4 ms·
Without cover traffic, its not clear to me that this would prevent a correlation attack from an adversary with resources.
by Paul-ish 8y ago
Without cover traffic, its not clear to me that this would prevent a correlation attack from an adversary with resources.
- kijiki 8y ago"These protocol changes are an incremental step, and we are continuing to work on improvements to Signal’s metadata resistance. In particular, additional resistance to traffic correlation via timing attacks and IP addresses are areas of ongoing development." It won't prevent correlation attacks, but it does make metadata attacks in general harder and less confident. An improvement is an improvement even if it doesn't completely solve a problem.
- bigiain 8y agoIf my IP address is my current VPN endpoint - I'm only worried about "the global passive observer" - and if I've got them curious about me there's no sensible technical measure I can take to prevent losing out to them. As James Mickens teaches us: "YOU"RE STILL GONNA GET MOSSAD'ED UPON"
- bjoli 8y agoI feel like the bar is constantly being raised. Which messengers provide cover traffic? To my knowledge it is only pond, which has been discontinued. Pond was limited to text at about 5kB/s. Sustained connections is not suitable for mobile phones, and unless you sustain a data flow or introduce random delays correlation attacks will always be possible. Signal could probably force TOR connectivity (forcing websockets for those connections), which would conceal the sender even more, but would not stop correlation attacks. This also wasn't made to stop correlation attacks. This is a measure to reduce metadata being stored on the server. Messages stored on the server won't have a "from" label that can be read by the server.