5 ms·

I think simonh was not arguing against the chain of causation, but rather agreeing with it, and arguing against "If the future can be perfectly predicted => peo

by mreome 8y ago

I think simonh was not arguing against the chain of causation, but rather agreeing with it, and arguing against "If the future can be perfectly predicted => people definitely do not have free will" and in favor of "If the future can not be perfectly predicted => people definitely do not have free will" If an entity's decision process is is not not dependent and repeatable based entirely on it's internal state and perceptions of it's environment, then it must be dependent on some external random element, and that element not being part of that entity, means it's choice is not entirely of it's own free will. This argument rejects duality of course, as one's "will" itself could be the external element.

starbeast 8y ago
Gödel had an interesting argument that I encountered via Rudy Rucker's blog; “There is no contradiction between free will and knowing in advance precisely what one will do. If one knows oneself completely then this is the situation. One does not deliberately do the opposite of what one wants.” http://www.rudyrucker.com/blog/2012/08/01/memories-of-kurt-godel/ http://www.rudyrucker.com/blog/2012/08/01/memories-of-kurt-g...
- vbuwivbiu 8y ago
  this quote has stayed with me ever since I first read it and I catch myself at points where I think I've just made a free decision thinking "I should try to overcome my will now and do the opposite", which I can never do, but wouldn't overcoming one's will do something be even more free will ?
  - simonh 8y ago
    My brother has a great anecdote. He was at work talking to some colleagues and one of them said free will was all about freely choosing what you believe. Everyone else agreed. My brother argued you can't necessarily choose what you believe, to much derision from his colleagues. So he challenged them. "OK, pick something you absolutely believe, that you have believed as long as you can remember and you are absolutely sure about. It doesn't matter what it is and it can be as trivial as you like and change your belief about it."
whack 8y ago
> I think simonh was ... arguing against "If the future can be perfectly predicted => people definitely do not have free will" Just so I'm understanding you correctly: Are you claiming that even if the future can be perfectly predicted, people can still have free will? At the moment of your conception, if I were to predict with 100% accuracy and confidence, every decision you will ever make in your life, would you still claim to possess free will?
- rocqua 8y ago
  > even if the future can be perfectly predicted, people can still have free will? Not OP, but essentially yes. Things get weird if you use your predictions to influence what I do. But I'd say that takes away my agency, whilst keeping my free-will intact. In general, those who claim determinism and free-will do not clash are called 'compatibilists'. Often, the argument is kind-of semantic. It starts with the idea that what most people consider 'free-will' is so ill defined we ought to work on the definition. It then follows that most definitions are very clear on whether we have free-will. Then, since most people feel like we have free-will, the definition that fits with that is chosen. At least, that is the case for me. Personally, I think the real difficult discussion lies with the concept of 'x is possible' in a deterministic world. Here, I grasp for bayesian statistics.
  - whack 8y ago
    That's an interesting perspective. I don't agree with it myself, but I agree that it's impossible to resolve this discussion without a clear definition. Personally, I define free will as having the ability to "change". To overcome your both your past self, and your environment. Ie, a billiards ball has no free will, because its motion is compelled by its past state, and by the environment around it. Similarly for cars, computers and every other inanimate object. Whereas a human can be said to have free will, because regardless of his past nature, and regardless of the environment around him, he still has the free will to transcend all that and do something wholly "unexpected". To me, that's what separates free will from an automaton. Hence why my definition of free will isn't compatible with determinism. I appreciate your point though that others might define free will in a wholly different manner.

by mreome 8y ago

starbeast 8y ago

Gödel had an interesting argument that I encountered via Rudy Rucker's blog; “There is no contradiction between free will and knowing in advance precisely what one will do. If one knows oneself completely then this is the situation. One does not deliberately do the opposite of what one wants.” http://www.rudyrucker.com/blog/2012/08/01/memories-of-kurt-godel/ http://www.rudyrucker.com/blog/2012/08/01/memories-of-kurt-g...

vbuwivbiu 8y ago
this quote has stayed with me ever since I first read it and I catch myself at points where I think I've just made a free decision thinking "I should try to overcome my will now and do the opposite", which I can never do, but wouldn't overcoming one's will do something be even more free will ?
- simonh 8y ago
  My brother has a great anecdote. He was at work talking to some colleagues and one of them said free will was all about freely choosing what you believe. Everyone else agreed. My brother argued you can't necessarily choose what you believe, to much derision from his colleagues. So he challenged them. "OK, pick something you absolutely believe, that you have believed as long as you can remember and you are absolutely sure about. It doesn't matter what it is and it can be as trivial as you like and change your belief about it."

whack 8y ago

> I think simonh was ... arguing against "If the future can be perfectly predicted => people definitely do not have free will" Just so I'm understanding you correctly: Are you claiming that even if the future can be perfectly predicted, people can still have free will? At the moment of your conception, if I were to predict with 100% accuracy and confidence, every decision you will ever make in your life, would you still claim to possess free will?

rocqua 8y ago
> even if the future can be perfectly predicted, people can still have free will? Not OP, but essentially yes. Things get weird if you use your predictions to influence what I do. But I'd say that takes away my agency, whilst keeping my free-will intact. In general, those who claim determinism and free-will do not clash are called 'compatibilists'. Often, the argument is kind-of semantic. It starts with the idea that what most people consider 'free-will' is so ill defined we ought to work on the definition. It then follows that most definitions are very clear on whether we have free-will. Then, since most people feel like we have free-will, the definition that fits with that is chosen. At least, that is the case for me. Personally, I think the real difficult discussion lies with the concept of 'x is possible' in a deterministic world. Here, I grasp for bayesian statistics.
- whack 8y ago
  That's an interesting perspective. I don't agree with it myself, but I agree that it's impossible to resolve this discussion without a clear definition. Personally, I define free will as having the ability to "change". To overcome your both your past self, and your environment. Ie, a billiards ball has no free will, because its motion is compelled by its past state, and by the environment around it. Similarly for cars, computers and every other inanimate object. Whereas a human can be said to have free will, because regardless of his past nature, and regardless of the environment around him, he still has the free will to transcend all that and do something wholly "unexpected". To me, that's what separates free will from an automaton. Hence why my definition of free will isn't compatible with determinism. I appreciate your point though that others might define free will in a wholly different manner.