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>Physics is notoriously bad at having curiosity about strange, unconventional, or truly novel ideas. Physics of today would be unrecognisable to a scientist at
by andrepd 8y ago
>Physics is notoriously bad at having curiosity about strange, unconventional, or truly novel ideas.
Physics of today would be unrecognisable to a scientist at the start of the 20th century. Indeed the physics of 1935 would be unrecognisable to a scientist at the start of the 20th century. Our understanding progressed enormously AND it did so because people put forward radical theories in complete rupture with the established, 300-year old classical mechanics. There was no "traditionalist resistance" to it after it became apparent that classical mechanics failed to explain phenomena that quantum theory did explain.
>am astonished at how aggressively physicists resisted and suppressed "unconventional" interpretations of quantum mechanics (like the many worlds interpretation) in favor of the obviously-wrong Copenhagen interpretation [emphasis mine]
Ahahaha, you clearly have no idea what you're talking about. There is nothing "obviously wrong" about the standard Copenhagen interpretation (unless you have some new insight you would like to share), nor was there any suppression of ideas. Many debates have been waged in the past ~100 years, and many alternative interpretations have been put forward, like Bohmian theory, superdeterminism, or "shut-up-and-calculate".
>decided that it was meaningless to ask any deep questions about what QM actually meant
Physics, indeed all science, studies observable reality. Any "deep" questions about why or about things not measurable, quantifiable, or empirically observable, are by definition outside the scope of science. It is therefore as unreasonable as complaining about why don't geologists study epistemology. The answer is the same: it's outside the scope of their study.
I also don't like that your phrase seems to imply that what physicists study is not "deep" as opposed to your philosophical questions. There are many deep and beautiful ideas in physics.
- tbabb 8y ago> There is nothing "obviously wrong" about the standard Copenhagen interpretation Can you tell me how to calculate whether a system of particles will cause another system of particles to collapse or not? Can you tell me under what circumstances a system of particles will evolve unitarily or not? Can you shade the region of the spacetime diagram of EPR where the wavefunction is collapsed? How about in a delayed choice quantum eraser experiment? If you tell me "you're not allowed to ask those questions" (or "hm, I never thought of that!"), then you're directly illustrating the complaint here about physics! The common narrative is that Copenhagen, many worlds, and the other interpretations of QM are all equivalent, but they are not. Copenhagen adds an extra physical event-- collapse-- where the wavefunction is suddenly nonunitary. The burden is on Copenhagen to tell me how and when this happens, and in fact to prove that it happens at all. Many worlds, on the other hand, predicts the same phenomenon-- the apparent collapse of a wavefunction to an eigenstate-- without adding unitarity violation, or any other phenomena at all beyond the normal, extremely well-verified mechanics of multi-particle system scattering; it merely treats the environment is a multi-particle quantum system. Many worlds is the null hypothesis (no, the extra worlds are not extra suppositions, they are predictions of known physical laws), and the burden is on Copenhagen to show that unitarity violation exists, and the burden is extremely high (possibly insurmountable?) for EPR and eraser experiments. When Copenhagen was devised, most believed that there was some "underlying state" in QM, and that measurement told you something about what the underlying state was. Bell's theorem should have sent a shockwave through the community which forced everyone to reevaluate fundamental assumptions and self-correct wrong ideas. But by accident of history, John Bell was too shy to publish in a major journal, and no one even read his result for four years. The implications of Bell's theorem were slow to diffuse through the community, and so the disruptive moment of reckoning that should have happened never came. By the time it was well-accepted, the narrative in physics had become "you're not allowed to ask about what quantum mechanics means, just shut up and calculate", and so the cognitive dissonance was cast aside. Annealing this attitude and this misstep away is taking excruciating decades. EDIT: I also don't mean to imply that there aren't deep and beautiful things in modern physics. There are! But physics is concertedly avoiding asking deep questions in areas where (I strongly believe) it is most important. The claim that "the meaning of QM is outside the scope of science" is exemplary, I think, of that attitude.
