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"Because middleboxes have been created and widely deployed that do not allow protocol versions that they do not recognize, the TLS 1.3 session must be disguised
by mcguire 8y ago
"Because middleboxes have been created and widely deployed that do not allow protocol versions that they do not recognize, the TLS 1.3 session must be disguised as a TLS 1.2 session."
And, from the bottom of my network-protocol-guy's heart, I hate them and everyone who's ever even seen one with the fiery passion of a million very angry suns.
- sigjuice 8y agoWhat would be some examples of these middle boxes?
- detaro 8y agoTypically "smart" firewalls/internet filtering things.
- jeroenhd 8y agoLoad balancers, IDS systems, traffic analysis, bad firewalls, content filtering systems, transparent proxies, some kinds of "intelligent switches", consumer routers with AV capabilities. Also anything sold by Blue Coat. You can read detailed examples on Cloudflare's blog, they've been very eager to experiment with TLS 1.3: https://blog.cloudflare.com/why-tls-1-3-isnt-in-browsers-yet/ https://blog.cloudflare.com/why-tls-1-3-isnt-in-browsers-yet...
- LinuxBender 8y agoIDP's / IPS's, firewalls that need to inspect payload, MitM Proxies such as Bluecoat, Websense, etc.., network appliances that create layer-7 flow data for debugging applications such as TrueSight and many more. Most big companies have contractual requirements to have an IPS/IDP to protect their customers. TLS1.3 means putting the decryption at the edge, which not everyone has done, then re-encrypting with something their IDP can decrypt.
- LeonM 8y agoI visited an infosec trade show recently, you wouldn't believe how many of these boxes are offered to 'improve' corporate security... Most of these boxes will break security chains, spoof DNS responses, require self-signed certs, etc. It's garbage. Kinda reminded me of 'the box' from the Silicon Valley TV-show. I guess corporate managers will prefer something tangible over actual good practices.
- supertrope 8y agoTraining is expensive and people will still click on ransomware payloads. Security appliances outsource blame.
- jandrese 8y agoMy favorite are the ones that re-sign connections without ever verifying that the original connection was signed by a legitimate authority.
- Tharkun 8y agoI encountered an interesting one at $bigcorp which required everyone in the corp to install shady certificates, and which would then inject <script> tags in all HTTP responses, including in XML and JSON REST responses. That was fun to debug.
- jandrese 8y agoIt's pretty common for these devices to require you to install their generated CA cert on every machine in the corporation. Administrators deploy it to the domain with a group policy object IIRC. Firefox users end up having to install it by hand, or else every website comes up as "you are being attacked by a MITM!!!!", which is technically true.
- spockz 8y agoSadly this also puts laptop users in the situation that they always need to vpn to the office otherwise sites that use HSTS will break either when on or outside the corporate networks, depending on when you visited the site first.
- nerdponx 8y agoWas explicit version whitelisting ever a legitimate security recommendation? Naively, it seems like a sane defensive measure against unanticipated behavior.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- tialaramex 8y agoThe version numbers are for negotiation purposes. One reasonable thing to do when the remote peer says "I want to speak TLS 8.6" is to say "Oh, I'm afraid we only allow TLS 1.2 here" and insist on talking TLS 1.2 anyway. But that's not what these boxes did. They go "TLS 8.6! Set Defence Condition One. Attack In Progress! Prepare For Immediate Nuclear Strike!" and they tear down the whole network connection. They did this with every previous version of TLS. The accepted lesson at this point is that if these idiots CAN break something they will, we don't care whether it's because they're too stupid not to break it or because they're actively assholes breaking things so nobody can have nice things, it doesn't matter. This is basically the network equivalent of that guy who just shoots anybody he doesn't recognise on his front step. We don't call that "a sane defensive measure" we call it murder, even if he thinks he was just on guard for "unanticipated behaviour" he's going to jail.
- snazz 8y agoThe reason for this is to prevent downgrade attacks where an attacker can perform a man-in-the-middle by forcing your client to use an insecure protocol version. It makes sense, even if it occasionally breaks websites.
- mcguire 8y agoPreventing downgrade attacks could be done by blacklisting known-bad versions, no? Assuming all future versions are bad leads to situations like this, where TLS 1.3 (and presumably all future versions) have to tunnel through a pseudo-TLS 1.2 connection.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- rkagerer 8y agoDon't worry, this clears it up: The particular version number (3.3 representing version 1.2) is due to TLS 1.0 being a minor revision of the SSL 3.0 protocol. Therefore TLS 1.0 is numeric version 3.1, TLS 1.1 is version 3.2, and so on. Talk about versioning schemes bastardized to hell. If people do that to my specs I hope I'm not around to see it.
- rlpb 8y agoThere's an interesting approach to tackling this problem described here: https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg26385.html https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg26385.h... Summary: constantly make up new protocol "versions". If everything did this, then middleboxes "that do not allow protocol versions that they do not recognize" will never be functional in the first place.