4 ms·

> If my decisions are not a product of my prior state, then they are not my decisions. The definition of 'me' is my prior state. There are two problems with th

by whack 8y ago

> If my decisions are not a product of my prior state, then they are not my decisions. The definition of 'me' is my prior state. There are two problems with this definition of free will. First, it implies that your present self (and future selves) are all entirely subservient to your prior state, and surrounding environment. Ie, the present you has no way of overcoming your past self or your environment. This means that you're essentially sitting in a roller-coaster ride, with no levers to pull or opportunity for change. Sure, your past self made the decision to get on the ride. But your present and future self are all helpless from that point on. Second, did even your past have any free will? The chain of causation extends all the way back. Your past self at time T-X is itself entirely subservient to your past self at time T-X-1. Extend this all the way back, and you realize that you're subservient to your "self" at the moment of conception. At no point did your consciousness have any ability to change the course of the life that was already plotted for it. If I predict at the moment of your birth, every single thing that will happen in your life and every decision you will make, can you really claim to possess free will? Hence why people try to cling on to randomness and uncertainty. "If the future can be perfectly predicted, people definitely do not have free will => ergo, if the future cannot be perfectly predicted, then maybe we have free will?" I agree with you though that this is shoddy reasoning. Just because there exists randomness at the quantum level, just means that we're passengers in a driverless car that's rolling dice. Randomness that we have no control over, does not grant us free will in any way.

mreome 8y ago
I think simonh was not arguing against the chain of causation, but rather agreeing with it, and arguing against "If the future can be perfectly predicted => people definitely do not have free will" and in favor of "If the future can not be perfectly predicted => people definitely do not have free will" If an entity's decision process is is not not dependent and repeatable based entirely on it's internal state and perceptions of it's environment, then it must be dependent on some external random element, and that element not being part of that entity, means it's choice is not entirely of it's own free will. This argument rejects duality of course, as one's "will" itself could be the external element.
- starbeast 8y ago
  Gödel had an interesting argument that I encountered via Rudy Rucker's blog; “There is no contradiction between free will and knowing in advance precisely what one will do. If one knows oneself completely then this is the situation. One does not deliberately do the opposite of what one wants.” http://www.rudyrucker.com/blog/2012/08/01/memories-of-kurt-godel/ http://www.rudyrucker.com/blog/2012/08/01/memories-of-kurt-g...
  - vbuwivbiu 8y ago
    this quote has stayed with me ever since I first read it and I catch myself at points where I think I've just made a free decision thinking "I should try to overcome my will now and do the opposite", which I can never do, but wouldn't overcoming one's will do something be even more free will ?
    - simonh 8y ago
      My brother has a great anecdote. He was at work talking to some colleagues and one of them said free will was all about freely choosing what you believe. Everyone else agreed. My brother argued you can't necessarily choose what you believe, to much derision from his colleagues. So he challenged them. "OK, pick something you absolutely believe, that you have believed as long as you can remember and you are absolutely sure about. It doesn't matter what it is and it can be as trivial as you like and change your belief about it."
- whack 8y ago
  > I think simonh was ... arguing against "If the future can be perfectly predicted => people definitely do not have free will" Just so I'm understanding you correctly: Are you claiming that even if the future can be perfectly predicted, people can still have free will? At the moment of your conception, if I were to predict with 100% accuracy and confidence, every decision you will ever make in your life, would you still claim to possess free will?
  - rocqua 8y ago
prmph 8y ago
What if current behavior is not completely determined by previous state, and yet is also not random?
- simonh 8y ago
  Saying what a thing is not can be helpful, but what is it? Like dualism, this is just kicking the philosophical can down the road.
narag 8y ago
Ie, the present you has no way of overcoming your past self or your environment. You are answering to someone that clearly expressed that you are your past self. Why would you want getting rid of yourself? This means that you're essentially sitting in a roller-coaster ride, with no levers to pull or opportunity for change. Not at all. Human being can learn, practice and make all kind of efforts to change ourselves. Sports, arts, science are all fields where humans show how to improve. You are getting to the no-levers problem by drawing a line between "you" and "what you do", as if you have nothing to do with what you do. Why?
jancsika 8y ago
> But your present and future self are all helpless from that point on. To me, "helpless" in the context of metaphysical free will means that an agent's actions are deterministic from the view of an outside observer. That is all it can ever mean AFAICT. Any sadness/frustration we may feel about this is equivalent to the sadness/frustration one feels for Heidegger's cat. That is to say, it's there, but it's philosophically incidental. "Helpless" in the context of physical free will means the normal meaning of helpless in all its glorious ambiguity. It can mean something close to "deterministic" in certain catastrophic situations. But more often it means something like "under the rule of a tyrant," "enslaved," or even "trapped" for whatever reason. In all those cases the sadness/frustration/etc. one feels is part and parcel of the outcome-- it affects whether one decides to fight, acquiesce, cope, etc. Since nobody within physical reality has sufficient knowledge to predict the future, the problem of metaphysical free will doesn't pop up.

