3 ms·
"Can you talk about the privacy and anonymity levels of these 4 scenarios?" Your thinking is going in the right direction here, but you should consider some de
by rsync 8y ago
"Can you talk about the privacy and anonymity levels of these 4 scenarios?"
Your thinking is going in the right direction here, but you should consider some deeper analysis of your behavior ...
In your example, 1.2B people access gmail - so far, so good.
But how many people access gmail and HN ? How about gmail and HN and MeFi ? All during US timezone waking hours ? You can see where I am going with this.
Now let's look at a different angle - you only visit gmail, so you're safely back in the 1.2B herd, right ? But how many people visit gmail with OSX ? With OSX vX.Y ? With your screen resolution, your enabled fonts, and your patch level?
You might be very surprised at how unique your web hit really is.[1]
The point being made here is that if you funnel all of your usage (traffic ?) everywhere, you create a usage "fingerprint" that can then be noticed or logged or tracked or correlated anywhere else you go.
It's not hopeless - you could spin up a throwaway VM that you would only use for gmail and nothing else, but again - there are opsec considerations there that can sink the whole operation, just like above, if you aren't very, very careful.
[1] https://panopticlick.eff.org/ https://panopticlick.eff.org/
- logicallee 8y agoAre you specifically saying that if someone wants to post to "get you killed.com", the web site for "Exposés that'll probably get you killed. Have an exposé you want to post that'll probably get you killed? Post them here now! We're on tor, too" then out of these two versions: 1. Only log in to tor to visit "get you killed.com" once you're ready to post the stuff that'll get you killed. No other tor usage. 2. Do all your usage through tor, including making your "get you killed.com" post but everything else too. Then out of these two versions, the person who is doing (1) is safer than the person doing (2)?