4 ms·
Let's be honest. No company would have resisted this sort of internal threat. This is either fiction (which it sounds like it is) or this is just a lack of time
by baby 8y ago
Let's be honest. No company would have resisted this sort of internal threat. This is either fiction (which it sounds like it is) or this is just a lack of time. The difference between pentesters vs real hackers are that hackers have as much time as they want.
- corndoge 8y agoI agree this reads like fiction. Strange capitalization, and no technical person I know or know of would write this way; it all seems very cavalier and not the careful writing of someone who actually does this for a living. Not that I know better.
- CPLX 8y agoIt’s a twitter thread, it’s worth noting.
- detaro 8y agoThe style seems fairly normal for public stories from that type of work.
- emmelaich 8y agoI found this odd: > spent some time hunting the Domain Controller The DC address(es) are trivial to find.
- crankylinuxuser 8y agoThey can be. But here's the problem: You have a GPO that turns on command and ps logging. Ok, so if you type those commands, you alert script logging engines. And then you search how to find the DC: https://serverfault.com/questions/78089/find-name-of-active-directory-domain-controller https://serverfault.com/questions/78089/find-name-of-active-... It's all PS or cmd. Trapped. You might find the DC listed in the registry if you look for key "DCname". However again, that's another thing you'd use app whitelisting for, and catch every invocation of regedit. A lot of unattended driveby attacks attempt to do bad things here, so you catch/trap them. Again, dead end. So, I'd love to see a good walkthrough how to find the DC if these avenues don't work.
- brazzledazzle 8y agoI think this one won’t get you caught: Explorer address bar (or start>run) > %logonserver%
- crankylinuxuser 8y agoTrue, for smaller orgs. When you get to larger orgs, the DC doesnt always have to be the logon server. In fact, you're liable to see a slew of logon kerb redirectors talking to a few ldap backends running as pri and secondary AD.
- brazzledazzle 8y agoI have to admit I’m not familiar with anything in your comment. Is this different terminology for a RODCs? I was also under the impression that AD didn’t have a primary DC, the only vestige of that is the PDC Emulator FSMO role.
- emmelaich 8y agoYou can just do a SRV DNS lookup. For PDC it is _ldap._tcp.pdc._msdcs.<DnsDomainName> See https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/servergeeks/2014/07/12/dns-records-that-are-required-for-proper-functionality-of-active-directory/ https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/servergeeks/2014/07/12/dns-... [edit: I see the SO link mentions SRV. Still]
- pizzalife 8y agoIt seems like fiction. I run a small but specialized computer security consultancy and most customers are not interested in throwing away money at "pentests" that don't involve breaking code. When we gain access to a customer's internal network, we do try lateral movement on the network and give recommendations for how to isolate different parts.
- crispyambulance 8y agoThe author is a well-known (on the twitter-sphere) pen-tester. Despite the childish gif memes and dramatic trimming, I don't think he made it up. But I agree, it seems strange that he didn't succeed. When corporations hire pen-testers, the set-up is that their CIO/CSO has full knowledge of what is going down and when so that they're prepared to intervene in the unlikely scenario of the pen-tester getting caught. Knowing the mentality that is common amongst c-level suits, however, it would not be surprising if the suit tipped-off his IT guy in advance. After all, wouldn't catching the well-paid pen-tester look better to the other suits than being utterly pwned and paying for privilege? The CIO might have successfully "kobiashi-maru'd" the whole exercise. Not saying that happened here, but if large corporations are capable of horrific security breaches, I think they're also capable of trying game the system to avoid things going sideways.
- vharuck 8y agoIf "gaming the system" includes setting up MFA and sensible admin rights, then I'd call the test a good use of time.
- blincoln 8y agoI can't tell you for sure that this is truth or fiction, but I've worked in information security for seven years (three as a consultant), and the story is 100% believable. The writing style is also consistent with the way about half of the pen testers I know write when they're not writing a formal report. I specialize in the remote version of the kind of test the author describes. I'd be happy to do it in-person too, but usually the clients were less interested in that.