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I've thought about this as well, but in a different sense. Think if cloudfare were actually the NSA. Seeing as how ssl terminates at their edge server before th

by cronix 8y ago

I've thought about this as well, but in a different sense. Think if cloudfare were actually the NSA. Seeing as how ssl terminates at their edge server before they pass it off to your actual server (whether they re-encrypt it or not), they have access to all of the decrypted traffic in transit before it reaches your server, don't they? > When you use Cloudflare, we must decrypt the data at our edge in order to cache and filter any bad traffic. Depending on the SSL setting from the options above, we may re-encrypt or send it as plain text. (full vs. flex) Since each certificate needs a dedicated IP address, we add your domain name and wildcard (*.domain.com) domain in the SAN (Subject Alternative Name) to the certificate.[1] [1] https://support.cloudflare.com/hc/en-us/articles/204144518-SSL-FAQ https://support.cloudflare.com/hc/en-us/articles/204144518-S...

ezekg 8y ago
I think it’s highly likely that Cloudflare is at least associated with the NSA/CIA, maybe more. Also Google, Facebook. One of the reasons I don’t own a Home/Alexa/etc. I value privacy.
- cronix 8y ago
  It would be perfect for them. Instead of having to hack, just get them to come to you under the guise of DDoS protection. "Hey, everyone's starting to encrypt and we can't get the data as easy as we used to." "Well, DDoS is a big problem out there. What if we offered a DDoS protection service because very few companies can afford the huge pipes needed to mitigate those attacks." "Perfect! We can offer it to free for most sites, and offer "free" SSL encryption that terminates on our end." "Yes! We'd gain their trust by offering such a service and they'd COME TO US begging for help." I've wondered about LetsEncrypt as well. Since they're they ones generating these "free ssl certs", don't they then have the means to the decrypt the data? Yes, I'm cynical, but I think we need to be. Same scenario as above. "Hey, we can just offer free certs and they will just give us the keys."
  - unilynx 8y ago
    LetsEncrypt, no. they don't ask you for your private key when you get a certificate, so they can't decrypt anything.
    - jjeaff 8y ago
      They couldn't decrypt, but as a CA, like any other trusted CA, they could man-in-the-middle the traffic, read it, then pass it along to your server, re-encrypted.
      - tialaramex 8y ago
        When a Chrome (and soon to be also Safari, Firefox) connects to a web server over TLS it expects to see SCTs, Signed Certificate Timestamps from some qualified logs (in Chrome's case at least one of these logs must be operated by Google and at least one must not). In most people's setups they get these baked inside their certificates, but you can do it in other ways and that'll work too. The SCTs can only be produced by these logs, and only when the log is shown the tbsCertificate data. The intent is that the log service promises to log all certificates for which it provides a timestamp. A Merkle Tree is used so that we can examine a log and obtain proof that it does indeed contain every certificate we've seen SCTs for. So, your conspiracy needs to involve the Certificate Authority (Let's Encrypt in this case), the CT logging team at Google, and at least one third party log operator. Or it would be detected when it was tried.
        jjeaff 8y ago
        >So, your conspiracy needs to involve the Certificate Authority (Let's Encrypt in this case), the CT logging team at Google... No, as you alluded to, my conspiracy only needs that the user uses any of the many browsers besides chrome.
  - zeta0134 8y ago
    At least in Let's Encrypt's case, I thought the free SSL cert was handled as a normal CSR request; the private key should never leave the server the certificate is issued for, assuming the client performing the CSR isn't compromised in some way. All Let's Encrypt's validator service should get is a challenge signed by the private key, not the key itself. A CA compromise is still very bad, but mostly because it allows an attacker to issue valid certificates and set themselves up as a MitM more easily. Let's Encrypt is still subject to this kind of attack, but so is every other CA; it's not a new threat. That can be reasonably worked around with certificate pinning and other techniques.
- eeZah7Ux 8y ago
  NSA always wanted to be a so-called global observer. CloudFlare is in the perfect position to be the global observer and it sell it as a feature, not a bug. NSA budget is big enough that it could buy CloudFlare 10 times a year, or have thousands of undercover agents. Every "target" website that is not using CF can be cheaply DDoSsed until it switches to CF or disappear.
- ttul 8y ago
  Are you actually concerned that NSA/CIA has any interest in what you do? If you’re not into terrorism or espionage, I guarantee you are not that important...
  - cronix 8y ago
    Is this one of those "if you're not doing anything wrong you have nothing to worry about" arguments? If I'm (we're) not that "important", why do they need the data in the first place? In order to determine if I'm (we're) "important" enough, instead of having some sort of evidence/proof to begin with like the constitution spells out. It's the biggest fishing expedition in the world, and can also be used in the future based on past data. They have no business looking at my data unless they have a legit reason to, as in I've done something and they have enough evidence to take before a judge and get a warrant. Due Process. Not the other way around.

