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> ...how does the user know his vote is valid and added to the tally? I could say the same thing currently - how do you know that vote you placed on a voting m

• zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC 8y ago
  > I could say the same thing currently - how do you know that vote you placed on a voting machine actually counted? Which is a reason for introducing an even less secure system how? Yes, voting computers are a huge security problem. Which is why they should be banned. > That's why you have codes that have no public mapping to candidates as I already suggested - I even suggested a primitive way to do so. As I mentioned above: Thinking of securing an election like securing a bank is doing things completely wrong. "The public" is not the primary attack vector you have to defend against. "The public" is who is supposed to have the power in an election. Entrenched powers is what you have to defend against.
• lb1lf 8y ago
  As for voting machines, I don't know, I cannot know - and, luckily, in my jurisdiction they don't exist. I'd be happy with voting machines if all they did was keep a running tally - have them print a ballot, have the voter deposit this ballot in an urn - if the result (gotten from the voting machine as the polls close) is disputed, recount the paper ballots, end of discussion. As for the second part, I misread your initial post -apologies.