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> Blackbox-security.com, the site selling IronChat and IronPhone, quoted Snowden as saying: "I use PGP to say hi and hello, i use IronChat (OTR) to have a serio

by wjn0 8y ago

> Blackbox-security.com, the site selling IronChat and IronPhone, quoted Snowden as saying: "I use PGP to say hi and hello, i use IronChat (OTR) to have a serious conversation," according to Web archives. It wasn’t immediately known if the endorsement was authentic. This strikes me as... very inauthentic. I think anyone with even a basic understanding of crypto would do things the other way around.

Someone1234 8y ago
> I think anyone with even a basic understanding of crypto would do things the other way around. Can you explain your reasoning? PGP lacks forward secrecy, a key feature that you'd want and which OTR provides.
- Cantonese 8y ago
  >blackbox security
  - Someone1234 8y ago
    That isn't a constructive reply. OTR is supported by dozens of clients with no connection to that company[0], and the protocol specification itself is available to the public[1]. The person I was responding to claimed that PGP was the superior choice to OTR, and I wanted to understand why. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Off-the-Record_Messaging#Native_(supported_by_project_developers) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Off-the-Record_Messaging#Nativ... [1] https://otr.cypherpunks.ca/Protocol-v3-4.1.1.html https://otr.cypherpunks.ca/Protocol-v3-4.1.1.html
    - sk5t 8y ago
      I found it a reasonably constructive reply, because the operation of a "black box" cannot be properly observed, whether or not some of its behavior adheres to a particular contract or protocol.
      - Someone1234 8y ago
        You seem to be taking the name of one specific company a little too literally. As I showed previously it is a public protocol that interoperates with open source clients, it isn't a black box in any way shape or form. I feel like this discussion is getting away from the original premise: > anyone with even a basic understanding of crypto would do things the other way around. i.e. use PGP instead of OTR. Nobody has yet even attempted explain their reasoning as to why? Bringing up one specific vendor is a deflection, rather than an answer.
        sk5t 8y ago
        You seem to be inferring focus on the name of the company more than intended. Is this not closed-source software? Might not it have some weaknesses at any point in its implementation or update mechanisms--by design or inadvertent--that put it at a disadvantage to PGP?
        Someone1234 8y ago
        This discussion started because someone claimed that the crypto of one was superior the crypto of the other, the implementations aren't strictly relevant i.e.: > anyone with even a basic understanding of crypto would do things the other way around. Not least of all because they made no reference to which implementation of PGP they were even calling superior, only the protocol itself.
        sk5t 8y ago
        The choice isn't between using OTR vs. using PGP. It's between using unaudited (but perhaps convenient) commercial software vs. using possibly-audited, offline-friendly (probably inconvenient) PGP to exchange extremely-high-sensitivity messages. The apocryphal Snowden account even appears to suggest PGP for the lower-sensitivity message.
- rakoo 8y ago
  For all the flak it's received, PGP has no known flaws if you know how to use it properly. IronChat may have had some security merits (I can't say), but until there's been some in-depth audits you can't trust it. It's not about the technical features that are theoretically available, it's more about how much you can believe they actually hold in reality.
  - Someone1234 8y ago
    > but until there's been some in-depth audits you can't trust it. OTR uses AES-128 w/the Diffie–Hellman key exchange, and SHA-1 hashes to confirm integrity. So in terms of technology it is a pretty well travelled road. And the advantages of OTR over PGP make it worth seriously considering for secure messaging. As to specific implementations I cannot say, but that's true with both OTR and PGP.
    - rakoo 8y ago
      > As to specific implementations I cannot say, but that's true with both OTR and PGP. That's exactly the root of the problem. When you say you use pgp, there's a very high chance you're using gnupg from the command line, ie the one that has been reviewed by every security expert who has wanted any bit of recognition. When you say you're using OTR, everything depends on the specific implementation, so there are infinitely more ways your setup can be compromised. I do agree that from a purely technical point of view OTR is better than PGP (except maybe the need for both parties to be online at the same time, but that's a minor inconvenience when comparing to the additional security OTR provides). But in this case the technical merits are not really important, what is really important is the complete system, and in that view the old, crufty, hard-to-use PGP wins.
    - deleted 8y ago
      [deleted]
  - throwawaymath 8y ago
    Saying PGP has no known flaws "if you know how to use it properly" is like saying it's easy to safely use AES GCM as long as you never reuse a nonce with the same key. Sure, it's true. But that reasoning kinda obviates everything. Some things are easier to use safely than others. Your second paragraph is basically the essence of criticisms against PGP.
- wjn0 8y ago
  Well, I took it to mean PGP vs IronChat. I'll take an open source implementation of a well-established protocol over a closed source implementation of another well-established protocol any day.

by wjn0 8y ago

Someone1234 8y ago

> I think anyone with even a basic understanding of crypto would do things the other way around. Can you explain your reasoning? PGP lacks forward secrecy, a key feature that you'd want and which OTR provides.

