3 ms·

It sounds like STAR is equivalent (or at least similar) to the Condorcet-with-score-based tiebreaker that somebody proposed elsewhere (edit to add: https://news

It sounds like STAR is equivalent (or at least similar) to the Condorcet-with-score-based tiebreaker that somebody proposed elsewhere (edit to add: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18395358 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18395358 ) in this thread. I understood that one but not STAR. It needs much better explanation and marketing! Edit: doh, wait, STAR is in fact the exact opposite -- scores first, ranks as a tiebreaker. I’m reading https://www.equal.vote/starvoting https://www.equal.vote/starvoting and I still don’t entirely follow. It’s lacking some detail I’d like to understand. For example, it looks like it is not a Condorcet method. That seems bad to me -- if you’re not electing the Condorcet winner, you need a very good explanation why; and I don’t trust an appeal to numerical ratings that each voter will interpret and use in different ways. Aha, yes, Wikipedia has a clearer explanation and confirms that it is not Condorcet: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/STAR_voting https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/STAR_voting I do agree that it looks probably better than IRV, but I’m not yet convinced that it’s a really good system and is worth pushing as a good approach for real elections.

deleted 8y ago
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quadrangle 8y ago
Thanks for being open-minded. I mentioned in my other reply (to your other reply) why Condorcet isn't strictly ideal. Discussing the edge-cases where STAR does not support the Condorcet candidate is too long a discussion, I can't get into it here. One short point: the primary problem with not electing Condorcet is that coordinated strategic majority could, in hindsight and for future elections, force the Condorcet by refusing to support later preferences. In STAR, that strategy is risky and unpredictable. If the Condorcet is a strong case, it will win STAR anyway. If it's an edge case, nobody knows in advance if it will be the true majority or just a bit less, so strategically zeroing all by the favorite is so risky in that edge case, most people won't do it (it could backfire for them to refuse to support their 2nd favorites if their hail-mary hope that they just might have a Condorcet turns out to be wrong). No strategies with STAR are reliable. The best outcomes come from just being honest. Note: STAR doesn't use rank as a tie-breaker only. It can flat-out overrule a score difference with the 2nd-highest scoring candidate winning. It's not just for ties. > I do agree that it looks probably better than IRV, but I’m not yet convinced that it’s a really good system Well, since IRV gets pushed for real elections and STAR is better on a large number of factors, and both are better than FPTP… You otherwise want to promote 3-2-1 https://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/3-2-1_voting https://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/3-2-1_voting or approval or maybe some good PR approach like PLACE voting https://medium.com/@jameson.quinn/place-voting-the-elevator-pitch-abbdbeb08ecf https://medium.com/@jameson.quinn/place-voting-the-elevator-... If you want to discuss this stuff more with other folks, https://forum.electionscience.org https://forum.electionscience.org is the place to go, btw

deleted 8y ago

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quadrangle 8y ago

Thanks for being open-minded. I mentioned in my other reply (to your other reply) why Condorcet isn't strictly ideal. Discussing the edge-cases where STAR does not support the Condorcet candidate is too long a discussion, I can't get into it here. One short point: the primary problem with not electing Condorcet is that coordinated strategic majority could, in hindsight and for future elections, force the Condorcet by refusing to support later preferences. In STAR, that strategy is risky and unpredictable. If the Condorcet is a strong case, it will win STAR anyway. If it's an edge case, nobody knows in advance if it will be the true majority or just a bit less, so strategically zeroing all by the favorite is so risky in that edge case, most people won't do it (it could backfire for them to refuse to support their 2nd favorites if their hail-mary hope that they just might have a Condorcet turns out to be wrong). No strategies with STAR are reliable. The best outcomes come from just being honest. Note: STAR doesn't use rank as a tie-breaker only. It can flat-out overrule a score difference with the 2nd-highest scoring candidate winning. It's not just for ties. > I do agree that it looks probably better than IRV, but I’m not yet convinced that it’s a really good system Well, since IRV gets pushed for real elections and STAR is better on a large number of factors, and both are better than FPTP… You otherwise want to promote 3-2-1 https://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/3-2-1_voting https://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/3-2-1_voting or approval or maybe some good PR approach like PLACE voting https://medium.com/@jameson.quinn/place-voting-the-elevator-pitch-abbdbeb08ecf https://medium.com/@jameson.quinn/place-voting-the-elevator-... If you want to discuss this stuff more with other folks, https://forum.electionscience.org https://forum.electionscience.org is the place to go, btw