by cronix 8y ago

ezekg 8y ago

I think it’s highly likely that Cloudflare is at least associated with the NSA/CIA, maybe more. Also Google, Facebook. One of the reasons I don’t own a Home/Alexa/etc. I value privacy.

cronix 8y ago
It would be perfect for them. Instead of having to hack, just get them to come to you under the guise of DDoS protection. "Hey, everyone's starting to encrypt and we can't get the data as easy as we used to." "Well, DDoS is a big problem out there. What if we offered a DDoS protection service because very few companies can afford the huge pipes needed to mitigate those attacks." "Perfect! We can offer it to free for most sites, and offer "free" SSL encryption that terminates on our end." "Yes! We'd gain their trust by offering such a service and they'd COME TO US begging for help." I've wondered about LetsEncrypt as well. Since they're they ones generating these "free ssl certs", don't they then have the means to the decrypt the data? Yes, I'm cynical, but I think we need to be. Same scenario as above. "Hey, we can just offer free certs and they will just give us the keys."
- unilynx 8y ago
  LetsEncrypt, no. they don't ask you for your private key when you get a certificate, so they can't decrypt anything.
  - jjeaff 8y ago
    They couldn't decrypt, but as a CA, like any other trusted CA, they could man-in-the-middle the traffic, read it, then pass it along to your server, re-encrypted.
    - tialaramex 8y ago
      When a Chrome (and soon to be also Safari, Firefox) connects to a web server over TLS it expects to see SCTs, Signed Certificate Timestamps from some qualified logs (in Chrome's case at least one of these logs must be operated by Google and at least one must not). In most people's setups they get these baked inside their certificates, but you can do it in other ways and that'll work too. The SCTs can only be produced by these logs, and only when the log is shown the tbsCertificate data. The intent is that the log service promises to log all certificates for which it provides a timestamp. A Merkle Tree is used so that we can examine a log and obtain proof that it does indeed contain every certificate we've seen SCTs for. So, your conspiracy needs to involve the Certificate Authority (Let's Encrypt in this case), the CT logging team at Google, and at least one third party log operator. Or it would be detected when it was tried.
      - jjeaff 8y ago
        >So, your conspiracy needs to involve the Certificate Authority (Let's Encrypt in this case), the CT logging team at Google... No, as you alluded to, my conspiracy only needs that the user uses any of the many browsers besides chrome.
- zeta0134 8y ago
  At least in Let's Encrypt's case, I thought the free SSL cert was handled as a normal CSR request; the private key should never leave the server the certificate is issued for, assuming the client performing the CSR isn't compromised in some way. All Let's Encrypt's validator service should get is a challenge signed by the private key, not the key itself. A CA compromise is still very bad, but mostly because it allows an attacker to issue valid certificates and set themselves up as a MitM more easily. Let's Encrypt is still subject to this kind of attack, but so is every other CA; it's not a new threat. That can be reasonably worked around with certificate pinning and other techniques.
eeZah7Ux 8y ago
NSA always wanted to be a so-called global observer. CloudFlare is in the perfect position to be the global observer and it sell it as a feature, not a bug. NSA budget is big enough that it could buy CloudFlare 10 times a year, or have thousands of undercover agents. Every "target" website that is not using CF can be cheaply DDoSsed until it switches to CF or disappear.
ttul 8y ago
Are you actually concerned that NSA/CIA has any interest in what you do? If you’re not into terrorism or espionage, I guarantee you are not that important...
- cronix 8y ago
  Is this one of those "if you're not doing anything wrong you have nothing to worry about" arguments? If I'm (we're) not that "important", why do they need the data in the first place? In order to determine if I'm (we're) "important" enough, instead of having some sort of evidence/proof to begin with like the constitution spells out. It's the biggest fishing expedition in the world, and can also be used in the future based on past data. They have no business looking at my data unless they have a legit reason to, as in I've done something and they have enough evidence to take before a judge and get a warrant. Due Process. Not the other way around.