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Great strategy here to aggregate results by splitting and distributing the data to different nodes. As for them vetting third-parties as mentioned in the artic
by oedmarap 8y ago
Great strategy here to aggregate results by splitting and distributing the data to different nodes.
As for them vetting third-parties as mentioned in the article, I'd actually prefer Mozilla to host different telemetry collection nodes itself and just route them round-robin anonymously within their own network.
IMO having to extend intermediary trust might be taking one step forward two steps back here if who collects the data != who analyzes it.
- xcodevn 8y agoYou don't need to trust all third-parties. Crypto magic guarantees that what you need is at least ONE server being honest. If you trust Mozilla, then you have nothing to worry about, except the proof or program may be wrong ;) Third-parties are for someone who doesn't trust Mozilla. Or that Mozilla could be compromised by an unknown adversary.
- betterunix2 8y agoThe security model of the Prio protocol requires two or more non-colluding servers, so having Mozilla control both would be pretty questionable.
- rhelmer 8y agoPart of the threat model is that individual orgs can be compelled in various ways to turn over individual user data, and having different orgs holding their own private keys helps to mitigate this.