4 ms·
Even assuming a secure implementation of this system (unlikely), what's to stop a man in the middle attack? When you're browsing at the coffee shop, I just lie
by poet 16y ago
Even assuming a secure implementation of this system (unlikely), what's to stop a man in the middle attack? When you're browsing at the coffee shop, I just lie to you about the server's public key.
Now sure, you could access the server one from a trusted connection to get the public key. But then when someone spoofs the public key you get a large and nasty error message saying the public key has changed. And history tells us that security can't safely be reduced to that type of user interface problem.
Long story short, you're massively underestimating how valuable it is that web browsers ship with certificates installed. When in doubt, don't re-implement SSL. ;)
- meinhimmel 16y agoAh, nice timing with your message. I think we wrote the same concerns. It's not just that the servers public key can be replaced on the victim's machine, but also an attacker can send their own public key instead of the victims to the server. During a MITM attack, all traffic would be fully viewable to an attacker without anyone really being the wiser.
- antileet 16y agoYou're right. I didn't assume that the initial page can be hijacked as well. My small hack was just to try and work around the problem, while I understand it's best to rely on proven solutions like SSL when things get serious. Thank you for pointing out where I was wrong.