- andrepd 8y ago>Can you tell me how to calculate whether a system of particles will cause another system of particles to collapse or not? You appear to be somewhat mistaken. Copenhagen interpretation does not postulate any specific explanation or mechanism for wave-function collapse, merely that "upon measurement, the wave-function collapses into an eigenstate of the observable being measured". This, of course, is a physically verified phenomenon. Now Copenhagen purposefully leaves the precise meaning of "measurement" undefined, since in my view there is no convincing empirical evidence that supports a specific mechanism for this phenomenon. Other interpretations posit mechanisms (decoherence (doesn't fully account), von Neumann "consiousness" (not empirical), etc.) for this collapse. My biggest complaint about many-worlds interpretation is how it is in its essence a non-scientific theory, as it makes assertions about an unobservable reality. It postulates other parallel realities that by definition do not communicate. Again, this makes it intrinsically a non-scientific theory. >Can you tell me under what circumstances a system of particles will evolve unitarily or not? Everywhere except on measurement, in which the state collapses. >How about in a delayed choice quantum eraser experiment? I'm not familiar with this experiment. >If you tell me "you're not allowed to ask those questions" By all means, ask as many questions as you want. That's after all the essence of scientific endeavour. But it's not very nice to misrepresent other positions, nor is it to claim everyone else is deluded (without strong evidence on your side at least). >Bell's theorem should have sent a shockwave through the community which forced everyone to reevaluate fundamental assumptions and self-correct wrong ideas. Bell's inequalities force no re-evaluation. They simply prove that the search for a local hidden-variable theory is impossible. It certainly raised important ideas for research, but it does not do anything to discredit established QM. >The claim that "the meaning of QM is outside the scope of science" is exemplary, I think, of that attitude. If a physical argument can be made about this problem, then it's in the scope of physics. Otherwise, it is not. As simple as that.
- naasking 8y ago> This, of course, is a physically verified phenomenon No it's not. There are interpretations in which collapse does not exist, so these experiments are not measuring what you think they're measuring unless you already assume the conclusion. Also, your view on other interpretations of QM are outdated. Arguably one of the more famous results on quantum mechanics, Bell's theorem, would have never existed if not for Bohmian mechanics. Don't discount the value of explanatory power. The fact that other interpretations provide far more explanatory power than Copenhagen makes them far more valuable. Many important results in quantum foundations would have never happened if everyone were a Copenhagenist.
- FakeComments 8y ago> There is nothing "obviously wrong" about the standard Copenhagen interpretation. Copenhagen interpretation showed up when they were faced with a choice between preserving locality or determinancy. They chose wrong — we know now QM is non-local, and that the underlying justification for the Copenhagen model is an extraneous philosophical proposition. But much like an extra dependency in a software project, no one wants to remove it now that it’s used everywhere, and there’s a lot of “good enough” stuff using it. That said, it seems to be one of the major impediments to a unified theory: by dropping the extraneous assumption, we have fewer things to reconcile with GR, and can start looking for GR geometries that have quantized non-local behaviors. ie, dropping Copenhagen and giving geons another look is probably worth it. (And is basically what loop quantum gravity people are doing, as far as I can tell.)
- selestify 8y agoCopenhagen does not require nonlocality
- FakeComments 8y agoNo, but if you have non-locality, then you don’t need the non-definiteness of Copenhagen, and could do with something like a Bohm or MW interpretation.
- kgwgk 8y agoOr you could do with Copenhagen... I found this quote from David Lindley in a review of Adam Becker's book referenced in this thead (http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/?p=10147 http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/?p=10147): "The problem with Copenhagen is that it leaves measurement unexplained; how does a measurement select one outcome from many? Everett’s proposal keeps all outcomes alive, but this simply substitutes one problem for another: how does a measurement split apart parallel outcomes that were previously in intimate contact? In neither case is the physical mechanism of measurement accounted for; both employ sleight of hand at the crucial moment."
- naasking 8y ago> Physics, indeed all science, studies observable reality. Any "deep" questions about why or about things not measurable, quantifiable, or empirically observable, are by definition outside the scope of science. This is wrong. Scientific theories provide predictive power, yes, but they should also provide explanatory power. Which is to say, they should describe a model of the world because this is how we devise experiments, and experiments are clearly critical for science. Two theories with equivalent predictive power but unequal explanatory power are not equally good theories.