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Police decrypt messages after breaking pricey IronChat crypto app
- wjn0 8y ago> Blackbox-security.com, the site selling IronChat and IronPhone, quoted Snowden as saying: "I use PGP to say hi and hello, i use IronChat (OTR) to have a serious conversation," according to Web archives. It wasn’t immediately known if the endorsement was authentic. This strikes me as... very inauthentic. I think anyone with even a basic understanding of crypto would do things the other way around.
- Someone1234 8y ago> I think anyone with even a basic understanding of crypto would do things the other way around. Can you explain your reasoning? PGP lacks forward secrecy, a key feature that you'd want and which OTR provides.
- Cantonese 8y ago>blackbox security
- Someone1234 8y agoThat isn't a constructive reply. OTR is supported by dozens of clients with no connection to that company[0], and the protocol specification itself is available to the public[1]. The person I was responding to claimed that PGP was the superior choice to OTR, and I wanted to understand why. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Off-the-Record_Messaging#Native_(supported_by_project_developers) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Off-the-Record_Messaging#Nativ... [1] https://otr.cypherpunks.ca/Protocol-v3-4.1.1.html https://otr.cypherpunks.ca/Protocol-v3-4.1.1.html
- sk5t 8y agoI found it a reasonably constructive reply, because the operation of a "black box" cannot be properly observed, whether or not some of its behavior adheres to a particular contract or protocol.
- Someone1234 8y agoYou seem to be taking the name of one specific company a little too literally. As I showed previously it is a public protocol that interoperates with open source clients, it isn't a black box in any way shape or form. I feel like this discussion is getting away from the original premise: > anyone with even a basic understanding of crypto would do things the other way around. i.e. use PGP instead of OTR. Nobody has yet even attempted explain their reasoning as to why? Bringing up one specific vendor is a deflection, rather than an answer.
- sk5t 8y agoYou seem to be inferring focus on the name of the company more than intended. Is this not closed-source software? Might not it have some weaknesses at any point in its implementation or update mechanisms--by design or inadvertent--that put it at a disadvantage to PGP?
- Someone1234 8y agoThis discussion started because someone claimed that the crypto of one was superior the crypto of the other, the implementations aren't strictly relevant i.e.: > anyone with even a basic understanding of crypto would do things the other way around. Not least of all because they made no reference to which implementation of PGP they were even calling superior, only the protocol itself.
- sk5t 8y agoThe choice isn't between using OTR vs. using PGP. It's between using unaudited (but perhaps convenient) commercial software vs. using possibly-audited, offline-friendly (probably inconvenient) PGP to exchange extremely-high-sensitivity messages. The apocryphal Snowden account even appears to suggest PGP for the lower-sensitivity message.
- rakoo 8y agoFor all the flak it's received, PGP has no known flaws if you know how to use it properly. IronChat may have had some security merits (I can't say), but until there's been some in-depth audits you can't trust it. It's not about the technical features that are theoretically available, it's more about how much you can believe they actually hold in reality.
- Someone1234 8y ago> but until there's been some in-depth audits you can't trust it. OTR uses AES-128 w/the Diffie–Hellman key exchange, and SHA-1 hashes to confirm integrity. So in terms of technology it is a pretty well travelled road. And the advantages of OTR over PGP make it worth seriously considering for secure messaging. As to specific implementations I cannot say, but that's true with both OTR and PGP.
- rakoo 8y ago> As to specific implementations I cannot say, but that's true with both OTR and PGP. That's exactly the root of the problem. When you say you use pgp, there's a very high chance you're using gnupg from the command line, ie the one that has been reviewed by every security expert who has wanted any bit of recognition. When you say you're using OTR, everything depends on the specific implementation, so there are infinitely more ways your setup can be compromised. I do agree that from a purely technical point of view OTR is better than PGP (except maybe the need for both parties to be online at the same time, but that's a minor inconvenience when comparing to the additional security OTR provides). But in this case the technical merits are not really important, what is really important is the complete system, and in that view the old, crufty, hard-to-use PGP wins.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- throwawaymath 8y agoSaying PGP has no known flaws "if you know how to use it properly" is like saying it's easy to safely use AES GCM as long as you never reuse a nonce with the same key. Sure, it's true. But that reasoning kinda obviates everything. Some things are easier to use safely than others. Your second paragraph is basically the essence of criticisms against PGP.
- wjn0 8y agoWell, I took it to mean PGP vs IronChat. I'll take an open source implementation of a well-established protocol over a closed source implementation of another well-established protocol any day.
