https://web.stanford.edu/~diamondr/DMQ.pdf https://web.stanford.edu/~diamondr/DMQ.pdf "This reduction in rental supply likely increased rents in the long-run,

https://web.stanford.edu/~diamondr/DMQ.pdf https://web.stanford.edu/~diamondr/DMQ.pdf "This reduction in rental supply likely increased rents in the long-run, leading to a transfer between future San Francisco renters and renters living in San Francisco in 1994. In addition, the conversion of existing rental properties to higher-end, owner-occupied condominium housing ultimately led to a housing stock increasingly directed towards higher income individuals. In this way, rent control contributed to the gentrification of San Francisco, contrary to the stated policy goal. Rent control appears to have increased income inequality in the city by simultaneously limiting displacement of minorities and attracting higher income residents. These results highlight that forcing landlords to provided insurance against rent increases can ultimately be counterproductive. If society desires to provide social insurance against rent increases, it may be less distortionary to offer this subsidy in the form of a government subsidy or tax credit. This would remove landlords’ incentives to decrease the housing supply and could provide households with the insurance they desire. A point of future research would be to design an optimal social insurance program to insure renters against large rent increases."