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There don't and should not be any trusted parties. Every trusted party is, by definition, a point of failure if the party is compromised. PCI requires that org

There don't and should not be any trusted parties. Every trusted party is, by definition, a point of failure if the party is compromised. PCI requires that organizations control cryptographic material using rules of dual control and split knowledge. No individual should have access to entire cryptographic key and any processes and devices should require at least two people to operate. For example, HSM-s are ALWAYS operated by at least two security officers. Cryptographic keys are generated by HSM in the form of multiple components onto multiple smartcards. Each smartcard is stored in a separate safe where only the security officer/s assigned to that component have access. The HSM to be injected with keys must be operated by multiple security officers with their components. The HSM is regularly inspected -- each security officer brings his key from his safe, two keys are required to open the enclosure where the HSM is located. When the payment terminal is injected with keys there are two operators present monitoring each other to prevent tampering with the process. Etc. With good understanding of the concepts it is possible to build secure system. It's not that hard.

schoen 8y ago
I think we're talking about different levels of the system. The attack in this case was not about an individual employee unilaterally taking an improper action, but about a company being officially compelled by a government to take an action that was contrary to the interest of an end-user. In the financial system this happens all the time and is considered somewhat unremarkable. If this company had had a dual control mechanism where multiple security officers had to be involved in order to issue signatures, presumably the company's executives would have told those security officers "we have to issue this signature because the government requires us to", and presumably the security officers would then have done it. It wasn't a rogue action from the organizational point of view, only from the customer's point of view. Also, in a messaging application new public keys have to be certified extremely frequently because new users and devices are constantly joining the system with new keys. Presumably this happens in an automated online fashion (otherwise, the security officers aren't going to get much sleep). That makes it even more challenging to subdivide the responsibility for certification, for many reasons. I don't mean to disparage the precautions that financial organizations have implemented, and I agree that some parts of the software world sometimes seem extremely cavalier in comparison. But I still think that in this particular case the threat models are extremely different.
- lmilcin 8y ago
  Nope, not really. 1. They are choosing and then providing devices. This is very important because it means they have physical contact with the device, initially, so they have means to bootstrap cryptographic system by way of injecting keys, etc. 2. They are middlemen transferring messages between multiple parties that use their devices without having to understand the secret part of the message and only routing the messages. 3. They are paid well enough for the service that they should be able to cover expensive devices and processes like manual key injection or expensive hardware security modules. 4. The core of the business is security, if it is not provided nothing else will change the fact they have not provided what they were paid for. The only real difference from payment industry is that the threat is from governments, too.
  - schoen 8y ago
    I forgot about the point that they physically provide the devices, which might be relevant somehow. But how could they use financial-industry-like controls to prevent themselves from being compelled by a government to certify a man-in-the-middle attack? How can the processes distinguish between "we believe this statement is true" and "the government compels us to state that we believe this statement is true"?

schoen 8y ago

I think we're talking about different levels of the system. The attack in this case was not about an individual employee unilaterally taking an improper action, but about a company being officially compelled by a government to take an action that was contrary to the interest of an end-user. In the financial system this happens all the time and is considered somewhat unremarkable. If this company had had a dual control mechanism where multiple security officers had to be involved in order to issue signatures, presumably the company's executives would have told those security officers "we have to issue this signature because the government requires us to", and presumably the security officers would then have done it. It wasn't a rogue action from the organizational point of view, only from the customer's point of view. Also, in a messaging application new public keys have to be certified extremely frequently because new users and devices are constantly joining the system with new keys. Presumably this happens in an automated online fashion (otherwise, the security officers aren't going to get much sleep). That makes it even more challenging to subdivide the responsibility for certification, for many reasons. I don't mean to disparage the precautions that financial organizations have implemented, and I agree that some parts of the software world sometimes seem extremely cavalier in comparison. But I still think that in this particular case the threat models are extremely different.

lmilcin 8y ago
Nope, not really. 1. They are choosing and then providing devices. This is very important because it means they have physical contact with the device, initially, so they have means to bootstrap cryptographic system by way of injecting keys, etc. 2. They are middlemen transferring messages between multiple parties that use their devices without having to understand the secret part of the message and only routing the messages. 3. They are paid well enough for the service that they should be able to cover expensive devices and processes like manual key injection or expensive hardware security modules. 4. The core of the business is security, if it is not provided nothing else will change the fact they have not provided what they were paid for. The only real difference from payment industry is that the threat is from governments, too.
- schoen 8y ago
  I forgot about the point that they physically provide the devices, which might be relevant somehow. But how could they use financial-industry-like controls to prevent themselves from being compelled by a government to certify a man-in-the-middle attack? How can the processes distinguish between "we believe this statement is true" and "the government compels us to state that we believe this statement is true"?