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DNS-Over-HTTPS (DoH) Operational and Privacy Issues
- amaccuish 8y agoIt's still not clear to me how this will work in internal networks. AFAIK it's not possible to distribute internal DoH servers via DHCP, and it seems orthagonal to the goals of DoH since "cafe wifi" could give you dodgy servers. But how do I as a network administrator with internal DNS domains serve my users? Maybe browsers and OSs could look at the local search domain, and send queries matching to DHCP servers, and everything else over DoH, kinda like split dns with a VPN?
- BillinghamJ 8y agoServe the internal IPs from public hostname DNS records? Internal DNS I think is largely not a good thing and I'd be happy to see it go.
- Aissen 8y agoCould you develop ? You think you should answer with internal IPs with external DNS records and everything is addressed at the routing level ?
- zimbatm 8y agoThe DNS zone would be public and tied to a real domain. So both private and public clients would be able to query Eg: ci.myorg-int.com -> 10.11.12.13 One advantage of such method is that it is possible to re-use the public CA infrastructure to provision services with TLS certificated. It also means that services can easily be migrated to public IPs once they are secured on the endpoint. The downside is that now all the internal services are discoverable using DNS scanning techniques. It means that competitors can see what services the organisation is using. Or attackers can better prepare themselves for infiltration. Another downside of DoH is that it's not possible to filter out DNS rebinding attacks. For example and attacker can trick your browser in requesting a resource from xxx.somedomain.com that points to 10.11.12.13. If the CI is vulnerable to CSRF then the attacker can use the browser to exfiltrate information or do some actions on the CI.
- megous 8y ago> Another downside of DoH is that it's not possible to filter out DNS rebinding attacks. Your web server should be configured to not serve content just by IP and require Host header to be a domain you control. (like using server_name in nginx) Otherwise they can just point to 10.11.12.13 directly anyway.
- X-Istence 8y agoSure, the web server SHOULD... but what if it is misconfigured? Or doesn't have an option to properly validate the Host header? This is an internal client using an internal IP address to communicate with an internal service... just so happens that a malicious user made the internal client talk to it maliciously. DNS rebinding attacks being stopped by the resolver are a great place to start and something we can do. Bypassing that protection in the name of resolving using DoH just means you've made things less secure.
- megous 8y agoI agree. I think DoH should be put on the edge of the network, using something like dnscrypt-proxy. I don't think it should be put in the browser. It would actually made my setup less private, since I use DoH over tor. Though configuring the http servers (like printers or whatever) and/or putting them behind a proxy on a sparate network, if they are sensitive/not configurable, should be done too.
- dsl 8y ago> Your web server should be configured I think you underestimate the number of things on your network that run unconfigurable web servers.
- amaccuish 8y agoDNSMASQ lets you luckily whitelist certain domains from dns rebinding protection (like Plex, which relies on resolving to internal IPs). I'm still not comfortable exposing internal network details to the internet however.
- kenny_r 8y agoAs a sysadmin I disagree strongly. Being able to host my own authoritative servers for my domains inside my org is a fantastic feature of DNS. It lets me do things like split-horizon, which lets me deal with clients coming from different origins that may reach certain servers with or without NAT. I'm also not keen on putting all my records on public name servers, for everyone to discover.
- BillinghamJ 8y agoYou could run your own DNS server. As long as you can get the relevant TLS cert, it doesn't even need to be public. You just would need to accept DOH connections
- amaccuish 8y agoFirst thing that comes to mind with this idea is that Active Directory is going to be around for a long while yet. Second, my network filters DNS rebinding, expect from plex.com. I guess I could ad my domain to it, but that's an extra point of failure.
- bluejekyll 8y agoIsn’t this a resolver configuration issue on the client? The browsers are not respecting DHCP in this case, but that doesn’t mean that other resolvers can’t be configured via DHCP to try DoH or DoT.
- protomyth 8y ago"everything else over DoH" I have local DNS servers set to resolve both our intranet and all external queries. Some external queries are blocked for various reason. Either a browser uses the local network settings or it gets banned from the network. This is not a discussion because the real world intrudes on what browser vendors think is best.
- zamadatix 8y agoImplicit proxying and inspection has always been a farce when it comes to "locking down clients". If you want to control traffic to clients you operate you should do it as an explicit proxy. If you want to control traffic to clients you don't operate it's not actually possible to both respect the client and inspect the traffic enough to meet security goals. This tradeoff has always been true but everyone settled on the "good enough" that means security isn't actually strong, clients aren't actually treated as internal or external, and protocols are ossified because the FW expects wxyz to implement the above two failures.
