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> Let’s say I’m range voting out of 10 and I give four candidates 1, 3, 8 and 10 points respectively. But the candidate I rated 3 wins, with the candidate I rat

> Let’s say I’m range voting out of 10 and I give four candidates 1, 3, 8 and 10 points respectively. But the candidate I rated 3 wins, with the candidate I rated 8 a close second. Damn it! If I’d known that was going to happen, I would have voted 1, 1, 10, 10. This is the EXACT reason STAR voting was invented. Unlike plain score, STAR has a runoff where it compares your preference of the top two and puts your full vote to your preference. So, this is like an exact case study of why STAR is worthwhile. STAR proposes 0-5, but we can stick with 1-10 for this case. You vote 1, 3, 8, 10 and the top two candidates are the ones you voted 3 and 8. With STAR, it doesn't matter that your 3 candidate got a total score higher than your 8 candidate, your vote in the runoff goes to your 8 because that's rated higher. If more voters rated that candidate higher, they win even if their plain score total was lower. Thus, you don't have to exaggerate all your scores. In fact, you have an incentive not to, because if you just give ties, you risk abstaining in the runoff instead of having a say there. I mean literally you just spelled out the most common critique of plain score voting which is itself THE argument for why we should use STAR instead.

iainmerrick 8y ago
It sounds like STAR is equivalent (or at least similar) to the Condorcet-with-score-based tiebreaker that somebody proposed elsewhere (edit to add: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18395358 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18395358 ) in this thread. I understood that one but not STAR. It needs much better explanation and marketing! Edit: doh, wait, STAR is in fact the exact opposite -- scores first, ranks as a tiebreaker. I’m reading https://www.equal.vote/starvoting https://www.equal.vote/starvoting and I still don’t entirely follow. It’s lacking some detail I’d like to understand. For example, it looks like it is not a Condorcet method. That seems bad to me -- if you’re not electing the Condorcet winner, you need a very good explanation why; and I don’t trust an appeal to numerical ratings that each voter will interpret and use in different ways. Aha, yes, Wikipedia has a clearer explanation and confirms that it is not Condorcet: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/STAR_voting https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/STAR_voting I do agree that it looks probably better than IRV, but I’m not yet convinced that it’s a really good system and is worth pushing as a good approach for real elections.
- deleted 8y ago
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- quadrangle 8y ago
  Thanks for being open-minded. I mentioned in my other reply (to your other reply) why Condorcet isn't strictly ideal. Discussing the edge-cases where STAR does not support the Condorcet candidate is too long a discussion, I can't get into it here. One short point: the primary problem with not electing Condorcet is that coordinated strategic majority could, in hindsight and for future elections, force the Condorcet by refusing to support later preferences. In STAR, that strategy is risky and unpredictable. If the Condorcet is a strong case, it will win STAR anyway. If it's an edge case, nobody knows in advance if it will be the true majority or just a bit less, so strategically zeroing all by the favorite is so risky in that edge case, most people won't do it (it could backfire for them to refuse to support their 2nd favorites if their hail-mary hope that they just might have a Condorcet turns out to be wrong). No strategies with STAR are reliable. The best outcomes come from just being honest. Note: STAR doesn't use rank as a tie-breaker only. It can flat-out overrule a score difference with the 2nd-highest scoring candidate winning. It's not just for ties. > I do agree that it looks probably better than IRV, but I’m not yet convinced that it’s a really good system Well, since IRV gets pushed for real elections and STAR is better on a large number of factors, and both are better than FPTP… You otherwise want to promote 3-2-1 https://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/3-2-1_voting https://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/3-2-1_voting or approval or maybe some good PR approach like PLACE voting https://medium.com/@jameson.quinn/place-voting-the-elevator-pitch-abbdbeb08ecf https://medium.com/@jameson.quinn/place-voting-the-elevator-... If you want to discuss this stuff more with other folks, https://forum.electionscience.org https://forum.electionscience.org is the place to go, btw
iainmerrick 8y ago
Here is my less-hot take: STAR is exactly back-to-front. You’re combining ranked voting with range voting. Ranked voting is objective and clear (the Condorcet criterion is very compelling) but unfortunately incomplete (Arrow’s theorem, which in this case boils down to unresolvable three-way cycles.) Range voting is more tractable (counting is easy, no awkward cycles) but subjective (no-one knows what the scores actually mean) and prey to tactical voting. STAR starts with range voting (so you lose Condorcet) and adds cut-down ranked voting as a final step (only after some rank information has been discarded; and ranking isn’t a sound way to resolve ties). It would be better to use ranked voting first, then range voting to resolve tie-breaks. That would make better use of the unique advantages of each voting style.
- quadrangle 8y ago
  Yes, STAR mixes rank and range to create a balance. I still don't buy your assertion that no one knows what scores mean. That's no stronger of an argument than the opposing critique of ranking: nobody knows in a rank ballot whether it's a slight preference between two supported candidates or a huge difference between a liked and a hated (but maybe some other candidate is even worse) situation. In both ranking and scoring, the ballot does not give a transparent view of the voters' beliefs. They only mean what they mean on the ballot, that there are relative scores or a ranked order. We can't and shouldn't assert that we can know more deeply what's behind those marks. Condorcet is not a bad principle per se, but it's not the absolutely most desirable. If it were the only factor, nobody would accept IRV. And Condorcet means that a candidate who is 2nd choice of 100% of the voters, maybe even a strong 2nd choice (rankings don't carry that info) will always lose even in a case where all the other candidates are grossly polarizing and will lead to civil war. There are at least cases where a consensus is superior to Condorcet. > It would be better to use ranked voting first, then range voting to resolve tie-breaks. How does this proposed idea work? What actual system are you suggesting that would do this? EDIT: I see this referenced in your other post.
  - iainmerrick 8y ago
    Condorcet means that a candidate who is 2nd choice of 100% of the voters, maybe even a strong 2nd choice (rankings don't carry that info) will always lose even in a case where all the other candidates are grossly polarizing That's not correct, if there are 4 or more candidates. If there were exactly 3 candidates the split would have to be something like 51-49, and then the candidate with 100% second place would come second. But it's arguable whether that's a bad result, and it seems like a very unlikely scenario anyway. Even 10% of people voting that candidate in first place would be enough for them to win it.

