installed apps weren't using custom sockets/transports/encoding to get around it. Users still control the browser feature enablement and can change destination server. Finally back to the original point - "malicious use doesn't follow the rulebook". System apps have always had the right to make an HTTPS connection to an IP address. Users have always had the right to make an HTTPS connection to an IP address. JavaScript from an ad has always had the right to make an HTTPS connection to an IP address. The user never had any control of this unless they were using an explicit proxy or intercepting traffic with a cert structure. The only thing users/enterprises following the "let me look at udp 53" mantra have had is the illusion of security and control. DoH changes none of this and is irrelevant to it, DoH is just a standard serialization of something anyone has been able to do for decades now. What DoH DOES do is prevent every random node inbetween a device and the DNS server from inspecting/modifying the traffic unless the end station is explicitly configured to allow it.