5 ms·
If by ‘cred stuffing’ you mean brute forcing accounts, that’s what short lockouts and 2 factor authentication are for. JavaScript is just a layer of obfuscation
by tinus_hn 8y ago
If by ‘cred stuffing’ you mean brute forcing accounts, that’s what short lockouts and 2 factor authentication are for. JavaScript is just a layer of obfuscation and doesn’t fundamentally help.
- roenxi 8y agoI'm not up to speed with the latest and greatest of what java-script can do, but isn't the source code fundamentally user-visible? We always used to laugh at people who did website security with javascript, the whole idea was that security processing had to be done server-side.
- aequitas 8y agoJavascript can be served dynamic as well, per user/connection specific even. So an attacker would have to investigate and counter each new version of the scripts. Even if this could be done automatic it greatly increases the cat/mouse factor for Google.
- dorgo 8y agoSo, basically javascript is used for security through obscurity?
- Borealid 8y agoCan't you use Javascript to implement challenge-response authentication, which meaningfully improves security by: 1. Preventing interception of passwords on the wire 2. Allowing a tunable "difficulty" parameter which makes brute-force attacks cost ineffective 3. Requiring that brute-force attackers either run a Javascript interpreter (dangerous, because the web site chooses what they do and could make them mine Bitcoins) or rewrite their brute-forcer each time the JS-driven network communication channel is altered It seems to me that having a client-and-server protocol beyond just "POST this data here" can be more secure than sending a password to the server for verification...
- dorgo 8y ago>1. Preventing interception of passwords on the wire Isn't this solved by https? I have no idea, but I hope at least that https protects my passwords. >2. Allowing a tunable "difficulty" parameter which makes brute-force attacks cost ineffective I don't want to wait for a login more than a second. Actually, I don't want to wait at all. >3. ... or rewrite their brute-forcer each time the JS-driven network communication channel is altered How is this different from altered HTML/CSS? An attacker has to adapt to the altered login page. It is not an argument for javascript. >It seems to me that having a client-and-server protocol beyond just "POST this data here" can be more secure than sending a password to the server for verification... You say it: a protocol! not a piece of javascript.
- zbentley 8y ago> Actually, I don't want to wait at all. Neither do I. But I also accept that, given the sheer volume of stolen creds and bots out there, sites that damage their bang/buck performance, even at the cost of very minor inconvenience to users, are likely to be targeted less frequently and in lower volume. Even if I wasn't begrudgingly willing to pay that price, I'd at least admit to the logic of making the process more time-consuming as a deterrent.
- floatboth 8y ago> I don't want to wait for a login more than a second. Do you log in that often?
- therealx 8y agoI believe some US banks have been doing this for a while.
- jhabdas 8y agoPoW ought to make a better defense. It also require JS. oh wait...
- mathw 8y agoI find the idea of detecting someone's trying to bust your login page with some kind of automated system and deciding to serve them a ridiculously aggressive Bitcoin miner rather amusing.
- httpsterio 8y agoNo not necessarily, and if it is, it's bad practice. Client-side js will always be readable, even if you obfuscate it, you can't trust it to never being decompiled. But server-side js never has to reach the client, it can be used to dynamically generate basically anything.
- bryanrasmussen 8y agosecurity through obscurity may be no security at all, but security without obscurity is probably not as good as security with obscurity for many security scenarios that one can imagine.
- aequitas 8y agoObscurity is just another layer you add onto your security. As with all security methods, no one is perfect and its always a balance with usability. But with security at this level nowadays every added layer helps. Even if it is not even used in the initial authentication step. Think of classifying certain patterns in the attacks and retroactive de-authorizing after login, increasing the time-cost for the attacker.
- raesene9 8y agoCredential stuffing more commonly refers to the practice of getting valid sets of creds from various password database dumps and retrying them across common/popular systems. 2FA is a good defence against it, but lockouts are less as they attacker will be going broad and not deep (could be a single request per user account)
- tinus_hn 8y agoI don’t see how JavaScript is anything more than a bandaid for that. The assumption is the attacker has the usercode and password combination and then you want to prevent him from logging in.
- rocqua 8y agoIp based lockouts as opposed to account based lockouts do better against cred stuffing. Because there is a cost to getting more IP adresses. Maybe carrier grade NAT would lead to too many false positives?
- delroth 8y agoMost bad actors doing abuse at scale have access to large networks of proxies on residential or mobile IPs, usually backed by malware on workstations, laptops and mobile phones. Even as a newcomer without the right contacts on the black market you can get started with very little upfront investment, using services like https://luminati.io/ https://luminati.io/ (they pay software developers to bundle their proxy endpoints within their apps).
- tinus_hn 8y agoIPv6 addresses aren’t really scarce.
- delroth 8y ago/64 and /48 are pretty much on the same order of magnitude as IPv4s in terms of difficulty of acquisition, and I don't know why you would ever look at more than /64 when most major operating systems randomize the last 64 bits anyway (RFC4941).