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Interesting, but the commit that introduced the malicious changes wouldn't be signed by the alleged author's key. Also I'd trust anyone who denies adding a bac
by _jomo 8y ago
Interesting, but the commit that introduced the malicious changes wouldn't be signed by the alleged author's key.
Also I'd trust anyone who denies adding a backdoor like this. Why would anyone do this with their name attached to the change?
What you'd actually do is change the author to "Anonymous Coward <nobody@android.com>" ;)
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/packages/apps/GlobalSearch/+/592150ac00086400415afe936d96f04d3be3ba0c https://android.googlesource.com/platform/packages/apps/Glob...
- ahmedalsudani 8y agoHah. That is an interesting commit! Definitely a smart move if you're pushing an unpopular change to an open source project.
- C4K3 8y agoIn the given scenario, the author signs tags and not commits. So the malicious commit wouldn't be signed at all because no commits are signed, and therefore nothing would look out of place. The article is arguing that only signing tags is insufficient, and that you should sign every commit individually to prevent this scenario.