Cantonese 8y ago
>blackbox security
- Someone1234 8y ago
  That isn't a constructive reply. OTR is supported by dozens of clients with no connection to that company[0], and the protocol specification itself is available to the public[1]. The person I was responding to claimed that PGP was the superior choice to OTR, and I wanted to understand why. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Off-the-Record_Messaging#Native_(supported_by_project_developers) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Off-the-Record_Messaging#Nativ... [1] https://otr.cypherpunks.ca/Protocol-v3-4.1.1.html https://otr.cypherpunks.ca/Protocol-v3-4.1.1.html
  - sk5t 8y ago
    I found it a reasonably constructive reply, because the operation of a "black box" cannot be properly observed, whether or not some of its behavior adheres to a particular contract or protocol.
    - Someone1234 8y ago
      You seem to be taking the name of one specific company a little too literally. As I showed previously it is a public protocol that interoperates with open source clients, it isn't a black box in any way shape or form. I feel like this discussion is getting away from the original premise: > anyone with even a basic understanding of crypto would do things the other way around. i.e. use PGP instead of OTR. Nobody has yet even attempted explain their reasoning as to why? Bringing up one specific vendor is a deflection, rather than an answer.
      - sk5t 8y ago
        You seem to be inferring focus on the name of the company more than intended. Is this not closed-source software? Might not it have some weaknesses at any point in its implementation or update mechanisms--by design or inadvertent--that put it at a disadvantage to PGP?
        Someone1234 8y ago
        This discussion started because someone claimed that the crypto of one was superior the crypto of the other, the implementations aren't strictly relevant i.e.: > anyone with even a basic understanding of crypto would do things the other way around. Not least of all because they made no reference to which implementation of PGP they were even calling superior, only the protocol itself.
        sk5t 8y ago
        The choice isn't between using OTR vs. using PGP. It's between using unaudited (but perhaps convenient) commercial software vs. using possibly-audited, offline-friendly (probably inconvenient) PGP to exchange extremely-high-sensitivity messages. The apocryphal Snowden account even appears to suggest PGP for the lower-sensitivity message.
rakoo 8y ago
For all the flak it's received, PGP has no known flaws if you know how to use it properly. IronChat may have had some security merits (I can't say), but until there's been some in-depth audits you can't trust it. It's not about the technical features that are theoretically available, it's more about how much you can believe they actually hold in reality.
- Someone1234 8y ago
  > but until there's been some in-depth audits you can't trust it. OTR uses AES-128 w/the Diffie–Hellman key exchange, and SHA-1 hashes to confirm integrity. So in terms of technology it is a pretty well travelled road. And the advantages of OTR over PGP make it worth seriously considering for secure messaging. As to specific implementations I cannot say, but that's true with both OTR and PGP.
  - rakoo 8y ago
    > As to specific implementations I cannot say, but that's true with both OTR and PGP. That's exactly the root of the problem. When you say you use pgp, there's a very high chance you're using gnupg from the command line, ie the one that has been reviewed by every security expert who has wanted any bit of recognition. When you say you're using OTR, everything depends on the specific implementation, so there are infinitely more ways your setup can be compromised. I do agree that from a purely technical point of view OTR is better than PGP (except maybe the need for both parties to be online at the same time, but that's a minor inconvenience when comparing to the additional security OTR provides). But in this case the technical merits are not really important, what is really important is the complete system, and in that view the old, crufty, hard-to-use PGP wins.
  - deleted 8y ago
    [deleted]
- throwawaymath 8y ago
  Saying PGP has no known flaws "if you know how to use it properly" is like saying it's easy to safely use AES GCM as long as you never reuse a nonce with the same key. Sure, it's true. But that reasoning kinda obviates everything. Some things are easier to use safely than others. Your second paragraph is basically the essence of criticisms against PGP.
wjn0 8y ago
Well, I took it to mean PGP vs IronChat. I'll take an open source implementation of a well-established protocol over a closed source implementation of another well-established protocol any day.