3 ms·

If the US couldn't pull it off 20 years ago, why the hell does Australia expect to successfully mandate encryption backdoors today?

tanbog 8y ago
Delusions of grandeur.
- Smoosh 8y ago
  Also, a complete lack of understanding of the problem and/or wilful ignoring of the effects of the proposed solution.
cyphar 8y ago
Australia has effectively no free speech or privacy protections, and so it's very likely they'll get big companies to play ball. The US ran into trouble for a variety of reasons but it wasn't an "in principle this is untenable" problem (and let's not forget the "export" encryption has caused problems for many years thanks to the US policies). I am quite worried about free software that implements encryption. As an Australian, I'm quite concerned that software I've written and is free software will be asked to be backdoored by the Australian government. I'm small fish, but if I was a GnuPG developer I'd be more worried -- will GnuPG even accept my patches anymore given my nationality?
- judge2020 8y ago
  I'm also concerned about the possibility of extradition. Say the Australian government decides to ask someone like Werner (Github/dd9jn) to backdoor GnuPG over the internet, and he doesn't comply. Disregarding five eyes, could he now be extradited from the US because he broke an Australian law? This question is in light of Huwaei's CFO being extradited from Canada. I know this law isn't something like the Iran sanctions, but I imagine extradition would still be a possibility.
- caf 8y ago
  As an Australian, I'm quite concerned that software I've written and is free software will be asked to be backdoored by the Australian government. I don't believe this is a significant risk, at least for the case of source code. The proposed legislation doesn't allow them to ask for "systemic weaknesses" - so a sneaky change in the source that leaks few bits of key material or something should be out. And a big part of this is secrecy - they don't want those targeted to know they're under surveillance - so it would be self-defeating to ask you to put an "if (user == osama_bin_laden) { send_to_ausgov(msg); }" line in the public source. If you distribute your free software through an app store or something there could be more risk, in that you might be asked to distribute a binary with code to target certain users - but even there I'd say there's still too much chance that people analysing the binary would discover the backdoor code, so it's doubtful they'd go that way either. It seems to me that the most likely use of the TCN power would be to ask the OS vendor to deploy some Game Over malware to a targeted endpoint (using their existing update or app store mechanism). We already know what that malware looks like, the hardest part is getting it onto the device. I find it hard to credit that Apple would stomach this, after they were seemingly prepared to go to the mat with the FBI in the All Writs Act case over a very similar issue. Would they withdraw entirely from the Australian market? You'd have to think that is a live possibility.
  - cyphar 8y ago
    > The proposed legislation doesn't allow them to ask for "systemic weaknesses". My problem with this argument is that the whole "systemic weaknesses" restriction is just a word-game so that the bill can escape certain criticism. As a hypothetical, if I implement an e2e system which is "entirely secure" and as a provider I have no method of attacking it (and let's imagine it's free software and uses reproducible builds, so users can trivially verify if their binary is backdoored) -- how can I respond to a Technical Assistance Notice? I simply cannot, without taking my existing program and making it insecure. Without creating a weakness which, by the nature of the problem, is systemic. Do you see what happened? The government hasn't asked me to create a systemic weakness but because of the very situation I've now been forced to make one -- it's just a word-game. They can't ask you to create a systemic weakness, but they sure as hell can put you in a situation where (in order to fulfill a "completely reasonable request" under threat of exceptionally large fines and civil prosecution) you must create a systemic weakness. Now of course, most programs are insecure and so this hypothetical isn't entirely practical. But the principle stands that there will be many situations where (in order to avoid exceptionally large fines and civil prosecution) companies will opt into creating a systemic weakness out of fear of not being able to comply with future Technical Assistance Notices.

tanbog 8y ago

Delusions of grandeur.

Smoosh 8y ago
Also, a complete lack of understanding of the problem and/or wilful ignoring of the effects of the proposed solution.

cyphar 8y ago

Australia has effectively no free speech or privacy protections, and so it's very likely they'll get big companies to play ball. The US ran into trouble for a variety of reasons but it wasn't an "in principle this is untenable" problem (and let's not forget the "export" encryption has caused problems for many years thanks to the US policies). I am quite worried about free software that implements encryption. As an Australian, I'm quite concerned that software I've written and is free software will be asked to be backdoored by the Australian government. I'm small fish, but if I was a GnuPG developer I'd be more worried -- will GnuPG even accept my patches anymore given my nationality?

judge2020 8y ago
I'm also concerned about the possibility of extradition. Say the Australian government decides to ask someone like Werner (Github/dd9jn) to backdoor GnuPG over the internet, and he doesn't comply. Disregarding five eyes, could he now be extradited from the US because he broke an Australian law? This question is in light of Huwaei's CFO being extradited from Canada. I know this law isn't something like the Iran sanctions, but I imagine extradition would still be a possibility.
caf 8y ago
As an Australian, I'm quite concerned that software I've written and is free software will be asked to be backdoored by the Australian government. I don't believe this is a significant risk, at least for the case of source code. The proposed legislation doesn't allow them to ask for "systemic weaknesses" - so a sneaky change in the source that leaks few bits of key material or something should be out. And a big part of this is secrecy - they don't want those targeted to know they're under surveillance - so it would be self-defeating to ask you to put an "if (user == osama_bin_laden) { send_to_ausgov(msg); }" line in the public source. If you distribute your free software through an app store or something there could be more risk, in that you might be asked to distribute a binary with code to target certain users - but even there I'd say there's still too much chance that people analysing the binary would discover the backdoor code, so it's doubtful they'd go that way either. It seems to me that the most likely use of the TCN power would be to ask the OS vendor to deploy some Game Over malware to a targeted endpoint (using their existing update or app store mechanism). We already know what that malware looks like, the hardest part is getting it onto the device. I find it hard to credit that Apple would stomach this, after they were seemingly prepared to go to the mat with the FBI in the All Writs Act case over a very similar issue. Would they withdraw entirely from the Australian market? You'd have to think that is a live possibility.
- cyphar 8y ago
  > The proposed legislation doesn't allow them to ask for "systemic weaknesses". My problem with this argument is that the whole "systemic weaknesses" restriction is just a word-game so that the bill can escape certain criticism. As a hypothetical, if I implement an e2e system which is "entirely secure" and as a provider I have no method of attacking it (and let's imagine it's free software and uses reproducible builds, so users can trivially verify if their binary is backdoored) -- how can I respond to a Technical Assistance Notice? I simply cannot, without taking my existing program and making it insecure. Without creating a weakness which, by the nature of the problem, is systemic. Do you see what happened? The government hasn't asked me to create a systemic weakness but because of the very situation I've now been forced to make one -- it's just a word-game. They can't ask you to create a systemic weakness, but they sure as hell can put you in a situation where (in order to fulfill a "completely reasonable request" under threat of exceptionally large fines and civil prosecution) you must create a systemic weakness. Now of course, most programs are insecure and so this hypothetical isn't entirely practical. But the principle stands that there will be many situations where (in order to avoid exceptionally large fines and civil prosecution) companies will opt into creating a systemic weakness out of fear of not being able to comply with future Technical Assistance Notices.