- xiao_haozi 8y agoI wonder why they would make public this information. Wouldn't it be advantageous for them to have those with criminal intent continue to utilize the platform and the police to have an established surveillance method? Or would it be unavoidable and become public information in criminal complaint filings and such?
- supakeen 8y agoIt was made public because the exposed operations of criminals led to threats being made against assumed 'leaky partners'. The police did not want these people to retaliate against other people and possibly endanger bystanders. While it might not be mentioned in this article, it's mentioned directly in an article of the Dutch DA here: https://www.om.nl/actueel/nieuwsberichten/@104414/doorbraak/ https://www.om.nl/actueel/nieuwsberichten/@104414/doorbraak/
- xiao_haozi 8y agoAh, okay. That makes sense.
- londons_explore 8y agoI can't imagine USA authorities taking the same course of action... "Let criminals kill criminals. Not our problem".
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- kodablah 8y ago> Or would it be unavoidable and become public information in criminal complaint filings and such? I would hope this is the case. While details may be omitted it seems, to know how discovery took place is important in one's ability to challenge it.
- xiao_haozi 8y agoYes, absolutely. However, we know from leaks over the past decade that this is not always the case for this types of surveillance methods (the methods being made public).
- trhway 8y agorephrasing a popular on HN saying - if you're using somebody else's crypto app, you're doing it wrong.
- colejohnson66 8y agoBut isn’t rolling your own crypto even worse?
- DoritosMan 8y agoYou wouldn't be rolling your own crypto? You could use standard crypto but with your own app/UI to make the crypto easy to use.
- jstanley 8y agoAnd why would "your own" app be easier to use than somebody else's?
- DoritosMan 8y agoI didn't mean "your own" app would be easier to use, I meant the crypto would be easier to use via an app instead of using it through the command line.
- United857 8y agoThen you have to worry about security from side channel attacks. Even things like the iOS or Android task-switcher UI caching screenshots of your app can be vectors.
- DoritosMan 8y agoOh yeah, making an app that is easy to use and still secure is definitely not easy. But at least you would know how you implemented the encryption on it.
- Fnoord 8y ago
- teilo 8y agoThe most obvious way this could have been done is by MITMing the key exchange. The giveaway is in the last paragraph: "The IronChat app, Schellevis reported, also failed to automatically check if the server it used to exchange messages with other users was the correct one."
- village-idiot 8y agoUnless if they were forced to do this by the authority, that’s an amateur hour mistake.
- qwerty456127 8y agoWhy would they even need to to trust a server for key exchange? Wouldn't it be more reasonable to just exchange public keys at the time of adding the contact to their contact list and then only update the keys using previously used keys?
- londons_explore 8y agoWorks until someone looses their phone. At that point the server steps in and hands the new key to all the old users contacts. That's most likely where the flaw was in this system.
- qwerty456127 8y agoEvery reasonable person that cares about privacy seriously has a second device with access to the same account and as soon as they loose a phone they tell everybody the account is compromised and make a new account. It's amazing how ridiculous some criminals happen to be, I know many don't even care to delete messages after reading.
- supakeen 8y agoFor the English readers without Dutch sources, here is some additional information which might or might not be in the article: Police seized and operated a server of a company called Blackbox Security which offered 'crypto phones'. Basically phones pre-installed with some software sometimes with all ability to communicate disabled aside from that application. The price for these phones was 1500 EUR including a 6 month plan, afterwards 750 EUR per 6 months for usage. While the Dutch DA and Police have not given any details as to how the security was broken there are some clues (this is speculative as fuck): * A users guide that used to be published on the Blackbox Security website hints towards their chat application being XMPP+OTR. * Real-time access but no historical access hints towards an MITM to change the previously exchanged OTR keys (a common way to 'break' into a conversation). * The application seemed to not enforce and/or check the key signatures for changes. This is not the first time the Dutch DA and Police have taken action against a 'crypto phone' provider. Ennetcom, another provider was taken down a year or so ago: https://www.zdnet.com/article/police-hack-pgp-server-with-3-6-million-messages-from-organized-crime-blackberrys/ https://www.zdnet.com/article/police-hack-pgp-server-with-3-... leading to arrests as well. The reason given by the DA for the publication of this news is that threats of violence and reprisal were being made on the taken down chat messages by owners of these devices after police action was taken against them. They wrongfully blamed the people they were communicating with of leaking the information. As tensions increased retribution hits were likely and the risk to the public would be there. Hence: release the information. To re-iterate, there is so far no reason to believe the actual cryptographic protocols in use got broken but that yes; taking over the server allowed them to MITM the OTR key exchanges and/or pretend to be another client. I could get more technical but since this is all speculation I don't see much value to it.
