4 ms·

But how would you protect the seller from the "evil buyer"? The one who receives the goods, but never releases the lock? Sure, he is not getting his money back,

• decentralised 8y ago
  The buyer has to pay to make the order, that's usually the case in most e-commerce transactions I can think of. If the evil buyer convinces the naive seller to ship products without a payment being executed or a smart-contract based bond, then the situation is exactly the same with or without cryptocurrencies.... the seller must report the buyer to the police and either hire a collection agency or take some other action to recover the goods. edit: on a second look, I think I misread your comment... are you asking about the mechanics of conterfactual transactions? If so, the idea is that the contract is entered with the buyer signing a transaction with some form of conditional operation. One the seller ships the product, the shipping code could very well be the condition that allows releasing the funds. There's plenty to talk about here around game theory and mechanism design, but if you are interested in the topic I can recommend some cool state-channel and plasma contracts we can go over and discuss.
  • ss248 8y ago
    >The buyer has to pay to make the order You mean like another lock? But what is stopping the seller from holding buyer's money hostage and force him to release the lock just to get some money back even when he did not receive the goods? An example of evil buyer would be something like: 1. The buyer buys goods from seller with smart-contract 2. The money in buyer's wallet gets locked. 3. The seller ships the goods. 4. The buyer receives the goods, but never signs the smart-contract. That way the buyer gets what he paid for, but the seller never receives the money. No matter how i think about it, smart-contract idea looks abusable.
    • decentralised 8y ago
      How about this: 1) the contract is initiated by the seller (sets amount, payable accounts, etc) 2) the contract is signed by the buyer, moving (or locking) an amount of money in the contract pending one of two situations: 2.1) the seller signs a message that the product has been shipped and the buyer signs a message the product has been received 2.2) the seller signs a message that the product has been shipped and after 30 days of no further message from the buyer's side the contract releases the funds In this case, the solution is to have a commitment from the buyer that unless they take action (sign a special message to denounce the transaction / pull out of the contract) the seller gets paid. To address the scenario where the seller is malicious, the buyer can use the on-chain commitments from both parties as evidence of malpractice and report the situation. (edit: formatting)
      • siquick 8y ago
        Isn't this very similar to what Escrow does?
      • deleted 8y ago
        [deleted]
      • jakelazaroff 8y ago
        Your caveat still renders the system vulnerable to malicious buyers. What if the buyer receives the product but "takes action" by denouncing the transaction or exiting the contract?
        • decentralised 8y ago
          That is a good point. On-chain, the solution is to have an oracle provide a third vote somehow. Off-chain, the solution is for the seller to report the buyer and its address to the authorities.
          • gerikson 8y ago
            Both solutions rely on trusted 3rd parties then.