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The article spends a significant portion of the first part of the article talking about how it was easier to get hands on the physical machine than it should be
by jrochkind1 8y ago
The article spends a significant portion of the first part of the article talking about how it was easier to get hands on the physical machine than it should be.
And in some cases, contrary to the mantra, "security by obscurity" is indeed an important _layer_ of security. But I'm not sure if this is one of them. Of all the domains that one would expect state actors to be trying to exploit, I'd think voting would be near the top. And I don't think trying to only make sure "authorized" people can get their hands on a voting machine is going to be much of a barrier to a state actor. The thing better really be secure no matter how much an attacker knows about it, to defend against state actors, no?
And of course these _weren't_. But I don't think making it harder to buy an old machine on ebay would provide enough barrier to the attackers in the realistic threat model, to even bother doing it. Better to spend the focus on the actual security of the machine. I feel like the "lifecycle management" of machines that the author prioritizes as a solution is a misdirection.
> By simply regulating and monitoring the sale of used voting machines more closely, we would create a huge barrier to bad actors.
A HUGE one? To the intelligence agency of a foreign state? I doubt it. If you think it was a huge one, it's a false sense of security that may lead you to insufficiently prioritize more important fixes. (Which may be _not using digital voting machines_.)