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> a secure remote compute arrangement is sort of a natural extension from Qubes I see what you mean, but on the other hand it's a threat to the endpoint securi
by forapurpose 8y ago
> a secure remote compute arrangement is sort of a natural extension from Qubes
I see what you mean, but on the other hand it's a threat to the endpoint security she's worked so hard on. If Intel offered a solution that allowed remote users to run code on your machine, no matter how secure they claimed it to be the response here would rightfully be 'what could go wrong?' Can it be made secure enough?
(I'm aware that Intel already offers such things, including via SGX which others in this discussion say is utilized by Golem.)
- wanderfowl 8y agoSure, but at the same time, a big part of Qubes involved creating very secure jails for processes, which they could not escape. So, 'keeping untrusted stuff in its box' is sort of her expertise, and if anybody's going to do that right, it's probably her. Chances are, the NSA won't be renting out Top Secret machines for Golem, but some rando with a multi-thousand dollar gaming rig she's just using to browse HN on may well view the tradeoff differently.
- wolfgke 8y ago> some rando with a multi-thousand dollar gaming rig she's just using to browse HN on may well view the tradeoff differently. I don't think so since you will immediately hear the difference in terms of fan noise. :-)
- glitch003 8y agoSeems like an acceptable tradeoff, like if it's cold in her room and she wants to get paid to heat it
- effie 8y agoYou have a very naive view of the quality of isolation Qubes OS can provide. It is currently basically sanely configured Xen domains with some python helper scripts. There is nothing in the way Qubes OS does isolation that would suggest some exceptional expertise in process isolation. That kind of expertise is more appropriately sought in projects like sel4, Genode, etc.