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> The problem here is: in the transition from the -NG to the -MAX, Boeing added this protection and didn’t tell anyone Totally out of my depth here, but how is
by stef25 8y ago
> The problem here is: in the transition from the -NG to the -MAX, Boeing added this protection and didn’t tell anyone
Totally out of my depth here, but how is it possible that they "didn't tell anyone" about a feature so crucial, how could pilots not know how the plane's computer will behave in such a fundamental, non edge-case scenario?
- slededit 8y agoBoeing specifically marketed this as not requiring new training. So they did everything they could to hide it in order to satisfy marketing’s desire. The FAA signed off. I guess the lawyers will argue if it was legal or not.
- tmd83 8y agoThat's what I'm wondering about. How did Boeing get away without disclosing it. Or if they disclose it how did FAA agree that this is not something that pilots need to know and train for. If they signed off on Boeing not letting pilots know FAA should be on the hook for this too.
- raverbashing 8y agoA stick Pusher is not a new feature, if you're right, and the FAA signed off that operators of the NG did not need any supplementary training and that caused the accident that will be very ugly for Boeing
- inferiorhuman 8y agoMCAS is not a stick pusher -- and that's the crux of the problem. A stick pusher would essentially adjust the elevator to pitch the plane down. MCAS trims the stabilizer. At full stabilizer travel you may not have sufficient elevator authority to overcome the downward pitch. Put another way, you can counteract the stick pusher by pulling back (although this may take a strong pilot). If you don't catch MCAS doing something stupid and the plane ends up fully trimmed down you cannot counteract this by pulling back. Here's some other examples of what happens when the stabilizer is trimmed without the pilot knowing. Sadly Capt. VanderBurgh died a couple years ago. Had he not it would have been fascinating to see his take on the Lion Air wreck. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WfNBmZy1Yuc https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WfNBmZy1Yuc And here's a quick overview of how the stabilizer functions in a 737: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l62NvkRWa5E https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l62NvkRWa5E
- foldr 8y ago> At full stabilizer travel you may not have sufficient elevator authority to overcome the downward pitch. Do the stabilizer trim tabs really have more authority than the elevator? That seems odd.
- voiture_rapide 8y agoThey aren’t “trim tabs” — it moves the entire stabilizer.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- foldr 8y agoAh ok, that make sense.
- FabHK 8y agoThis article from 2013 outlines the differences quite nicely. It's a subtle point (that I hadn't appreciated before reading the article), but trim on a Cessna (on which many pilots learn) and modern jet work quite differently, though you rarely ever notice the difference in normal ops (because you never go massively out of trim). The author speculates that several accidents might be attributable to this. Do you really understand how your trim works? Many do not, and why it matters. Alex Fisher - GAPAN https://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/2627.pdf https://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/2627.pdf
- VBprogrammer 8y agoI only really appreciated this while reading while reading about https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alaska_Airlines_Flight_261 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alaska_Airlines_Flight_261 It's quite an interesting one if you are into that kind of thing.
- inferiorhuman 8y agoWell an MD-80 does use trim tabs.
- ourmandave 8y agoBut it's right there in the Terms of Service box! The pilot probably just clicked right through it without reading.
- bilbo0s 8y agoWow. Your statement is so true on so many levels and applicable to so many industries that it seems unfair that I can only upvote you once.
- xvf22 8y agoBoeing can self certify[0]. I'm not sure where this enhancement/feature would fall but they seem to have at least some latitude. [0] https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faa-extends-boeings-authority-to-self-certify-aircraft/ https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faa-e...
- inferiorhuman 8y ago> Totally out of my depth here, but how is it possible that they "didn't tell anyone" about a feature so crucial, how could pilots not know how the plane's computer will behave in such a fundamental, non edge-case scenario? I couldn't even hazard a guess. Boeing told the Brazilian authorities about it. See the table on Page 18 under MCAS. http://www.anac.gov.br/assuntos/setor-regulado/profissionais-da-aviacao-civil/avaliacao-operacional-1/Boeing_737_OE_Report_Revoriginal.pdf http://www.anac.gov.br/assuntos/setor-regulado/profissionais... For comparison here's the FAA equivalent: http://fsims.faa.gov/wdocs/fsb/b-737_rev%2014.pdf http://fsims.faa.gov/wdocs/fsb/b-737_rev%2014.pdf Note that MCAS is distinctly absent from the difference tables (also) on page 18. The FAA signed off on the NG to MAX training as "B" level differences. This means no sim time necessary[1] (although apparently American Airlines doesn't have a MAX sim in the first place). The Brazilians were made aware of MCAS and thought that also qualified as a "B" level difference. The question then is: did the FAA think MCAS constituted a C or D level difference? 1: See the table on page 14 for a list of the FAA definition of different categories of differences