5 ms·

Roger Penrose is a pretty famous mathematician who has a side-hobby of arguing that AGI is impossible. I believe his most famous work in this vein is https://e

Roger Penrose is a pretty famous mathematician who has a side-hobby of arguing that AGI is impossible. I believe his most famous work in this vein is https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Emperor%27s_New_Mind https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Emperor%27s_New_Mind, but he has a handful of others as well. His arguments are pretty well grounded in both math and physics. I wouldn't describe the work as "quantitative", but it's probably about as quantitative as is possible at this point.

dragonwriter 8y ago
> Roger Penrose is a pretty famous mathematician who has a side-hobby of arguing that AGI is impossible. If AGI is impossible, natural intelligent is either impossible or non-physical, but Penrose’s argument seems be that computing is insufficient for AGI, not that AGI is impossible.
- Retra 8y ago
  Even then, much of his argument is that there must be something "quantum" happening in the human brain, but he apparently fails to notice that a transistor is a quantum device or otherwise articulate why a mechanical object cannot possibly do all the quantum things a neuron can presumably do. Or why a computer model of that process would never be sufficient to emulate it. Half his arguments are misrepresentations of other people's positions and vague pseudo-mathematical conclusions masquerading as indisputable fact. All-in-all, that book is a big nothing.
  - yters 8y ago
    I agree with your synopsis. Penrose raises interesting questions, but his answers are not very convincing. But then again, no materialist answer to his question is very convincing. Which gives us two options: 1. ignore the question by labeling it nonsensical 2. expand our range of hypotheses to include immaterial answers
    - Retra 8y ago
      (2) has never provided a convincing answer to any question, and there's no reason to believe it will here either.
      - yters 8y ago
        Sure it has. Modern physics depends on a number of concepts that were originally considered impossible for materialist explanations, such as any sort of "pulling" force, field effects, wave particle duality, and more recently with the refutation of local realism. Originally, materialists thought everything had to reduce to bumping billiard balls. Math itself is necessarily immaterial, and modern science would completely collapse without mathematics. So, it seems prima facie your claim that immaterial explanations have never been able to adequately answer any question to be incorrect. I see no problem with also proposing an immaterial soul as a scientific hypothesis, if we are able to make the claim quantifiable and empirically testable.
        dragonwriter 8y ago
        > Modern physics depends on a number of concepts that were originally considered impossible for materialist explanations, It depends on a lot of things that were considered impossible, but not things that are logically incompatible with materialism. > So, it seems prima facie your claim that immaterial explanations have never been able to adequately answer any question to be incorrect. No, all the things you point to are material explanations.
        yters 8y ago
        Well, that gets to the question of how we define materialism. Broadly enough, then a nonphysical soul can also be a new materialistic cause, so we do not have a disagreement. The fundamental issue is whether the new theory, materialistic or not, can be quantitatively and empirically tested in some way. I propose the notion of the mind as a halting oracle is such a thing. And we can call it a materialistic halting oracle so we don't violate the need for purely materialistic explanations. https://am-nat.org/site/halting-oracles-as-intelligent-agents/ https://am-nat.org/site/halting-oracles-as-intelligent-agent...

dragonwriter 8y ago

> Roger Penrose is a pretty famous mathematician who has a side-hobby of arguing that AGI is impossible. If AGI is impossible, natural intelligent is either impossible or non-physical, but Penrose’s argument seems be that computing is insufficient for AGI, not that AGI is impossible.

Retra 8y ago
Even then, much of his argument is that there must be something "quantum" happening in the human brain, but he apparently fails to notice that a transistor is a quantum device or otherwise articulate why a mechanical object cannot possibly do all the quantum things a neuron can presumably do. Or why a computer model of that process would never be sufficient to emulate it. Half his arguments are misrepresentations of other people's positions and vague pseudo-mathematical conclusions masquerading as indisputable fact. All-in-all, that book is a big nothing.
- yters 8y ago
  I agree with your synopsis. Penrose raises interesting questions, but his answers are not very convincing. But then again, no materialist answer to his question is very convincing. Which gives us two options: 1. ignore the question by labeling it nonsensical 2. expand our range of hypotheses to include immaterial answers
  - Retra 8y ago
    (2) has never provided a convincing answer to any question, and there's no reason to believe it will here either.
    - yters 8y ago
      Sure it has. Modern physics depends on a number of concepts that were originally considered impossible for materialist explanations, such as any sort of "pulling" force, field effects, wave particle duality, and more recently with the refutation of local realism. Originally, materialists thought everything had to reduce to bumping billiard balls. Math itself is necessarily immaterial, and modern science would completely collapse without mathematics. So, it seems prima facie your claim that immaterial explanations have never been able to adequately answer any question to be incorrect. I see no problem with also proposing an immaterial soul as a scientific hypothesis, if we are able to make the claim quantifiable and empirically testable.
      - dragonwriter 8y ago
        > Modern physics depends on a number of concepts that were originally considered impossible for materialist explanations, It depends on a lot of things that were considered impossible, but not things that are logically incompatible with materialism. > So, it seems prima facie your claim that immaterial explanations have never been able to adequately answer any question to be incorrect. No, all the things you point to are material explanations.
        yters 8y ago
        Well, that gets to the question of how we define materialism. Broadly enough, then a nonphysical soul can also be a new materialistic cause, so we do not have a disagreement. The fundamental issue is whether the new theory, materialistic or not, can be quantitatively and empirically tested in some way. I propose the notion of the mind as a halting oracle is such a thing. And we can call it a materialistic halting oracle so we don't violate the need for purely materialistic explanations. https://am-nat.org/site/halting-oracles-as-intelligent-agents/ https://am-nat.org/site/halting-oracles-as-intelligent-agent...