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Just from top of my head, a faulty Airspeed Sensor and some quirky AOA sensor behaviour was one of the reasons why the Air France flight crashed into the Atlant
by hef19898 8y ago
Just from top of my head, a faulty Airspeed Sensor and some quirky AOA sensor behaviour was one of the reasons why the Air France flight crashed into the Atlantic a couple of years ago. These two factors contributed to a loss of situational awareness, a lack of system knowledge, the quirky AOA sensor behaviour, meant the pilots never regained situational awareness.
And trim may sound trivial, but sudden changes of the center of gravity can be instantly fatal. Once you leave the space of small trim adjustments needed, for e.g. fuel consumption, recovery may well be impossible. That's why load planning of planes and cargo handling / stowing are so important. You don' t want to end up with a center of gravity in a place that is incompatible with flight.
- JshWright 8y agoThe major difference is that the Lion Air crash took place during the day, in clear weather. AF447 crashed at night, in poor weather conditions.
- fr0sty 8y agoAF447 was a bad airspeed sensor and a switch of the control system from "normal law" to "alternate law" as a response to the momentary bad inputs. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447
- SteveCoast 8y agoFrom memory; pitot tubes froze over and airspeed became unreliable. Autopilot disengaged and they had a stall warning. One pilot went full nose down, the other wanted full nose up. The latter probably believed the flight envelope protections were still in place which would not let you stall even if you did full nose up. But they weren't because the flight computer switched to alternate law when airspeed was unreliable so they had full control of the airplane and (probably) didn't realize it. Additionally when presented with two different control stick inputs the flight computer just averaged them, and since there was no force feedback there is no tactile sense that you're arguing with the other pilot over what you should be doing. Also only one person is supposed to be in command. My memory is also that the senior captain was in the third seat and didn't have a full grasp of the situation either. I did read the air accident report quite a while ago so this might be wrong, but in summary, it's not exactly arguable that the aircraft did the wrong thing (it did as designed minus the freeze issue which is suboptimal but something that can happen) and the pilots didn't exactly do the wrong thing either since they may have little to no experience flying the plane in alternate law (certainly not at high altitude and speed), and it's not unreasonable to be fully aware that they had full control (as opposed to the flight computer mediating and not letting them do something stupid like stall it all the way down to the ocean). Lastly, when in cruise it's not completely trivial to fly like a Cessna at 1,000ft. At cruise on a big heavy jet you can't go much higher as the air is too thin to fly. You can't go much faster without braking the sound barrier. You can't go much slower as you'll stall. I believe it's called "coffin corner", and while commercial passenger planes do it every day it's not quite as simple as you might think.
- garaetjjte 8y ago> flight computer switched to alternate law when airspeed was unreliable so they had full control of the airplane Alternate law still enforces bank angle protection. With full control (direct law) it could have entered spin. (or maybe they could realized situation earlier) Stall warning was confusing because pulling up even more removed warning temporarily because extreme AoA was interpreted as sensor failure.
- Johnny555 8y agoit's not exactly arguable that the aircraft did the wrong thing I still think it's arguable that the "right thing" is for the plane to say "Hey, I don't know how to fly this thing anymore, so I'm giving up! Oh and since I'm so confused, the plane is in alternate law, so all of those nomal-law protections you usually have aren't there." and then handing over control to the pilot that hasn't been actively flying the plane and expecting him to suddenly figure out what's been happening and why the autopilot gave up. Since the pilots did pretty much the opposite of what they should have done, maybe the plane could have done better itself, even with the unreliable airspeed?
- xenadu02 8y agoThere's no excuse for secretly averaging widely divergent inputs, especially in alternate law (which the plane wouldn't be in unless something is going wrong). It should have picked one and indicated to the other pilot that his/her input was being ignored. IIRC this isn't an issue on the Boeing design, only Airbus. One the contributing factors was that the stall warning cut out when the nose was pointed higher up, giving the copilot the impression his attempt to full nose up was the right decision. When the nose lowered the stall warning kicked back in. IIRC this was because the computer saw the full nose up as an "impossible" condition and decided not to issue the stall warning. As the nose lowered certain values came back in-range so it issued the warning. Without these two wildly incorrect behaviors the plane probably wouldn't have crashed.
- exidy 8y agoIt didn't secretly average inputs. The plane gave alerts both visual and audible (DUAL INPUT) that the pilots were providing conflicting inputs. I agree that the force feedback of the Boeing FBW system is better, but the pilots should have understood the alerts provided, and either communicated or made use of their override switches. Solving the problem by ignoring one of the pilots would be an interesting engineering problem. How do you choose?