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The fundamental principle-agent issue here, is that startup-y people, who thrive on small teams getting stuff done, are essential for getting a startup up the g
by sdrinf 8y ago
The fundamental principle-agent issue here, is that startup-y people, who thrive on small teams getting stuff done, are essential for getting a startup up the ground; however it is exactly the point where startups hold the least cash to compensate with.
This generally leads to stock-option based compensation; which, in turn, expires 30 days after employee leaves.
This economics -as practiced presently- strongly implies for savvy startupy people to work only on startups of their own; which in turn makes early hiring extremely difficult.
There are 2 points of equilibrium here:
* The current one is people leading less savvy people on. This leads to a lot of resentment; see rest of HN for that.
* a much less wrong solution would be to have secondary markets set up significantly earlier in the game (post series a); which would make stock & options immediate liquid. Despite sales difficulties(for finding counter parties for that), this can be a huge advantage during hiring, as employees don’t have to take on lottery tickets; and allow early employees to resign with much less resentment.
- savrajsingh 8y agoSecfi.com trying to solve this in some regard (not quite)
- jcroll 8y agoCan you elaborate more on how this "secondary market" would work?
- pbreit 8y agoEasiest would be to offer employees a small % of liquidity during a fundraising round. Not sure why this is not done more frequently.
- goldfeld 8y agoBecause anything of value is kept tight for investors and for the possibility of more investors? Early startups don't have much else to offer, which is not to say the way startups is done is morally commendable.