4 ms·

I don't like how this article tries to generalize smart-phone voting itself as the problem. The trouble is this particular app. I personally think blockchain p

I don't like how this article tries to generalize smart-phone voting itself as the problem. The trouble is this particular app. I personally think blockchain powered voting solutions with a PKI backed ID Card like my Estonian e-Residency card could be a fairly strong way of authentication.

fooyc 8y ago
Just like this app, you seem to focus on protecting against the voter (or someone using the voter's phone). How do you protect against a compromission of: * The mobile phone's OS (by a virus, by the manufacturer) * The app's server code * The app's hosting providers We are speaking about governments, or very rich parties trying to change to outcome of elections here.
- amingilani 8y ago
  All wonderful questions, and maybe some of the tech needs to be refined. But I can already cryptographically sign transactions on my hardware Bitcoin wallet. Embedding displays into cards isn't impossible, BofA does it for OTPs already. A combination could ensure that users know the vote they're casting by confirming it on a secure hardware token. With that done, you could upload that vote to a blockchain based system that's auditable, but anonymized. But I can't give you a good answer to "what if someone steals the phone and card". One solution is to have remote election officers that verify your identity via the camera in real-time as you cast the vote. They could look at your face, or even read your fingerprint off the camera (I know that's possible because my country lets banks do that). You'd only be able to cast the vote through devices with good enough cameras and under good enough lightening and you may have to wait a little while, but it'll be secure and you won't have to travel — especially if you're registered in a distant state or district. It's better than nothing.

4 ms·

I don't like how this article tries to generalize smart-phone voting itself as the problem. The trouble is this particular app. I personally think blockchain p

by amingilani 8y ago

fooyc 8y ago
Just like this app, you seem to focus on protecting against the voter (or someone using the voter's phone). How do you protect against a compromission of: * The mobile phone's OS (by a virus, by the manufacturer) * The app's server code * The app's hosting providers We are speaking about governments, or very rich parties trying to change to outcome of elections here.
- amingilani 8y ago
  All wonderful questions, and maybe some of the tech needs to be refined. But I can already cryptographically sign transactions on my hardware Bitcoin wallet. Embedding displays into cards isn't impossible, BofA does it for OTPs already. A combination could ensure that users know the vote they're casting by confirming it on a secure hardware token. With that done, you could upload that vote to a blockchain based system that's auditable, but anonymized. But I can't give you a good answer to "what if someone steals the phone and card". One solution is to have remote election officers that verify your identity via the camera in real-time as you cast the vote. They could look at your face, or even read your fingerprint off the camera (I know that's possible because my country lets banks do that). You'd only be able to cast the vote through devices with good enough cameras and under good enough lightening and you may have to wait a little while, but it'll be secure and you won't have to travel — especially if you're registered in a distant state or district. It's better than nothing.