I work in this industry. I'm on the indexing side of it, not the ETF/fund side. We obviously have relationships with all the major fund providers, especially

I work in this industry. I'm on the indexing side of it, not the ETF/fund side. We obviously have relationships with all the major fund providers, especially the three big names mentioned in the article. And I happen to work for the big dog - S&P. "Why? Partly because of two high barriers to entry: the huge scale enjoyed by the big indexers would be difficult to replicate by new entrants; and index fund prices (their expense ratios, or fees) have been driven to commodity-like levels, even to zero." I can attest that is absolutely 100% true. This business structure is perfect when economies of scale come into play. And S&P is a master of this. It's extremely difficult for others to compete with us because, like everything else, there is a range of services/quality. S&P is at the top end - the Mercedes of index providers. People pay more, but they get the best service/products. The margins are extremely high for any business. But for an service that is considered to have been "commoditized" (and it has to a large extent), our margins are insane. All our competitors want to attack those margins but they have trouble because they aren't able to provide the quality, variety, or depth of service that we do. Which leaves them only able to charge much less and be on the lower end of pricing. Time and time again I've seen some clients leave to go with someone cheaper and become displeased and end up coming back. That's because they simply don't have the internal systems, data contracts, or expertise from having been doing this for as long as we have. Another thing is that the business model in general is damn near unbeatable. The 500 and DJIA combined require very little work overall as they are just two out of thousands of products we have. But they account for hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue. That's sort of like having a hit movie or book. But the difference with this business model as opposed to most other areas of capitalism is that the revenue is recurring. No where else have I seen unpatented, non-copyrighted intellectual property retain its value like this. Usually there is a surge at the start and then it tapers off fast after release/purchase. That creates a cash cow which they use to build stronger infrastructure and stay at the top. That being said, let me address the main concern of the article - the issue of ownership for the index funds (not the index providers). I might very well be missing something here, but the answer seems obvious to me. They should just update the law so that the shares owned by the fund providers aren't considered theirs but rather the end holders of the ETFs/funds that they are packaged into. In fact this is so obvious to me I don't understand how it's not already the law since that's the case for a lot of other things like this. If you have a Charles Schwab account and issue an order for a buy, they buy it for you by placing the order under their trading ID on the market. You are later updated to be a holder of record during the trade settlement process. Schwab is a service/pass-through agent. It's very similar for the fund providers. They just buy the shares to package/securitize in advance and then sell to someone. This is the creation/redemption aspect of ETF management. When the creation/redemption process goes on or ETF shares change hands, a process similar to becoming a holder of record through trade settlement should occur. Yes, that would result in you technically being listed as owner of a fractional amount of shares, but that's a hell of a lot better (and easier to deal with) than saying that the fund provider owns all the shares and you just trust them to vote properly for you.