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Even then, much of his argument is that there must be something "quantum" happening in the human brain, but he apparently fails to notice that a transistor is a
by Retra 8y ago
Even then, much of his argument is that there must be something "quantum" happening in the human brain, but he apparently fails to notice that a transistor is a quantum device or otherwise articulate why a mechanical object cannot possibly do all the quantum things a neuron can presumably do. Or why a computer model of that process would never be sufficient to emulate it. Half his arguments are misrepresentations of other people's positions and vague pseudo-mathematical conclusions masquerading as indisputable fact.
All-in-all, that book is a big nothing.
- yters 8y agoI agree with your synopsis. Penrose raises interesting questions, but his answers are not very convincing. But then again, no materialist answer to his question is very convincing. Which gives us two options: 1. ignore the question by labeling it nonsensical 2. expand our range of hypotheses to include immaterial answers
- Retra 8y ago(2) has never provided a convincing answer to any question, and there's no reason to believe it will here either.
- yters 8y agoSure it has. Modern physics depends on a number of concepts that were originally considered impossible for materialist explanations, such as any sort of "pulling" force, field effects, wave particle duality, and more recently with the refutation of local realism. Originally, materialists thought everything had to reduce to bumping billiard balls. Math itself is necessarily immaterial, and modern science would completely collapse without mathematics. So, it seems prima facie your claim that immaterial explanations have never been able to adequately answer any question to be incorrect. I see no problem with also proposing an immaterial soul as a scientific hypothesis, if we are able to make the claim quantifiable and empirically testable.
- dragonwriter 8y ago> Modern physics depends on a number of concepts that were originally considered impossible for materialist explanations, It depends on a lot of things that were considered impossible, but not things that are logically incompatible with materialism. > So, it seems prima facie your claim that immaterial explanations have never been able to adequately answer any question to be incorrect. No, all the things you point to are material explanations.
- yters 8y agoWell, that gets to the question of how we define materialism. Broadly enough, then a nonphysical soul can also be a new materialistic cause, so we do not have a disagreement. The fundamental issue is whether the new theory, materialistic or not, can be quantitatively and empirically tested in some way. I propose the notion of the mind as a halting oracle is such a thing. And we can call it a materialistic halting oracle so we don't violate the need for purely materialistic explanations. https://am-nat.org/site/halting-oracles-as-intelligent-agents/ https://am-nat.org/site/halting-oracles-as-intelligent-agent...
- posterboy 8y ago> Math itself is necessarily immaterial, and ... No, that strikes me as false. Geometry is very material and can explain a good bunch of mathematics. Differential geometry, an important aspect of modern AI, is necessarily symbolic, but that does not exclude its materialistic applications.
- yters 8y agoIf math is material, then we can destroy it. So, for instance, I could destroy the number 1. That doesn't make any sense. Even if the entire universe were destroyed, mathematics would still exist. Recreate the universe again and math would remain unchanged.
- posterboy 8y agoPlanet youhaventseenit in the Horse Nebula is material. Can you destroy it? No! Could it be destroyed by an unfortunate event? Perhaps. But if the number 1 is just an abstract thought, then that thought can seize to exist. > Even if the entire universe were destroyed, mathematics would still exist. You presuppose that maths is immaterial to proof that it's immaterial. That stance cannot be argued with, because you cannot show it to be true. If thought seized to exist, there would be nothing left to argue with, so this is reductio ad absurdum either way leading to a false dychotomy. What remains is: "maths" does exist. So my stance holds as much explanatory power as yours, no more, no less, but yours is metaphysical. You idealize things you don't understand, unless you have a concrete plan of action to "Recreate the universe again".