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One thing I've always wondered is why electronic voting machines aren't code reviewed AT LEAST as much as slot machines. Electronic gambling devices are intens
by naikrovek 8y ago
One thing I've always wondered is why electronic voting machines aren't code reviewed AT LEAST as much as slot machines.
Electronic gambling devices are intensely code reviewed. It's the law. Why not electronic voting machines?
That said, paper ballots and hand counting are the answer for secure and accurate vote counts.
- wlll 8y ago> One thing I've always wondered is why electronic voting machines aren't code reviewed AT LEAST as much as slot machines. One reason could be if the people who would legislate on this benefit when voting machines don't work properly?
- SketchySeaBeast 8y ago"There's no way I was legitimately voted in! Clearly the voting machines broke!"
- detcader 8y agoUse of slot machines make businesses money. Use of voting machines...
- jobigoud 8y agomake businesses money?
- jbigelow76 8y agoRegulations seem to me like they are always reactionary to bad shit happening, we're just too dumb to be prescient enough to get ahead of the problems because we are too arrogant to think we'll make the same mistakes we always make and because we think our intentions are insurance against those mistakes if they do happen.
- janekm 8y agoOne problem with voting machines is that "bad stuff happening" can be beneficial to the people in charge of overseeing them, quite the opposite of gambling machines.
- tekromancr 8y agoI think it makes sense that regulations are reactionary against bad shit that has (traffic fatalities, market manipulation, food and drug safety, etc) or is currently happening (global climate change). If we tried to write regulations against everything that might possibly maybe go wrong, I imagine we would end up with an unworkable regulatory landscape that ends up doing more harm than good. And I say this as someone who thinks regulations are a good thing on balance.
- tzs 8y ago> That said, paper ballots and hand counting are the answer for secure and accurate vote counts Hand counts aren't particularly accurate. Change that to paper ballots counted by optical scanners with some clever ballot design using cryptographic techniques to allow voters to verify that their vote was included correctly in the count and to allow independent third party auditing of the results, and then you have a secure and accurate system. One way to do that is this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scantegrity https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scantegrity
- aleksei 8y ago> Hand counts aren't particularly accurate. Citation? Hand counts are as accurate as you want them to be. Just keep counting. The problem with any form of voting that allows you to verify your vote was counted correctly, is that anyone can verify you voted 'correctly'. The only way to ensure a fair election is to vote by paper ballot and have the count executed by anyone who wants to participate.
- tzs 8y ago> The problem with any form of voting that allows you to verify your vote was counted correctly, is that anyone can verify you voted 'correctly'. That's not correct. There are several systems that let you verify your ballot was included in the count and the count is correct, which together show that your vote was counted correctly, without letting anyone verify who specifically you voted for. See Punchscan, Prêt à Voter, and Scantegrity II for examples. Look at the research literature under end to end auditable voting systems [1] for more on this topic. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_auditable_voting_systems https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_auditable_voting_sy...
- jacques_chester 8y agoYou know what else achieves this goal, in a way that doesn't require anyone to refer anyone else to a mathematical proof? Pen and paper.
- russdill 8y agoBecause there is no money in electronic voting machines, at least not when compared to gambling machines. If similar review and certification was required, states would throw their hands up at the cost and just opt for optically scanned paper ballots.
- pjc50 8y agoThe failures are quite likely deliberate and malicious, given the corrupt revolving door between Diebold and the Republican party. https://medium.com/@jennycohn1/georgia-6-and-the-voting-machine-vendors-87278fdb0cdf https://medium.com/@jennycohn1/georgia-6-and-the-voting-mach...
- naikrovek 8y agoI think it's wound up that way. I do not think it started that way, I think it started that way because there was no incentive for Diebold or other electronic voting vendors to do the right thing, and now keeping things status quo is very easy for an incumbent. I imagine that it is very hard to convince someone that was elected with electronic voting machines that there is a problem with electronic voting machines.
- Bluestrike2 8y agoThe simple answer? Money and jurisdiction. There's an article[0] with a powerful quote on the subject: "There is no one election in the United States, there are thousands of independent elections. ... They’re run with their own policies, and their own processes, and, frankly, in a lot of ways, their own vocabulary." Machines are usually bought by local jurisdictions. Some states cover the costs for all elections; some for only some elections; over 6 cover nothing. In any case, local jurisdictions are faced with a conundrum: do we spend money for something that's used only a couple days a year, or fund more immediately beneficial programs (roads, aid programs, etc.)? Budgets can't even keep up with replacing equipment, let alone thorough code and security reviews. Assuming the administrators even recognize what kind of work needs done. It's outside their experience, and when you start considering the kind of attack vectors that freaking nation states can literally create, even the best efforts of well-intentioned election officials are going to be wholly insufficient. And when nation states that are willing to put in the effort are the threat you're protecting against, everything changes. Individual states are unlikely to try and setup the kind of review that you're looking at. Or--possibly--even realize that they need to. It's expensive, and the people they're relying on to inform them about these matters are often the people selling the machines. Worse, you're looking at at least 50 separate efforts to secure voting machines. They may, or may not, somehow wind up coordinating with each other. The federal government could, but states guard their control over elections fiercely: just look at how almost all of them told the Obama administration to go pound sand when DHS warned them of potential hacking attempts. Unless there's a major, undeniable breach, I don't expect much to change anytime soon in most states. Even then, we'll probably see a shift to paper ballots rather than the sort of hideously expensive expenditures needed for the sort of rigorous IT security efforts we now know are necessary for electronic voting in the current threat environment. Otherwise, we'll be lucky to see piecemeal incremental improvements when individual states get around to them. 0. https://www.propublica.org/article/election-security-a-high-priority-until-it-comes-to-paying-for-new-voting-machines https://www.propublica.org/article/election-security-a-high-...