4 ms·
You'd think, but as I remember even the EMV specs can be a bit handwavy about the entropy of derivation components, and the tendency to rely on both limited att
by motohagiography 8y ago
You'd think, but as I remember even the EMV specs can be a bit handwavy about the entropy of derivation components, and the tendency to rely on both limited attempts in hardware, and the security of keys generated and stored in HSMs (which people essentially use hashicorp to replace these days), the attack surface is fairly broad for a police service.
There is a basic bootstrapping problem with all these systems, where either you have a TSM facility of some sort, or you accept the ostensibly very low likelihood that your key provisioning protocol gets compromised.
Trouble is, if you are a target of any intelligence interest, any linux remote zero day means your provisioning server is probably going to get owned out of the gate as soon as someone seizes one of your devices.
Not checking a signature seems like an unforced error, but really, there are so many plausible ways this could have happened.
- lmilcin 8y agoBootstrapping can be done correctly, but it requires a lot of planning and preparation to do right. We had to scrap few attempts at bootstrapping. For example, we had to scrap our first attempt because we have allowed single employee to receive the package with the HSM. The security of well designed system will not be impacted by any number of zero-days or attackers having free access to your network, devices, databases, etc. This is because well designed system will not base security of the data it protects on components and mechanisms that cannot be trusted to be secure.
- motohagiography 8y agoReally depends on your threat model. If it includes international police and intelligence agencies, a COTS HSM seems optimistic.