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> You seem to have a hard time accepting that there are conflicting but equally valid moral systems out there. Yes, because this would entail moral relativism:
by woodruffw 8y ago
> You seem to have a hard time accepting that there are conflicting but equally valid moral systems out there.
Yes, because this would entail moral relativism: I would have to accept that for any course of action that I think is right, there might be any number of equally right but diametrically opposed actions. This undermines the entire point of a moral system, which is to be universal.
> Its more relaxed ways of justifying statements make it easier to disguise opinions as genuine philosophy, however I do believe that it is something else totally.
I apologize if this is incorrect, but I think this is coming from a position of ignorance. You cannot just wave your hands in (analytic) academic philosophy and expect people to accept, must less respect, your positions. You need to present a proof, containing formal methods, that your claim follows from your premises and that your premises are true. I'd wager that the majority of moral philosophers accept the validity of moral systems they don't think are correct, but not the soundness.
> If you try to publish something that improves a predictive model of the world, you'll get published. If you just try to publish unjustified speculations, it is far less likely.
But wait: this isn't a definition of science, it's just an efficient means for getting it published. It also doesn't cover science that produces new models. If every major science journal required me to sign a letter affirming the existence of God, would be we comfortable with that being a defining characteristic of the field?
> If you are uncomfortable calling it science because you have a different definition of the word, fine, call it what you want
I don't have a different definition, at least not necessarily. What I'm pointing out is that you're placing a lot of value on this thing we call science, and yet we haven't really established what it is. Is it synonymous with truth? How do we go about doing science on purely formal systems, like mathematics? What do we do with scientific results that are later invalidated?
Essentially, I don't think science is the only sound epistemic process. In the trivial case, logic is another one (and one potentially more important). Less trivially, I would claim that morality is a third.
> Any field of science will have understandable introductory material online, if you have one on these formal ethics systems, I'd be curious to read it.
J. S. Mill's Utilitarianism is an easy read, and is freely available online. Peter Singer also makes most of his work available. Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals is not an easy read (especially not with free older translations), but he is also available online. Similar for Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, which is probably somewhere between the other two. Together, these three make up the dominant meta- and ethical positions in the field today.
> When they needed ethics, they had to come up with answers themselves.
My point above was that they didn't have to. More concretely, they haven't, in at least one case: I taught an undergraduate course on ethics in cybersecurity, and used ethics material directly from philosophy.
When I say "haven't done their homework," I'm not referring to a need to build their own ethics -- I'm referring to the prevailing arrogance that allows them to dismiss moral philosophy without even understanding it first.
> This is a battleground that belongs to politics, religion, arts, culture.
But these are all things that philosophy either built or tempered!
Our political systems (in the West) are the direct consequence of 17th, 18th, and 19th century political philosophy, all of which have their own lineages. Most religions make substantial philosophical claims, and even respond to the philosophical challenges presented both inside and outside their orders. The field of aesthetics makes claims like "art is in the eye of the beholder" sensible to begin with.
Now, there's an obvious sense in which what you say is true: it does ultimately come down to my personal preferences. But again, this doesn't tell me what my personal preferences should be. We could appeal to the worlds of politics, religion, &c for answers, but these all ultimately make normative claims based on their philosophical underpinnings. Why not cut out the middleman?