4 ms·

What I often see in my local election is that 3rd-party candidates are often (not always, but often) very inexperienced, and might have platforms that don't mak

What I often see in my local election is that 3rd-party candidates are often (not always, but often) very inexperienced, and might have platforms that don't make sense or aren't coherent. I've frequently got serious doubts about their ability to function competently - let alone effectively - in the position they're applying for. With IRV, though, I could see a situation where they are much more likely to win simply because, nowadays, Republicans' and Democrats' general level of mutual disdain is such that I wouldn't be surprised if it ends up being common for people who identify with one major party to rank the candidate from the other major party below every other candidate more-or-less out of spite.

boomboomsubban 8y ago
>What I often see in my local election is that 3rd-party candidates are often (not always, but often) very inexperienced, and might have platforms that don't make sense or aren't coherent This is a symptom of our current system. Anybody who has any ambition in politics will modify some of their positions to fit one of the major two parties. If running for another party wasn't a death sentence, you would see more competent candidates in those parties.
- bunderbunder 8y ago
  Yep. Just trying to think through plausible practical scenarios where IRV might produce a bad outcome. Which is worth doing because, regardless of what the ideal situation is, if it's associated with a spectacularly bad outcome in one of the earlier elections that uses it, that's going to be a big impediment to wider adoption.
__d 8y ago
Even in a sharply polarized contest, it's usually the case that most of the "third party" candidates receive fewer first-preference votes than those from the major parties. So the minor parties (and independents) are eliminated first, and their preferences are distributed. Which usually means than one of the major party candidates scrapes over 50%, reflecting the minor party voters' basic preference for one of the major parties over the other. In this (common) situation, I think IRV actually works really well. The major parties still end up in government, but they see the first-preference percentages for the minor parties, and understand what policy positions are important to the electorate.

boomboomsubban 8y ago

>What I often see in my local election is that 3rd-party candidates are often (not always, but often) very inexperienced, and might have platforms that don't make sense or aren't coherent This is a symptom of our current system. Anybody who has any ambition in politics will modify some of their positions to fit one of the major two parties. If running for another party wasn't a death sentence, you would see more competent candidates in those parties.

bunderbunder 8y ago
Yep. Just trying to think through plausible practical scenarios where IRV might produce a bad outcome. Which is worth doing because, regardless of what the ideal situation is, if it's associated with a spectacularly bad outcome in one of the earlier elections that uses it, that's going to be a big impediment to wider adoption.

__d 8y ago

Even in a sharply polarized contest, it's usually the case that most of the "third party" candidates receive fewer first-preference votes than those from the major parties. So the minor parties (and independents) are eliminated first, and their preferences are distributed. Which usually means than one of the major party candidates scrapes over 50%, reflecting the minor party voters' basic preference for one of the major parties over the other. In this (common) situation, I think IRV actually works really well. The major parties still end up in government, but they see the first-preference percentages for the minor parties, and understand what policy positions are important to the electorate.