- protomyth 8y agoWe don't want Google or Mozilla to have a running list of our users DNS requests. We don't want Google or Mozilla to have a list of our internal servers. They are browsers and can use the same network stack as any other program. I have other types of filtering, but the whole idea of a browser ignoring internal services is going to get it banned.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- devman0 8y agoI think its going to come down to smart network management in the client OS. If I'm on a trusted network, use the network resolvers (either via UDP 53 or DoH, or whatever) and if I'm not use preconfigured resolvers like 1.1.1.1 or something, part of not trusting the network should also be not trusting the resolver. Before DoH this was a moot point since UDP 53 can be trivially captured and redirected, now the client OS can actually do something about it. I don't like the idea of individual applications overriding system resolver settings.
- bugmen0t 8y agoIf you're the admin, you can disable DoH through a group policy, no?
- LinuxBender 8y agoNo. Well, not for shops that have non windows. In the bay area, it is quite common to have a mix of Windows, Mac and some Linux. We are 60+% Mac.
- josteink 8y ago> AFAIK it's not possible to distribute internal DoH servers via DHCP Back in the days we used to call this DHCP option 6, i.e. DNS. I'm not sure why you want to replace a DHCP provided DNS server with a DHCP provided DoH server. Because why on earth would the DHCP-server provide different DNS-servers for those two use-cases? The idea itself makes no sense. Can we please just get back to regular DNS, please? It works. It scales. It's possibly the single last thing on the internet which is still decentralized, and I'd hate to see this become another centralized, single point of failure, walled-garden bullshit.
- isostatic 8y agoI assume you agree on the need for securing DNS (DNS over TLS for example). Just watched a UKNOF presentation on DNS changes. Sounds like google/mozilla were fed up with the sluggishness of standards bodies, network operators, and OSes in securing DNS, so have gone for their own version. Charitably I'd like to think that this is a wakeup call from Mozilla, "sort out your shit or this is the future, but with google owning it"
- xg15 8y ago> There is a general expectation that when a browser starts turning on DoH, it will give the user a choice of trusted DoH providers and enable end users to specify their own trusted configurations, similar to the list of search providers seen in browsers today. Is this really the general expectation? From what I've read so far, I'd expect that both Chrome and Firefox will simply hardwire this to dedicated resolver endpoints selected by them - and maybe provide group policy or about:config options as an override, with strong communication that ordinary users should not use them.
- da_chicken 8y agoThat's what browser manufacturers want to do, but that only works in the consumer space or small office space. A company isn't going to happy about a browser that by default will self-configure the intranet to be inaccessible. Especially given the way that updates tend to reset settings when the developers think that their preferred configuration is the only right configuration. And sure, they can probably deploy fixed settings that cover their needs, but what happens when you suddenly need multiple profiles with different configurations to handle the different DNS needs at different sites? "It's always DNS," is even a common saying for sysadmins. Now it's going to get more complicated because web browsers will ignore DHCP? Wow, great. Simply put, I still don't buy the idea that the browser needs a DNS client. The OS network stack can, and should, be the provider of that service. This is just, "We know what's best for everybody. It's easier to ignore router vendors, DNS server vendors, ISPs, IEEE standards, and so on if we just do it ourselves in spite of the problems it's sure to cause. That other way is hard, anyways. Damn the consequences, we're going to do it anyways!"
- kiriakasis 8y ago> browser that by default will self-configure the intranet to be inaccessible. Maybe I am not up to date, but Mozzilla has always been explicit that it would not be activated by default (and that one way of activating it would have the system DNS as fallback) > The OS network stack can, and should, be the provider of that service. I understand why it is important not to mess with the underlying network stack, but I would also like not to be redirected to random websites when on a public wifi (even if sometimes blocking data intensive domains like youtube is a good thing). I feel that the original mozzilla blog had a pretty good explanation of the advantages.
- nimbius 8y agofor me this feels like trading the devil you know, for the devil you dont. my ISP snoops my DNS queries if i use their DNS, however Mozilla has shown time and time again they dont care what customers think in terms of privacy or features. no one wanted video chat, DRM content, or pocket and yet here we are looking at another feature from Mozilla that privileges them to my DNS queries.
- ectospheno 8y agoComically enough, browser manufacturers aren't going to hardcode the IP of the DoH server. They will look it up using the DNS you already control. Give them a non-routable address and log the attempt. Then go tell that user to stop. If some crazy group does hardcode it then they have made your job even easier.
- pmoriarty 8y agoWhy would you refer to a DNS server by domain name and not by IP in the first place?
- adrianmonk 8y agoI can think of some possible motivations: (1) Some kind of load-balancing thing and/or edge DoH servers. It gives you an opportunity to connect to a DoH server near you. Latency matters for DNS, and for traditional DNS, DHCP takes care of hooking you up with a nearby server. This could give comparable functionality for DoH. (This could probably also be done at the IP routing layer. But it's nice to have options.) (2) Decoupling. You can change DoH server IP addresses without releasing a new browser build. And anyway, if you did try to do it by releasing new browser builds, you'd have users who don't bother to update.
- jandrese 8y agoAlso, presumably these services will use pinned certificates so it won't be possible for someone MITM the query for the DNS provider and do anything more than just DOS your DoH.