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> BUT, how we verify people and distribute private keys without again trusting a middleman? In the case of a national election it's of course okay to trust tha

by lawn 8y ago

> BUT, how we verify people and distribute private keys without again trusting a middleman? In the case of a national election it's of course okay to trust that the government distributes the keys. As I said in Sweden we have BankID. With it you log in to all banks, do your taxes, doctors appointments and journals, etc. These are given out at banks and service points which require your ID and send to your address (the exact same security checks as when you're voting). They can be withdrawn and renewed as needed. We distribute the votes so 1 vote = 1 BankID vote. It's also technically possible to allow users to change their vote if done before the deadline. All this can happen on any blockchain for example the very secure Bitcoin chain. > What if I lose my private key? You renew your BankID and you can change your vote. > What if somebody starts paying people for their private keys? What if somebody starts paying people to vote for them? Same problem. > What happens if a user claims the vote they cast isn’t what the public ledger shows their public key/address as having voted for? That it's even possible is an improvement over what we have today. Now I just don't know if my vote was counted incorrectly either by a tired worker or a corrupt one(s). > What does the blockchain really provide in these kinds of imagined uses? All votes can be counted publicly by anyone. There's no possibility for more votes than registered residents for example. There's no delay. A lot of money is spent on setting up voting booths, collecting votes and counting them. This is much cheaper. We also don't throw away so much paper. > assuming a 51% attack isn’t affordable enough for some party wanting to sway the election Firstly a 51% attack would be easily detectable. Secondly the only thing you can do is prevent people from voting. You cannot vote for them. Thirdly all votes cast on the orphaned blocks can still be detected.

mckmk 8y ago
>We distribute the votes so 1 vote = 1 BankID vote. It's also technically possible to allow users to change their vote if done before the deadline. You're describing a system where the government has a list of IDs and associated Private Keys and therefore knows who everyone votes for. That IS NOT OK.
- lawn 8y ago
  There are ways to anonymize transactions. For example Monero's ring signatures and stealth addresses or ZCash's shielded transactions. Also it's not that the government has their private keys. The government basically sends a token to an address the voter controls. So they cannot steal their votes and they cannot see where their transactions went. So this is solvable.
  - mckmk 8y ago
    > So this is solvable. I'm not so confident. The Monero output from those transactions is actually only knowable to the intended recipient so I don't really know how this would work best. Would there be a pre-determined address that we're all sending our vote transactions to? Would that key be public so it could be audited by everyone? It seems like in this scenario systematic abuse by the government would be trivial. Just grant a few % extra tokens to address you control and sign the transactions to vote your way and the'd be no auditability, no knowing which votes came from where. In many elections the polling is good enough and the margin narrow enough that it would be extremely easy to do and not look suspicious.
    - lawn 8y ago
      For example we could have a single address and you vote by tagging your transaction in some way or several addresses which each correspond to one answer. These should all be public. The initial seeding should also be public so the total amount of votes could be audited as well. It's possible to set it up so you can't ever create any new votes after the initial seed (this is possible in all current token schemes for example). > Just grant a few % extra tokens to address you control and sign the transactions to vote your way and the'd be no auditability, no knowing which votes came from where. In many elections the polling is good enough and the margin narrow enough that it would be extremely easy to do and not look suspicious. This is a big problem with paper voting actually. At least with the blockchain based voting you cannot create extra votes out of thin air. With paper voting you might be able to say "the faulty votes came from this district". You could accomplish the same by setting up separate blockchain votes for each district and then just adding them together to form the final vote to get the same property.
tim333 8y ago
>What if somebody starts paying people to vote for them? Same problem. Not really - paying someone to vote with the usual paper system doesn't work because you can't verify that they've voted the way you paid them to.
- vinni2 8y ago
  >you can’t verify that they’ve voted the way you paid them to. Not if the voter opts in for the vote by mail.

by lawn 8y ago

mckmk 8y ago

>We distribute the votes so 1 vote = 1 BankID vote. It's also technically possible to allow users to change their vote if done before the deadline. You're describing a system where the government has a list of IDs and associated Private Keys and therefore knows who everyone votes for. That IS NOT OK.

lawn 8y ago
There are ways to anonymize transactions. For example Monero's ring signatures and stealth addresses or ZCash's shielded transactions. Also it's not that the government has their private keys. The government basically sends a token to an address the voter controls. So they cannot steal their votes and they cannot see where their transactions went. So this is solvable.
- mckmk 8y ago
  > So this is solvable. I'm not so confident. The Monero output from those transactions is actually only knowable to the intended recipient so I don't really know how this would work best. Would there be a pre-determined address that we're all sending our vote transactions to? Would that key be public so it could be audited by everyone? It seems like in this scenario systematic abuse by the government would be trivial. Just grant a few % extra tokens to address you control and sign the transactions to vote your way and the'd be no auditability, no knowing which votes came from where. In many elections the polling is good enough and the margin narrow enough that it would be extremely easy to do and not look suspicious.
  - lawn 8y ago
    For example we could have a single address and you vote by tagging your transaction in some way or several addresses which each correspond to one answer. These should all be public. The initial seeding should also be public so the total amount of votes could be audited as well. It's possible to set it up so you can't ever create any new votes after the initial seed (this is possible in all current token schemes for example). > Just grant a few % extra tokens to address you control and sign the transactions to vote your way and the'd be no auditability, no knowing which votes came from where. In many elections the polling is good enough and the margin narrow enough that it would be extremely easy to do and not look suspicious. This is a big problem with paper voting actually. At least with the blockchain based voting you cannot create extra votes out of thin air. With paper voting you might be able to say "the faulty votes came from this district". You could accomplish the same by setting up separate blockchain votes for each district and then just adding them together to form the final vote to get the same property.

tim333 8y ago

>What if somebody starts paying people to vote for them? Same problem. Not really - paying someone to vote with the usual paper system doesn't work because you can't verify that they've voted the way you paid them to.

vinni2 8y ago
>you can’t verify that they’ve voted the way you paid them to. Not if the voter opts in for the vote by mail.