- cm2187 8y agoTo be honest if you own the server, you can push an update to the app to start sending data in clear and the user would be no wiser.
- baybal2 8y ago>* The application seemed to not enforce and/or check the key signatures for changes. Xabber clone? If so, this, again, demonstrates that automatic key renegotiaton is a glaring security vulnerability open for real world exploitation. Throw that into Moxie Marlinspike's garden. Edit, seems their app store is still up. Checkout it out yourself http://www.appstoreprivacy.com http://www.appstoreprivacy.com
- 0x54D5 8y agoHow to do this without paying hundreds of dollars: 1. Get $5/month virtual machine anywhere. 2. Install https://github.com/matrix-org/synapse https://github.com/matrix-org/synapse 3. Install https://about.riot.im/ https://about.riot.im/ 4. Register & Login to your own chat server 5. ??? 6. Profit.
- squarefoot 8y agoI know nothing about the IronChat service, but if what is shown in that archived page is the real device then it's pretty obvious that it was doomed to be cracked. A cellphone? Seriously... a freaking cellphone? Cellphones -all of them- use binary closed blobs to manage device drivers, and to date there is not a single cellphone in the known universe which is free of proprietary closed code. That includes also the Librem5, which is a wonderful step in the right direction, still not completely free of closed blobs, hence not secure. So what's the problem with (closed) device drivers? Well, they run all the time, they run at maximum privileges (higher than root) and they cannot be audited to spot any malicious code, which makes them the most effective place to hide spyware code. If any government tells a hardware manufacturer to "put our spyware into your driver or your business ends tomorrow" they comply, nobody can spot the code and there's no anti malware software that will detect it. But why one should care if all text is end-to-end encrypted? Well, on a bugged phone there's no such thing as safe encryption. Let me be more clear: if you tap the text on the virtual keyboard or any device connected to say the USB port or through bluetooth, the text is read by the relevant drivers (higher priority, closed, not auditable) before it reaches the encryption code (lower priority user app) then it can be stored, transmitted (network drivers are closed too) etc. Closed device drivers can be used on most platforms (including PCs) to build a covert channel where information (text, sound, images etc.) travels completely unbeknownst to the user, so a platform can't be considered as secure until every single bit of software and firmware contained can be checked. So, how did the police decrypt that traffic? I can only speculate that they confiscated one of these devices, then built a bugged driver for some vital devices within it, then got to the manufacturer and forced them to inject that tampered driver as an online update for that given model of phone, possibly installing only if some conditions were verified to be sure it was one of the targets. If that scenario is half true, then there is not a single piece of computer hardware in the world one can safely assume to be secure. An Arduino-like board, maybe, until the day they'll build faster ones around bigger chips carrying closed blobs inside.
- errantspark 8y agoWhile what you're saying is technically correct, I think you vastly overestimate the resources available and likely to be committed by law enforcement, and the competence of the people making/selling these phones.
- sterlind 8y agoHow were the police able to seize the company that sold IronChat in the first place? That's like shutting down Open Whisper Systems for criminals using Signal. Do we know if the company knowingly did business with organized crime? Or defied a court order? Or is it simply illegal to sell encryption hardware in .nl?
- rocqua 8y agoNot sure whether this is how they did it, but a new law has given police 'hacking powers'. Otherwise, it'd probably be a court order based on the claim they knowingly did business with organized crime.
- ProAm 8y ago> A 46-year-old man who owned the crypto phone service and a 52-year old partner have been arrested on charges related to money laundering and participation in a criminal organization.
- londons_explore 8y agoMy bet is those two were aware of the law and tried to do everything "above board". The law said "most of your customers are criminals, helping them evade detection is criminal in itself, you're under arrest". Pretty sad, considering the authors of PGP could be imprisoned on the same reasoning.
- 8y ago
- thinkingemote 8y agoAnyone know if the security company had warrant canaries or any dead man switch situations specified which were or were not triggered?
- sushid 8y agoIf you were on the list before, I’m sure purchasing a 1500 EUR/6 month crypto chatting phone would definitely pique the police’s interest.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- tomford614 8y agoAnybody wants a job to make a new crypto phone hit me on Wickr tomford614