4 ms·

Let's also not forget the pilot. They are supposed to read the manual so they can respond to a badly behaving auto pilot / guidance system. There is always a pi

Let's also not forget the pilot. They are supposed to read the manual so they can respond to a badly behaving auto pilot / guidance system. There is always a pilot override. I guess you can bundle that in to airline blame though (lack of training or bad org structure). But really, this is a new plane and Boeing probably don't have adequate software testing in place for the newly written / ported software.

qarioz 8y ago
No, you need certification to be able to fly eact plane type, which equal to 6 months retraining. For this incident Boeing "forgot" to tell companies do not do what you usually do, as it doing what you do actually worsen the situation. Boeing released emergency notice after that incident, and data from black box showed that the pilot is doing precisely what they are used to do. Plane it self is legal to fly at that time.
- thesimon 8y ago
  But isn't moving "STAB TRIM" to CUT OUT a memory item even in the 737 NG in the case of a trim runaway?
  - mnw21cam 8y ago
    Yes. The newfangled plane had a new way for trim runaway to occur, but the action to take in the event of trim runaway shouldn't be (AFAICT) any different. They managed it on the previous flight.
- karmakaze 8y ago
  > do not do what you usually do, as it [...] worsen the situation This sounds like the worst UI evolution. Could they not have come up with something that's more natural? I don't know anything about controls and procedures for commercial aircraft, but it is so complex that nothing is natural? Like listening to Formula1 team radio where the engineer tells the driver to set some cryptic mode in the steering wheel menu. I wonder how much of a competitive advantage it would be to make easier/safer to fly commercial aircraft. It would be sad to hear that these are the results of great effort of that goal.
_archon_ 8y ago
The FAA issued a mandatory airworthiness directive as a result of this crash. Boeing didn't include training for a new anti-stall automation regime in their type cert update class for existing 737-rated pilots moving to the 737 MAX. There was apparently a malfunctioning angle of attack sensor, which caused a software data conflict which caused the anti-stall assist (which the pilot wouldn't have known existed) to repeatedly trim the aircraft nose-down. There is also the possibility that a separate pilot assist system read a possible near-stall and enforced difficulty in pulling back on the stick (to prevent what it saw as a potential stall). So the pilot couldn't pull out of the dive that the MCAS (trim changer) had caused. The blame for this incident does not lie on the pilots failing to RTFM. Boeing changed several systems without telling anyone. Now the plane's been type rated, so software changes to fix it are significantly difficult. Imagine Boeing as a guy saying "Screw those idiots who operate our multimillion dollar safety-critical product; they're too stupid to know how to work it!" This is a closer perspective to the truth than the parent's comment. Mentour pilot overview: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zfQW0upkVus https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zfQW0upkVus FAA Emergency Airworthiness Directive: http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgad.nsf/0/83ec7f95f3e5bfbd8625833e0070a070/%24FILE/2018-23-51_Emergency.pdf http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgad.nsf/...
- linuxftw 8y ago
  > Boeing didn't include training for a new anti-stall automation regime in their type cert update class for existing 737-rated pilots moving to the 737 MAX. There was apparently a malfunctioning angle of attack sensor, which caused a software data conflict which caused the anti-stall assist (which the pilot wouldn't have known existed) to repeatedly trim the aircraft nose-down. If this is accurate, it's beyond criminal. If they're putting pilots in planes with automated systems without any knowledge of those systems, let alone how to operate/override them, someone needs to be behind bars and is responsible for the deaths of those people.

qarioz 8y ago

No, you need certification to be able to fly eact plane type, which equal to 6 months retraining. For this incident Boeing "forgot" to tell companies do not do what you usually do, as it doing what you do actually worsen the situation. Boeing released emergency notice after that incident, and data from black box showed that the pilot is doing precisely what they are used to do. Plane it self is legal to fly at that time.

thesimon 8y ago
But isn't moving "STAB TRIM" to CUT OUT a memory item even in the 737 NG in the case of a trim runaway?
- mnw21cam 8y ago
  Yes. The newfangled plane had a new way for trim runaway to occur, but the action to take in the event of trim runaway shouldn't be (AFAICT) any different. They managed it on the previous flight.
karmakaze 8y ago
> do not do what you usually do, as it [...] worsen the situation This sounds like the worst UI evolution. Could they not have come up with something that's more natural? I don't know anything about controls and procedures for commercial aircraft, but it is so complex that nothing is natural? Like listening to Formula1 team radio where the engineer tells the driver to set some cryptic mode in the steering wheel menu. I wonder how much of a competitive advantage it would be to make easier/safer to fly commercial aircraft. It would be sad to hear that these are the results of great effort of that goal.

_archon_ 8y ago

The FAA issued a mandatory airworthiness directive as a result of this crash. Boeing didn't include training for a new anti-stall automation regime in their type cert update class for existing 737-rated pilots moving to the 737 MAX. There was apparently a malfunctioning angle of attack sensor, which caused a software data conflict which caused the anti-stall assist (which the pilot wouldn't have known existed) to repeatedly trim the aircraft nose-down. There is also the possibility that a separate pilot assist system read a possible near-stall and enforced difficulty in pulling back on the stick (to prevent what it saw as a potential stall). So the pilot couldn't pull out of the dive that the MCAS (trim changer) had caused. The blame for this incident does not lie on the pilots failing to RTFM. Boeing changed several systems without telling anyone. Now the plane's been type rated, so software changes to fix it are significantly difficult. Imagine Boeing as a guy saying "Screw those idiots who operate our multimillion dollar safety-critical product; they're too stupid to know how to work it!" This is a closer perspective to the truth than the parent's comment. Mentour pilot overview: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zfQW0upkVus https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zfQW0upkVus FAA Emergency Airworthiness Directive: http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgad.nsf/0/83ec7f95f3e5bfbd8625833e0070a070/%24FILE/2018-23-51_Emergency.pdf http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgad.nsf/...

linuxftw 8y ago
> Boeing didn't include training for a new anti-stall automation regime in their type cert update class for existing 737-rated pilots moving to the 737 MAX. There was apparently a malfunctioning angle of attack sensor, which caused a software data conflict which caused the anti-stall assist (which the pilot wouldn't have known existed) to repeatedly trim the aircraft nose-down. If this is accurate, it's beyond criminal. If they're putting pilots in planes with automated systems without any knowledge of those systems, let alone how to operate/override them, someone needs to be behind bars and is responsible for the deaths of those people.