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Science aside, the breakdown-of-bicameral-theory has intriguing parallels to Lacan's theory of the mirror stage. In this (nonscientific - but we're learning the
by thanatropism 8y ago
Science aside, the breakdown-of-bicameral-theory has intriguing parallels to Lacan's theory of the mirror stage. In this (nonscientific - but we're learning the limits of scientific psychology) theory, infants are born unarticulated, a mass of limbs with no wholeness to them. In the mirror stage they discover they have a body which is articulated and which is subject to the gaze of others. This begins the split between the Imaginary and the Symbolic (social reality). Under bicameral conditions, men didn't see themselves as articulated and autonomous, let alone as objects of others' (or in the case of gods, the Other, who provides the law) gaze. They didn't have imaginations split from social reality.
- theoh 8y agoIsn't the mirror stage really about discovering the unity of the body (as a kind of closed contour), thus permitting entry into the Imaginary? Then the Symbolic is initiated when these entities (of which the body's image is supposedly the first) start to be thought of in relation to each other, as in language. In that sense, I don't think you can have language without the Symbolic, so the analogy with Jaynes fails. Jaynes didn't claim that the bicameral phase meant undifferentiated reality without terms or objects. As I understand it, Lacan is talking about individual psychology. It doesn't make sense to talk about a person whose mind is "fused" with social reality, unless you believe that reality is some kind of solipsistic hallucination.
- thanatropism 8y agoAbout entering the Imaginary: you're in the right. That said, there are a number of stages in the development of Lacan's thought (Malcolm Bowie counts three); he starts out ostensibly as a clinician but gradually expands his concepts outwards until they're a generalized theory of subjectivity. From this point we can argue whether societies have structures somehow resembling subjectivity - as an economist I've spent a lot of time on the clock doing this. The thing is that as a clinical theory Lacan is way out there in the sophistic hallucination scale, even for the tiny minority that wants to resurrect psychodynamic therapy. Yet that's not what draws people to him, is it?
- theoh 8y agoWell, I've never heard of Lacanian economics, but there are plenty of fields in which understanding a bit about Lacan is essential if you want to appreciate the canon. Lacan as a person/analyst doesn't seem appealing to me, but some kind of psychodynamic therapy surely has a future in the long term, as insight accumulates into the mind. So Lacan seems like something to cautiously sift through for insight. The social as a subjective entity, or at least an apparently somewhat integrated/regulated entity that individual humans can interact with (the big Other), certainly exists as a concept in people's minds. It's a very formalistic, broad-brush picture of social interactions, of a kind that would probably appeal to computer scientists. There's not a lot of scope for nuance at the level of individual interactions. From that point of view, I suppose it could resemble the crude regulative ideas that control the bicameral mind.
- thanatropism 8y agoEconomists don't use Lacan yet, no.
- Alan_Dillman 8y agoI have early memories of a non verbal world, and in it, objects were not discrete. There were visually distinct elements, such things on the walls, and the walls themselves, but I had no concept of them being separate, or having names, or needing them, and didn't think about them. I just looked around. There was no chain of thoughts, just silent observation. Likewise, I lacked object permanence. When my mother left the room, she ceased to exist; I did not think about her or imagine her being somewhere else. There was no sense of time, no before or after that I can tell.I was just living in the moment. Ironically I know now what time it was, my rough age, and even the season, because of the specifics of where my room was. It was afternoon nap time. The sunlight was streaming in my window, which happened only in fall/winter, as there was a summertime screen of trees. We later reoriented our house, so that lets me establish my age too. I was just turned two, and late to talk. There must have been some sense of self by then, but I think that starts earlier, developing from kicking your legs and swinging your arms, and eventually realizing that you are a causation. Talking about this memory damages it, because language and symbolism overlays the experience into an approximation. But it is very different from my other memories. I think I held onto that memory because I had a later event that echoed it. Soon after we moved to another town, and there a whole bunch of people got the flu. People had not forgotten the Spanish Flu by the early 70s, and there was worries about another one. So they quarantined the hospital,put me in an oxygen tent, and I got to enjoy another timeless experience. By that time I could think, though I didn't talk. During admittance, my mom was holding me while talking to a nurse, and I saw a person in an oxygen tent get pushed down a hallfway. I pointed and asked, "Can I be in one of those?" Years later when I related this to my mother, she laughed and said, "No you didn't, you were too young to talk like that." I wasn't yet old enough to be told "you'll be here for a few days at least", or "mommy can't visit you(and she was pregnant)". The O2 tent was comprised of a yellowish, rubbery vinyl, and I remember touching it, and that it was a new experience for me. Couldn't really see anything through it, except diffuse sunlight. So I lay there facing the wall mostly, too sick to move, and spent a week with no internal narrative. I don't remember feeling lonely, scared, or bored. I remember a nurse checking on me(and probably changing my diaper), but not being awake at night.
- justinpombrio 8y agoFYI, this way of experiencing the world can be regained through meditation. This includes, from my experience: - The quieter inner narrative and silent observation. - The feeling that things not currently being experienced do not "exist" in the same way that things currently being experienced do. They exist in your imagination, and they exist in the sense that you correctly predict that if you were to observe them they would be there, but this knowledge feels ephemeral in contrast to the vivid detailed senses being experienced right now. - The disconnectedness of time. The past only exists in your memories. If you recall a memory, that happens in the present, and is quite unlike the experience you had that formed the memory. - Less of a sense of self. All your knowledge is available, but it feels third-person. I can't relate to some of the other parts of your experience, though, like the lack of separation/names of objects, and the realization of causation. As a caveat, I haven't been in this state of mind for a week or two, and as you say it doesn't play well with being remembered and analyzed.