3 ms·

That's true but it can be made to work with oracles or a third-party arbitration (eg: check out Kleros, Truebit and Plasma) system.

mikeash 8y ago
But now you’re no longer “without a third party.”
- decentralised 8y ago
  There are nuances to the type of third parties we are talking about here. The type I'm discussing, something like the Lightning Channel and Plasma operators, these are roles that have cryptoeconomic properties that don't allow them to take over your wallet or refuse your service. edit: The base premise of having a smart-contract being itself the escrow is perfectly achievable. This doesn't mean that such a setup is the best solution to every use case and I believe that we'll see plenty of developments in this area in the coming years. For now the best approaches use game theory and computer science to reduce the amount of "trust" the parties must have in each other and the system itself but they are very much under active research & development.
spookthesunset 8y ago
That isn't "trustless" anymore! You gotta trust a bunch of unknown crypto startups now. Are these guys really add more value to the economy than chargebacks? I very much doubt it.
- decentralised 8y ago
  That's not correct. You can have a third party that is trustless, ie that cannot perform any action on its own that would favour or harm you. Take for instance the role of Plasma operator or Lightning Channel operator; The role allows for a third party to have the costs of setting up infrastructure for you to use, but at no point are your funds held by the operator and you are always able to exit a contract if you submit on-chain evidence of fraud.
  - throwaway2048 8y ago
    They could easily collude with the party you are making a contract with, and rule against you however.
    - decentralised 8y ago
      That's not the case in many (most?) of the cases I mentioned. In plasma for instance, the operator and seller could collude against the buyer but any "illegal" operation they do on-chain is enough for anyone to trigger a mass-exit and cause financial and reputational loss to the operator. A common theme in all the on-chain payment technologies I mentioned is that they do not put any one party in "charge" but the volunteers who run staking channels of any sort (plasma, lightning, etc) can and will suffer financial damages (loss of deposit, etc) if proven to act maliciously.

mikeash 8y ago

But now you’re no longer “without a third party.”

decentralised 8y ago
There are nuances to the type of third parties we are talking about here. The type I'm discussing, something like the Lightning Channel and Plasma operators, these are roles that have cryptoeconomic properties that don't allow them to take over your wallet or refuse your service. edit: The base premise of having a smart-contract being itself the escrow is perfectly achievable. This doesn't mean that such a setup is the best solution to every use case and I believe that we'll see plenty of developments in this area in the coming years. For now the best approaches use game theory and computer science to reduce the amount of "trust" the parties must have in each other and the system itself but they are very much under active research & development.

spookthesunset 8y ago

That isn't "trustless" anymore! You gotta trust a bunch of unknown crypto startups now. Are these guys really add more value to the economy than chargebacks? I very much doubt it.

decentralised 8y ago
That's not correct. You can have a third party that is trustless, ie that cannot perform any action on its own that would favour or harm you. Take for instance the role of Plasma operator or Lightning Channel operator; The role allows for a third party to have the costs of setting up infrastructure for you to use, but at no point are your funds held by the operator and you are always able to exit a contract if you submit on-chain evidence of fraud.
- throwaway2048 8y ago
  They could easily collude with the party you are making a contract with, and rule against you however.
  - decentralised 8y ago
    That's not the case in many (most?) of the cases I mentioned. In plasma for instance, the operator and seller could collude against the buyer but any "illegal" operation they do on-chain is enough for anyone to trigger a mass-exit and cause financial and reputational loss to the operator. A common theme in all the on-chain payment technologies I mentioned is that they do not put any one party in "charge" but the volunteers who run staking channels of any sort (plasma, lightning, etc) can and will suffer financial damages (loss of deposit, etc) if proven to act maliciously.