5 ms·
> What about all the 1024 bit keys that litter the DNSSEC PKI? You’re moving the goalposts. The parent comment was explicitly about the root key. Yes, there a
by teddyh 8y ago
> What about all the 1024 bit keys that litter the DNSSEC PKI?
You’re moving the goalposts. The parent comment was explicitly about the root key. Yes, there are still weak keys below the root, just as there are still weak certifikates with MD5 hashes out there, but that is neither here nor there.
- tptacek 8y agoNo, modern browsers won't honor MD5 (or, for that matter SHA-1) certificates. But there's nothing they can do about 1024 bit RSA keys in DNSSEC. Starting to see the pattern?
- akerl_ 8y agoJust to clarify, bluejekyll referred to the root keys as a "somewhat weak RSA key", you pointed out that the root keys are 2048 bit, and tptacek responded pointing out that while the root keys are 2048 bit, the chain between them and basically any site with DNSSEC has 1024 bit keys involved. That's not really "moving the goalpost", so much as "a conversation involving more than 2 people". I pulled up the chain for cloudflare.com on the grounds that they'd care more than the average site about DNSSEC, and here was the result: http://dnsviz.net/d/cloudflare.com/dnssec/ http://dnsviz.net/d/cloudflare.com/dnssec/ So that's a 2048 bit root, and then as the chain passes through .com there's a 1024 bit RSA key, and then they have ECC keys for their zone. If their TLS cert had a hop in the chain that used MD5 hashes, Chrome would be refusing to trust their site.
- teddyh 8y agoFirstly, now that the root has a 2048 bit key, I predict that the rest of the TLDs will follow soonish. Previously, the concept was unproven, but now that it has been proven to work, I assume that keys will be rolled and progress will be made. Secondly, as I understand it, a 1024-bit RSA key, while not recommended, is still vastly more secure than an MD5 hash.
- tptacek 8y agoPeople have been predicting that since before Adam Langley wrote "Why Not Dane In Browsers", and making excuses about the keys that are there. Nobody denies that a 1024 bit RSA key is less bad than an MD5 certificate; it's still quite bad, and, personally, I'd argue, the worst kind of bad --- the kind of flaw that motivates large capital and operational expenditures at intelligence agencies.
- belorn 8y agoAre you saying that with the right amount of budget a 1024 RSA key can be broken today?
- tptacek 8y agoYes, of course I am. I'd be repeating something Eran Tromer said 10 years ago.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- teddyh 8y agoEven if every key below the root were 1024 bits, why would this be an argument against the concept of DNSSEC in general? DNSSEC keys can, by design, be rolled and replaced, and people will replace them as soon as they feel it is reasonably safe to do so. The perfect is the enemy of the good. What is the intended result of advocating for choosing not to adopt DNSSEC? Is this intended result actually likely, or is it more like a boycott for the principle of the thing?
- tptacek 8y agoI don't think I can answer this any more effectively than I did in "Against DNSSEC", linked upthread. I'll just point out that the bad is also the enemy of the good.