iainmerrick 8y ago

It sounds like STAR is equivalent (or at least similar) to the Condorcet-with-score-based tiebreaker that somebody proposed elsewhere (edit to add: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18395358 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18395358 ) in this thread. I understood that one but not STAR. It needs much better explanation and marketing! Edit: doh, wait, STAR is in fact the exact opposite -- scores first, ranks as a tiebreaker. I’m reading https://www.equal.vote/starvoting https://www.equal.vote/starvoting and I still don’t entirely follow. It’s lacking some detail I’d like to understand. For example, it looks like it is not a Condorcet method. That seems bad to me -- if you’re not electing the Condorcet winner, you need a very good explanation why; and I don’t trust an appeal to numerical ratings that each voter will interpret and use in different ways. Aha, yes, Wikipedia has a clearer explanation and confirms that it is not Condorcet: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/STAR_voting https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/STAR_voting I do agree that it looks probably better than IRV, but I’m not yet convinced that it’s a really good system and is worth pushing as a good approach for real elections.

deleted 8y ago
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quadrangle 8y ago
Thanks for being open-minded. I mentioned in my other reply (to your other reply) why Condorcet isn't strictly ideal. Discussing the edge-cases where STAR does not support the Condorcet candidate is too long a discussion, I can't get into it here. One short point: the primary problem with not electing Condorcet is that coordinated strategic majority could, in hindsight and for future elections, force the Condorcet by refusing to support later preferences. In STAR, that strategy is risky and unpredictable. If the Condorcet is a strong case, it will win STAR anyway. If it's an edge case, nobody knows in advance if it will be the true majority or just a bit less, so strategically zeroing all by the favorite is so risky in that edge case, most people won't do it (it could backfire for them to refuse to support their 2nd favorites if their hail-mary hope that they just might have a Condorcet turns out to be wrong). No strategies with STAR are reliable. The best outcomes come from just being honest. Note: STAR doesn't use rank as a tie-breaker only. It can flat-out overrule a score difference with the 2nd-highest scoring candidate winning. It's not just for ties. > I do agree that it looks probably better than IRV, but I’m not yet convinced that it’s a really good system Well, since IRV gets pushed for real elections and STAR is better on a large number of factors, and both are better than FPTP… You otherwise want to promote 3-2-1 https://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/3-2-1_voting https://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/3-2-1_voting or approval or maybe some good PR approach like PLACE voting https://medium.com/@jameson.quinn/place-voting-the-elevator-pitch-abbdbeb08ecf https://medium.com/@jameson.quinn/place-voting-the-elevator-... If you want to discuss this stuff more with other folks, https://forum.electionscience.org https://forum.electionscience.org is the place to go, btw

iainmerrick 8y ago

Here is my less-hot take: STAR is exactly back-to-front. You’re combining ranked voting with range voting. Ranked voting is objective and clear (the Condorcet criterion is very compelling) but unfortunately incomplete (Arrow’s theorem, which in this case boils down to unresolvable three-way cycles.) Range voting is more tractable (counting is easy, no awkward cycles) but subjective (no-one knows what the scores actually mean) and prey to tactical voting. STAR starts with range voting (so you lose Condorcet) and adds cut-down ranked voting as a final step (only after some rank information has been discarded; and ranking isn’t a sound way to resolve ties). It would be better to use ranked voting first, then range voting to resolve tie-breaks. That would make better use of the unique advantages of each voting style.

quadrangle 8y ago
Yes, STAR mixes rank and range to create a balance. I still don't buy your assertion that no one knows what scores mean. That's no stronger of an argument than the opposing critique of ranking: nobody knows in a rank ballot whether it's a slight preference between two supported candidates or a huge difference between a liked and a hated (but maybe some other candidate is even worse) situation. In both ranking and scoring, the ballot does not give a transparent view of the voters' beliefs. They only mean what they mean on the ballot, that there are relative scores or a ranked order. We can't and shouldn't assert that we can know more deeply what's behind those marks. Condorcet is not a bad principle per se, but it's not the absolutely most desirable. If it were the only factor, nobody would accept IRV. And Condorcet means that a candidate who is 2nd choice of 100% of the voters, maybe even a strong 2nd choice (rankings don't carry that info) will always lose even in a case where all the other candidates are grossly polarizing and will lead to civil war. There are at least cases where a consensus is superior to Condorcet. > It would be better to use ranked voting first, then range voting to resolve tie-breaks. How does this proposed idea work? What actual system are you suggesting that would do this? EDIT: I see this referenced in your other post.
- iainmerrick 8y ago
  Condorcet means that a candidate who is 2nd choice of 100% of the voters, maybe even a strong 2nd choice (rankings don't carry that info) will always lose even in a case where all the other candidates are grossly polarizing That's not correct, if there are 4 or more candidates. If there were exactly 3 candidates the split would have to be something like 51-49, and then the candidate with 100% second place would come second. But it's arguable whether that's a bad result, and it seems like a very unlikely scenario anyway. Even 10% of people voting that candidate in first place would be enough for them to win it.