5 ms·

I can agree in general, but, for now, disabling a firefox --install maliciousaddon.xpi and firefox --setconfig keyyoudontwant=valueyoudontlike is enough barrier

by mrmr1993 8y ago

I can agree in general, but, for now, disabling a firefox --install maliciousaddon.xpi and firefox --setconfig keyyoudontwant=valueyoudontlike is enough barrier to stop a majority of bad actors. None of us want users to click yes through install screens, having toolbars and spyware installed for the average user, but that has been the reality of those APIs thus far. Perhaps a more fine-grained permission model is needed for cross-application changes, but I can't think of anybody actively working on it in an OS.

xte 8y ago
Having a simple text-based config with a repo, like [AddOns] ensure-ffpkg AddonName [Themes] set-default ThemeName install ThemeA, ThemeB [Settings] key:val ... and have the AddonName downloaded with GNUPG signature check from an official Mozilla repo is by far more save that demand using interactive GUIs. Simply ask at startup to accept "potentially dangerous" extensions if you specify a local .xpi file it the same. What you describe is the classic Windows approach that have proved enough to be ineffective and only useful for commercial practice. Mozilla is formally a foundation and Firefox is formally a FOSS project...