by whack 8y ago

mreome 8y ago

I think simonh was not arguing against the chain of causation, but rather agreeing with it, and arguing against "If the future can be perfectly predicted => people definitely do not have free will" and in favor of "If the future can not be perfectly predicted => people definitely do not have free will" If an entity's decision process is is not not dependent and repeatable based entirely on it's internal state and perceptions of it's environment, then it must be dependent on some external random element, and that element not being part of that entity, means it's choice is not entirely of it's own free will. This argument rejects duality of course, as one's "will" itself could be the external element.

starbeast 8y ago
Gödel had an interesting argument that I encountered via Rudy Rucker's blog; “There is no contradiction between free will and knowing in advance precisely what one will do. If one knows oneself completely then this is the situation. One does not deliberately do the opposite of what one wants.” http://www.rudyrucker.com/blog/2012/08/01/memories-of-kurt-godel/ http://www.rudyrucker.com/blog/2012/08/01/memories-of-kurt-g...
- vbuwivbiu 8y ago
  this quote has stayed with me ever since I first read it and I catch myself at points where I think I've just made a free decision thinking "I should try to overcome my will now and do the opposite", which I can never do, but wouldn't overcoming one's will do something be even more free will ?
  - simonh 8y ago
    My brother has a great anecdote. He was at work talking to some colleagues and one of them said free will was all about freely choosing what you believe. Everyone else agreed. My brother argued you can't necessarily choose what you believe, to much derision from his colleagues. So he challenged them. "OK, pick something you absolutely believe, that you have believed as long as you can remember and you are absolutely sure about. It doesn't matter what it is and it can be as trivial as you like and change your belief about it."
whack 8y ago
> I think simonh was ... arguing against "If the future can be perfectly predicted => people definitely do not have free will" Just so I'm understanding you correctly: Are you claiming that even if the future can be perfectly predicted, people can still have free will? At the moment of your conception, if I were to predict with 100% accuracy and confidence, every decision you will ever make in your life, would you still claim to possess free will?
- rocqua 8y ago

prmph 8y ago

What if current behavior is not completely determined by previous state, and yet is also not random?

simonh 8y ago
Saying what a thing is not can be helpful, but what is it? Like dualism, this is just kicking the philosophical can down the road.

narag 8y ago

Ie, the present you has no way of overcoming your past self or your environment. You are answering to someone that clearly expressed that you are your past self. Why would you want getting rid of yourself? This means that you're essentially sitting in a roller-coaster ride, with no levers to pull or opportunity for change. Not at all. Human being can learn, practice and make all kind of efforts to change ourselves. Sports, arts, science are all fields where humans show how to improve. You are getting to the no-levers problem by drawing a line between "you" and "what you do", as if you have nothing to do with what you do. Why?

jancsika 8y ago

> But your present and future self are all helpless from that point on. To me, "helpless" in the context of metaphysical free will means that an agent's actions are deterministic from the view of an outside observer. That is all it can ever mean AFAICT. Any sadness/frustration we may feel about this is equivalent to the sadness/frustration one feels for Heidegger's cat. That is to say, it's there, but it's philosophically incidental. "Helpless" in the context of physical free will means the normal meaning of helpless in all its glorious ambiguity. It can mean something close to "deterministic" in certain catastrophic situations. But more often it means something like "under the rule of a tyrant," "enslaved," or even "trapped" for whatever reason. In all those cases the sadness/frustration/etc. one feels is part and parcel of the outcome-- it affects whether one decides to fight, acquiesce, cope, etc. Since nobody within physical reality has sufficient knowledge to predict the future, the problem of metaphysical free will doesn't pop up.